MGLE01: SAUDI AMBASSADOR SEES NASRALLAH (WHO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001072 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/WERNER E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2026 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PTER LE SY SA SUBJECT: MGLE01: SAUDI AMBASSADOR SEES NASRALLAH (WHO BACKS AOUN),MUSES ON REPLACING SINIORA WITH MIKATI Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) In a 4/5 meeting with the Ambassador, Saudi Ambassador Abdulaziz Khoja reported on his two-hour meeting the previous evening with Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. Nasrallah, Khoja said, reported that Hizballah would back Michel Aoun for Lebanon's presidency and would oppose Nassib Lahoud or any other March 14 candidate to replace Emile Lahoud. Previously, Khoja said, Nasrallah had remain neutral on Aoun; this shift, in Khoja's view, probably stems from Syrian instruction. Nasrallah also told Khoja that Syria would never agree to any positive initiatives with PM Fouad Siniora, MP Saad Hariri, or any of their associates. Predicting a dangerous deadlock in Lebanon, Khoja -- claiming to be "thinking outloud" and without instructions from Riyadh -- asked whether it might time to encourage the replacement of Siniora with previous PM Najib Mikati, in order to build a constructive Syrian-Lebanese relationship. The Ambassador said he saw no logical reason why the March 14 parliamentary majority would commit political suicide by returning the premiership to someone who claimed long-term friendship to Bashar al-Asad. The focus should be on the problem -- Syria -- and not on producing a new Lebanese premier at Syria's behest. Khoja also reported that he pressed Nasrallah on threatening language he used publicly the previous week. Insisting he was ready to have Hizballah's arms the subject of Lebanese dialogue, Nasrallah admitted that he had made a mistake in referring to violence to prevent disarmament by force. End summary. NASRALLAH BACKS AOUN FOR PRESIDENCY; SAUDI SUSPECTS SYRIAN INSTRUCTIONS -------------- ¶2. (S) The Ambassador met Khoja in the Saudi Embassy on 4/5. Based on a two-hour meeting he had with Nasrallah the previous evening, Khoja said that he had perceived some changes and hardening in Hizballah's positions. Most dramatically, Khoja said, Nasrallah said that, when presidential elections occur, Hizballah will back Aoun. (Khoja first said that Hizballah would "fight for Aoun." When the Ambassador asked if Nasrallah was implying physical or street action, Khoja said no.) Previously, in his talks with Khoja, Nasrallah had remained coy on Aoun, saying that, while Aoun was a strong candidate, Hizballah needed to study the issue. Given that Nasrallah "doesn't like Aoun" and previously hinted that he did not trust him, Khoja interpreted Hizballah's support for Aoun as deriving from new orders from Syria. ¶3. (S) Khoja said that he asked Nasrallah about other potential presidential candidates. Nasrallah admitted to Khoja that Nassib Lahoud was perhaps the best, in terms of competence, honesty, and international profile. Khoja agreed. But Nassib, Nasrallah said, has no relationship with Lebanon's Shia. Moreover, Nassib's long-term vision for Lebanon is at odds with Hizballah's. Nasrallah has no confidence that the Shia would be protected under Nassib. Nasrallah told Khoja that Hizballah also would try to block a Nassib Lahoud presidency out of deference to Aoun, who despises Nassib Lahoud more than any other candidate. While noting that they had discussed only Nassib at length, Khoja said that he perceived a "completely closed door" from Nasrallah in terms of any of the March 14 presidential candidates. Khoja said that he could not predict whether Hizballah would take to the streets to try to prevent the ascendency of Nassib or any other March 14 candidate, but he acknowledged that was a possibility. SYRIANS OUT TO WEAKEN, HUMILIATE SINIORA; MAYBE IT'S TIME TO LOOK BEYOND SINIORA -------------- ¶4. (S) When asked why he seemed to backtrack a bit in the national dialogue, Nasrallah told Khoja that, no matter what the ongoing national dialogue participants asked, Syria would never react positively to anything linked to Siniora. Syria will not do anything that responds constructively to the initiatives and requests from Siniora, even those backed by the national dialogue. The Syrians, Khoja quoted Nasrallah as saying, hate Siniora and want him destroyed politically. Any opening to him might strengthen him, so they simply will not deal with him. If Siniora keeps insisting on going to Damascus, he will either get low-level meetings and BEIRUT 00001072 002 OF 003 cold-shoulder treatment rsulting in humiliation, or Bashar al-Asad will invite President Emile Lahoud to come instead, in a revival of the Syrian-Lebanese Higher Committee. Siniora will be put in his place as an insignificant subordinate to Emile Lahoud. The Syrian hatred extends to MP Saad Hariri and to all of the March 14 associates of Siniora and Hariri. ¶5. (S) Given this Syrian refusal to deal with Siniora, Khoja said that Saudi Arabia was deeply worried about the deteriorating relationship between Syria and Lebanon and the continued deadlock inside Lebanon. Based on his meeting with Nasrallah, Khoja concluded that the situation will never improve as long as Siniora remains PM, since Syria will look to actively undermine him, perhaps even with Hizballah's assistance. Maybe, Khoja said, it is time to suggest to the Lebanese that the