Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIRUT1024
2006-03-31 15:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:
MGLE01: LEBANON'S RELIGIOUS LEADERS NOT
VZCZCXRO9024 OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS DE RUEHLB #1024/01 0901549 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 311549Z MAR 06 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2856 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001024
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2016
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: LEBANON'S RELIGIOUS LEADERS NOT
OPTIMISTIC ABOUT POLITICAL PROGRESS
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).
SUMMARY
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001024
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2016
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: LEBANON'S RELIGIOUS LEADERS NOT
OPTIMISTIC ABOUT POLITICAL PROGRESS
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, head of the Maronite
church, and Patriarch Catholicos Aram I, head of Lebanon's
Armenian Orthodox community, both expressed doubt that the
current political deadlock between the March 14 forces and
the informal coalition of Hizballah, Amal, and Michel Aoun's
Free Patriotic Movement could be resolved. Sfeir, in
particular, was dismayed by the new rupture between the
antagonists that took place at the Arab Summit on March 29
and spilled over into yesterday's Cabinet session, which
dissolved into a shouting match between embattled President
Lahoud and March 14 stalwarts Marwan Hamadeh and Ahmad
Fatfat. In discussing the presidential situation, Sfeir
remarked the most qualified non-Aoun candidates would be
Nassib Lahoud, Boutros Harb, and somewhat surprisingly, Nayla
Mouawad. He said that Aoun, despite his front-runner status
in the Christian community, would not be able to represent
all of Lebanon (i.e. Saad Hariri's Future Movement and Walid
Jumblatt's Druse community). Patriarch Aram likewise deeply
regretted the incident in Khartoum, saying it effectively
marked the end of the national dialogue, a process which had
already begun to sputter. End summary.
2. (U) The head of the Maronite church in Lebanon,
Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, met with the Ambassador
and POLOFF on March 31 in Bkirki, north of Beirut. Sfeir had
just returned to Beirut from Rome and, as usual, had been
meeting with numerous political figures, the most recent
being Michel Aoun on March 30. The Ambassador met with the
Armenian patriarch on March 30 in Antelias.
3. (C) Patriarch Sfeir was gratified the US and the rest of
the international community were continuing their strong
support of Lebanon's nascent democracy, as evidenced by the
unanimous passage of UNSCR 1664 and recent statements by
President Bush. Sfeir said it was more important than ever
that Lebanon have the support of its friends as the country
struggled with political stalemate.
A DISCOURAGING WEEK
--------------
4. (C) The understated Sfeir characterized the past week as
"most discouraging" with a rapid cascade of unfavorable
developments: Lahoud/Siniora's public argument in Khartoum,
the harsh criticism of Siniora (and implicitly, Saad Hariri)
by Speaker Berri in Parliament, a press conference by
Hizballah's Hassan Nasrallah and Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal
featuring fiery rhetoric not heard in months, and finally,
the political tumult of last night's Cabinet session.
5. (C) He agreed with the Ambassador that with the country
now roughly split between two camps, political progress would
be very difficult, as it would require patience and goodwill
-- not presently in evidence. Sfeir observed that while all
sides seem to be avoiding actions that could lead to actual
violence, the past few days has seen the gulf widen between
the adversaries.
AOUN'S MYSTIFYING OPTIMISM
--------------
6. (C) Remarkably enough, Sfeir said that in his meeting
the previous evening, FPM leader Michel Aoun had seemed
"optimistic" about his chances to ascend to the presidency.
Sfeir said the former general implied that the improved
security situation (last act of political violence: December
12 assassination of Gibran Tueni) was due principally to his
ability to work with Hizballah, as demonstrated by their
February 6 communique. According to Sfeir, Aoun seems to be
amazingly confident that his dalliance with Nasrallah will be
perceived by Lebanon's citizenry as a noble act worthy of
reward.
7. (C) Shaking his head in bemusement, Sfeir continued that
although Aoun may rightfully claim leadership of the
Christian community ("...as he is always telling me..."),his
selection as president would be divisive and ill-advised. Of
course, he acknowledged, the institution of the presidency
was allotted to the Christian community, but Lebanon's
president must also be able to reach across all sectarian
lines, and this the patriarch said, Aoun cannot do --
concluding that Lebanon under Aoun would be "ungovernable."
BEIRUT 00001024 002 OF 002
8. (C) Bluntly describing the overall behavior of Lebanon's
politicians as "deplorable," the patriarch stated it would be
extremely difficult to change the president, particularly
after the recent heated exchanges. Sfeir acknowledged he was
aware of a recent suggestion that perhaps the pro-reform
coalition could "float" candidates to reassure the Christian
community that March 14 (i.e. Saad Hariri) didn't want to
steamroll the process. He indicated the idea had some merit
and ticked off the individuals he believed had the best
qualifications: Nassib Lahoud, Boutros Harb, and Nayla
Mouawad. He admitted that Mouawad's candidacy would be
breaking the mold, but noted that even Muslim counties had
elected women as chiefs of state, and perhaps it was time for
Lebanon. (Whispering to the Ambassador later as the
Ambassador got up to leave, Sfeir clarified that his personal
favorite was Nassib Lahoud.)
9. (C) Concerning Lahoud, the patriarch plainly said the
isolated president served at the pleasure of the Syrian
regime, and if he resigned without their permission, he would
be under "serious threat." Sfeir also bemoaned the
"humiliation" of the institution and expressed fear that the
presidency would suffer irreparable damage if the current
status continued. He argued that as the only non-Muslim head
of state in the Arab world, special care should be taken to
preserve it as an important symbol of pluralism and
liberalism.
10. (C) Sfeir also commented on other ideas being put forth
by various factions. He said the idea of new parliamentary
elections was fraught with risk because it would subject
Lebanon's electorate with yet another change in government.
He remarked there was also the question of the proposed new
electoral law, which was also in danger of stalemate due to
political differences. Another idea, which apparently came
from Aoun, was a proposal to change the country's
constitution to permit direct election of the president.
This, the patriarch felt, may be acceptable in more stable
times, but in the current situation may produce as much
instability as snap parliamentary elections.
11. (C) In Sfeir's opinion, the most reasonable solution
would be to allow the constitution to work: propose 3-4 well
qualified candidates and follow established parliamentary
procedures. This, he concluded, was the only way to produce
a legitimate president who could represent all the country's
sectarian communities.
ANOTHER VOICE OF REASON
--------------
12. (C) Armenian Patriarch Aram was similarly distressed by
the escalating war of words between March 14 and March 8
(plus Aoun) forces. He contended the national dialogue,
though well intended, could not truly address the two most
important issues: the presidency and Hizballah's arms. Aram
maintained that despite Hassan Nasrallah's confident
demeanor, the Hizballah leader could actually do nothing
without the permission of his sponsors in Tehran. Tehran, he
argued, may not really care whether Lahoud stays or goes, but
under current international circumstances, the Iranian regime
would never permit the loss of an armed proxy so close to its
chief nemesis, Israel. As a result, the Armenian patriarch
believed there could be some movement regarding the Lebanese
presidency, but none at all concerning Hizballah's militia.
13. (C) In the Armenian patriarch's opinion, Lebanon and
the West had to be most concerned with the growing power and
reach of Iran -- in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, and
Iraq. Shia Iran's ambitions, and the concurrent growth of
Sunni fundamentalism, he remarked, would confront democratic
nations for an extended time to come and require steadfast
positions and cooperation among those countries seeking
freedom.
FELTMAN
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2016
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: LEBANON'S RELIGIOUS LEADERS NOT
OPTIMISTIC ABOUT POLITICAL PROGRESS
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, head of the Maronite
church, and Patriarch Catholicos Aram I, head of Lebanon's
Armenian Orthodox community, both expressed doubt that the
current political deadlock between the March 14 forces and
the informal coalition of Hizballah, Amal, and Michel Aoun's
Free Patriotic Movement could be resolved. Sfeir, in
particular, was dismayed by the new rupture between the
antagonists that took place at the Arab Summit on March 29
and spilled over into yesterday's Cabinet session, which
dissolved into a shouting match between embattled President
Lahoud and March 14 stalwarts Marwan Hamadeh and Ahmad
Fatfat. In discussing the presidential situation, Sfeir
remarked the most qualified non-Aoun candidates would be
Nassib Lahoud, Boutros Harb, and somewhat surprisingly, Nayla
Mouawad. He said that Aoun, despite his front-runner status
in the Christian community, would not be able to represent
all of Lebanon (i.e. Saad Hariri's Future Movement and Walid
Jumblatt's Druse community). Patriarch Aram likewise deeply
regretted the incident in Khartoum, saying it effectively
marked the end of the national dialogue, a process which had
already begun to sputter. End summary.
2. (U) The head of the Maronite church in Lebanon,
Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, met with the Ambassador
and POLOFF on March 31 in Bkirki, north of Beirut. Sfeir had
just returned to Beirut from Rome and, as usual, had been
meeting with numerous political figures, the most recent
being Michel Aoun on March 30. The Ambassador met with the
Armenian patriarch on March 30 in Antelias.
3. (C) Patriarch Sfeir was gratified the US and the rest of
the international community were continuing their strong
support of Lebanon's nascent democracy, as evidenced by the
unanimous passage of UNSCR 1664 and recent statements by
President Bush. Sfeir said it was more important than ever
that Lebanon have the support of its friends as the country
struggled with political stalemate.
A DISCOURAGING WEEK
--------------
4. (C) The understated Sfeir characterized the past week as
"most discouraging" with a rapid cascade of unfavorable
developments: Lahoud/Siniora's public argument in Khartoum,
the harsh criticism of Siniora (and implicitly, Saad Hariri)
by Speaker Berri in Parliament, a press conference by
Hizballah's Hassan Nasrallah and Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal
featuring fiery rhetoric not heard in months, and finally,
the political tumult of last night's Cabinet session.