cabinet resign and Siniora be replaced, in order to permit political breakthroughs between Lebanon and Syria and inside Lebanon. TO SATISFY SYRIA'S CONCERNS, KHOJA MUSES ON BRINGING BACK MIKATI -------------- ¶6. (S) Emphasizing that he was thinking outloud and without instructions, Khoja asked what the Ambassador thought about a renewed Najib Mikati premiership, given that the Syrians might deliver to Mikati the type of positive relations that they deny to Siniora. After all, Khoja pointed out, Mikati had done a good job during his April-July 2005 premiership, overseeing parliamentary elections on time and ruling moderately. Mikati is well placed to bridge the current, sharp political divides in Lebanon. He is not as blindly pro-Syrian as he detractors allege. ¶7. (S) The Ambassador expressed astonishment and asked whether Khoja had mentioned the idea to Nasrallah or Nasrallah to him. "We discussed the idea," Khoja said, claiming that they were simply brainstorming about how to get Lebanon out of the current crisis; "what do you think?" The Ambassador said that Khoja was looking to fix the wrong problem. It was not Siniora who was preventing improvmeent in Syrian-Lebanese relations; instead, the Syrians refused to deal seriously with Lebanon's PM and the requests forwarded by him as a result of the national dialogue. The focus should be on getting Syria to respond constructively and positively, not on replacing Siniora. In the spirit of UNSCR 1559, Syria should not be able to dictate who is and who isn't an acceptable prime minister in Lebanon. ¶7. (S) In a lengthy debate, Khoja said that he agreed Syria was the problem. But hej argued that the only way to accomplish the goal of a positive Syrian response was jettisoning Lebanon's PM in favor of someone with whom the Syrians could work. Mikati would be in office at the pleasure of the Hariri bloc, so he could not govern entirely according to Syrian wishes. The Ambassador said that he could not see any possible motivation for the March 14 MPs to back a Mikati premiership, especially if they knew that Syria would deliver to Mikati. In essence, the Syrians would show that March 14 cannot produce results but friends of Syria can. Backing Mikati in the knowledge he will be bestowed with political gifts from Syria would be akin to political suicide, the Ambassador said. Mindful of the long-term competition to be Lebanon's preeminent Sunni leader, Saad Hariri would not want another Sunni, not from the Hariri bloc, to have success where his own appointee failed. ¶8. (S) Moreover, while Mikati is a far more sophisticated and western-oriented politician than other pro-Syrians in Lebanon, and despite the reported current scratchiness between the Mikati and Asad families, Mikati would be seen as governing Lebanon in Syria's interest. Once in office, he could work with Emile Lahoud and Parliament Speaker Berri to reverse many of the anti-Syrian gains of the past year and to restore his own relationship with Bashar. All three of Lebanon's top positions would be in the hands of people aligned with March 8 pro-Syrian forces. Mikati, working with Michel Aoun and Emile Lahoud, could help push Lebanon toward early parliamentary elections in hopes of destroying the March 14 parliamentary majority once and for all. While agreeing with Khoja that Mikati had done a good job during his 2005 premiership, the Ambassador thought that now was not the time to contemplate his return. Mikati has proven an able premier who may have a future term, but not now. Khoja asked, "what other choice do we have?" The Ambassador suggested keeping the focus on where the problem is, with the BEIRUT 00001072 003 OF 003 Syrians. NASRALLAH BACKS AWAY FROM VERBAL THREATS -------------- ¶9. (S) Khoja noted that he had also criticized Nasrallah for the statements he made at a Beirut "resistance" conference last week, in which Nasrallah was televised threatening to cut off the hands and end the lives of those trying to disarm Hizballah by force. Such words, Khoja reported telling Nasrallah, are completely contrary to the spirit of the national dialogue. Khoja said that Nasrallah admitted to making a mistake in using such words. Realizing what he had done, Nasrallah professed shock when he saw himself saying such words on the television news broadcasts. He emphasized to Khoja that Hizballah was fully committed to discussing the issues of its arms at the national dialogue. Khoja shook his head when the Ambassador said that he thought Nasrallah's words were perhaps a reflection of his real attitude. COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (S) It strikes us that our Saudi colleague got his analysis right -- that the Syrians will continue to avoid any kind of positive response to Siniora -- but the proposed solution all wrong. Replacing Siniora with the traditionally pro-Syrian Mikati (who, admittedly, did a good job last year as PM) would be the equivalent of a reward to Syria for bad behavior. Obsessed with trying to reverse the deterioration in Syrian-Lebanese relations, Khoja appears ready to abandon a prime minister closely connected to Saudi Arabia (and whose patron, Saad Hariri, carries a Saudi passport) in favor of one close to Damascus. We hope that Khoja, at pains to stress that he was "thinking aloud," was truly just brainstorming and not giving indication of the thinking of Saudi Arabia. But it is significant that he discussed the idea with Hassan Nasrallah, who we suspect put the hot air into this trial balloon to begin with. FELTMAN