5. (C) He agreed with the Ambassador that with the country
now roughly split between two camps, political progress would
be very difficult, as it would require patience and goodwill
-- not presently in evidence. Sfeir observed that while all
sides seem to be avoiding actions that could lead to actual
violence, the past few days has seen the gulf widen between
the adversaries.
AOUN'S MYSTIFYING OPTIMISM
--------------
6. (C) Remarkably enough, Sfeir said that in his meeting
the previous evening, FPM leader Michel Aoun had seemed
"optimistic" about his chances to ascend to the presidency.
Sfeir said the former general implied that the improved
security situation (last act of political violence: December
12 assassination of Gibran Tueni) was due principally to his
ability to work with Hizballah, as demonstrated by their
February 6 communique. According to Sfeir, Aoun seems to be
amazingly confident that his dalliance with Nasrallah will be
perceived by Lebanon's citizenry as a noble act worthy of
reward.
7. (C) Shaking his head in bemusement, Sfeir continued that
although Aoun may rightfully claim leadership of the
Christian community ("...as he is always telling me..."),his
selection as president would be divisive and ill-advised. Of
course, he acknowledged, the institution of the presidency
was allotted to the Christian community, but Lebanon's
president must also be able to reach across all sectarian
lines, and this the patriarch said, Aoun cannot do --
concluding that Lebanon under Aoun would be "ungovernable."
BEIRUT 00001024 002 OF 002
8. (C) Bluntly describing the overall behavior of Lebanon's
politicians as "deplorable," the patriarch stated it would be
extremely difficult to change the president, particularly
after the recent heated exchanges. Sfeir acknowledged he was
aware of a recent suggestion that perhaps the pro-reform
coalition could "float" candidates to reassure the Christian
community that March 14 (i.e. Saad Hariri) didn't want to
steamroll the process. He indicated the idea had some merit
and ticked off the individuals he believed had the best
qualifications: Nassib Lahoud, Boutros Harb, and Nayla
Mouawad. He admitted that Mouawad's candidacy would be
breaking the mold, but noted that even Muslim counties had
elected women as chiefs of state, and perhaps it was time for
Lebanon. (Whispering to the Ambassador later as the
Ambassador got up to leave, Sfeir clarified that his personal
favorite was Nassib Lahoud.)
9. (C) Concerning Lahoud, the patriarch plainly said the
isolated president served at the pleasure of the Syrian
regime, and if he resigned without their permission, he would
be under "serious threat." Sfeir also bemoaned the
"humiliation" of the institution and expressed fear that the
presidency would suffer irreparable damage if the current
status continued. He argued that as the only non-Muslim head
of state in the Arab world, special care should be taken to
preserve it as an important symbol of pluralism and
liberalism.
10. (C) Sfeir also commented on other ideas being put forth
by various factions. He said the idea of new parliamentary
elections was fraught with risk because it would subject
Lebanon's electorate with yet another change in government.
He remarked there was also the question of the proposed new
electoral law, which was also in danger of stalemate due to
political differences. Another idea, which apparently came
from Aoun, was a proposal to change the country's
constitution to permit direct election of the president.
This, the patriarch felt, may be acceptable in more stable
times, but in the current situation may produce as much
instability as snap parliamentary elections.
11. (C) In Sfeir's opinion, the most reasonable solution
would be to allow the constitution to work: propose 3-4 well
qualified candidates and follow established parliamentary
procedures. This, he concluded, was the only way to produce
a legitimate president who could represent all the country's
sectarian communities.
ANOTHER VOICE OF REASON
--------------
12. (C) Armenian Patriarch Aram was similarly distressed by
the escalating war of words between March 14 and March 8
(plus Aoun) forces. He contended the national dialogue,
though well intended, could not truly address the two most
important issues: the presidency and Hizballah's arms. Aram
maintained that despite Hassan Nasrallah's confident
demeanor, the Hizballah leader could actually do nothing
without the permission of his sponsors in Tehran. Tehran, he
argued, may not really care whether Lahoud stays or goes, but
under current international circumstances, the Iranian regime
would never permit the loss of an armed proxy so close to its
chief nemesis, Israel. As a result, the Armenian patriarch
believed there could be some movement regarding the Lebanese
presidency, but none at all concerning Hizballah's militia.
13. (C) In the Armenian patriarch's opinion, Lebanon and
the West had to be most concerned with the growing power and
reach of Iran -- in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, and
Iraq. Shia Iran's ambitions, and the concurrent growth of
Sunni fundamentalism, he remarked, would confront democratic
nations for an extended time to come and require steadfast
positions and cooperation among those countries seeking
freedom.
FELTMAN