SCO: MFA, SCO SECRETARIAT AND RUSSIAN EMBASSY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 009673 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2016 TAGS: PREL MARR RS CH KZ TI UZ SUBJECT: SCO: MFA, SCO SECRETARIAT AND RUSSIAN EMBASSY DISCUSS UPCOMING SUMMIT, IRANIAN PRESIDENT'S PARTICIPATION AND DOWNPLAY EXPANSION REF: A. SECSTATE 72746 BEIJING 8117 BEIJING 9506 ¶B. BEIJING 8927 Classified By: Political External Unit Chief Edgard Kagan. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Senior Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) official Du Wei, who serves as Assistant to SCO Secretary General Zhang Deguang, expressed understanding of U.S. concerns regarding the possibility of statements critical of the U.S. presence in Central Asia being issued at the June SCO Summit and said he would convey our views to the group's members. Russia's Permanent Representative to the SCO Secretariat stated that the declaration will not address the issue of coalition forces in Central Asia. According to an MFA official handling SCO affairs, Beijing recognizes U.S. apprehension and does not wish to see any "unpleasant stance or situation" at the June Summit that does not serve the interests of U.S.-China relations. Our contacts highlighted that statements made by individual observer country representatives do not represent the official SCO or Chinese position. The Iran nuclear issue will not be "specifically or formally" raised during the Summit, Du asserted. There is no plan for the joint Declaration to address the Iran or Coalition force issue, but the document will outline members' views on certain international situations. In preparation for the Summit, the May 15 Foreign Ministers' Meeting approved draft documents on SCO election observers, cooperation between SCO member and observer states and coordination between Afghanistan and the various SCO institutions for the heads- of-state to endorse at the Summit, the MFA reported. While the SCO will not become a "security haven" for member countries, security cooperation is fundamental for further development. End Summary. Declaration Not Likely to Include Coalition Forces -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Assistant to Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Secretary General Zhang Deguang, Du Wei, thanked poloff for SIPDIS his May 18 delivery of Ref A points on the June SCO Summit and expressed understanding of U.S. concerns. While poloff explained that the United States is delivering the same message separately to all SCO members, Du stated that the Secretariat has the responsibility to pass the information SIPDIS along to member nations, pending Secretary General Zhang's approval. ¶3. (C) Deputy Director of the MFA Department of European and Central Asian Affairs Fifth (SCO) Division Wang Wenli (Ref B),in a separate meeting on May 19, noted that she was aware of the concerns recently conveyed by high-level U.S. officials to the MFA (Ref C),as well as discussed by Presidents Bush and Hu, over the July 2005 Astana Declaration's call for a deadline for U.S. troop withdrawal from Central Asia. Wang said that following the Astana Summit, China stressed on several occasions its respect for other SCO members' requests and decisions, which were the main factors behind the statement's inclusion in the Astana Declaration. The PRC understands that the United States does not wish to see similar language issued during the Shanghai Summit in June, she remarked, adding that the two countries share the interests of regional peace, stability and prosperity. Wang maintained that the member states have not discussed incorporating language on the Iran nuclear issue or the presence of Coalition forces in the region in the joint Declaration to be issued in Shanghai. Beijing does not want such issues to be included in the Declaration or see any "unpleasant stance or situation" at the June Summit that does not serve the interests of U.S.- China relations. ¶4. (C) In a separate May 18 meeting, Russian Federation Permanent Representative to the SCO Secretariat Gregory BEIJING 00009673 002 OF 004 Logvinov told the A/DCM that the SCO Summit Declaration would not address Coalition forces in Central Asia. He said that the SCO's current position is that the issue should be handled bilaterally. Iranian President Will Attend -------------- ¶5. (C) Du said that he had "heard" that Iranian President Ahmadinejad will attend the Summit, and the MFA subsequently confirmed Iran's acceptance of the invitation. Wang noted that Ahmadinejad has begun to arrange bilateral meetings during the Summit and that China and Iran are also discussing a possible bilateral event. Du asserted that all observer nations have the right to attend most SCO events. President Ahmadinejad attended and spoke at last September's UN High-Level Event, and neither the U.S. Government nor UN Secretary-General Annan would have denied him these rights. Iran's Statements not Representative of SCO or China -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Du and Wang stressed, however, using almost identical language, that statements by individual observer country officials do not represent the official SCO position. Wang added that they also do not represent the PRC position. The SCO does not want any statement issued at the Summit to run contrary to the principles and spirit of the SCO, Du remarked. He said he did not expect sensitive issues involving its observers, such as India- Pakistan tensions or the Iran nuclear issue, to negatively affect the SCO's operation. The SCO offers observer nations a favorable environment for resolving their internal problems and preventing an "escalation of disagreements." Du also highlighted that they are not full members and therefore exert limited influence on the organization. ¶7. (C) Wang exhibited a greater degree of anxiety over the possibility that President Ahmadinejad might make certain contentious statements at the Summit and that the media would play up these remarks. The MFA does not have the authority or leverage to persuade him to soften his rhetoric. She maintained, nonetheless, that the Iranian President will not have the opportunity to manipulate the SCO into adopting a common stance in support of Tehran's position on the nuclear issue. As an observer, Iran is only invited to the general session, not the closed-door heads of states' or working-level meetings reserved for members. President Ahmadinejad will not be permitted to sign the Declaration or other agreements, she noted. ¶8. (C) Logvinov stated that Beijing is very anxious about Ahmadinejad's involvement in the Summit and predicted that future developments in the Iran nuclear crisis could preclude Ahamdinejad's participation (Ref C). Iran Issue Will Not Be "Formally" Addressed -------------- ¶9. (C) Asked whether the SCO would adopt a position on Iran's nuclear program at the Summit, Du stated that the Iran nuclear issue has not been "formally" adopted into the Summit agenda and will not be "specifically or formally" addressed during the event. Remarking that he had not seen a finalized version of the agenda, Du reported that the joint Declaration will summarize and evaluate the SCO's progress over the past five years, analyze the current state of SCO cooperation in various fields and outline goals for the next five years of development. The document will also touch on member states' views toward certain international and regional issues. Based on the procedures and discussions among SCO members, there is no current plan to raise the Iran nuclear issue at the Summit, Wang confirmed. She remarked, however, that given SCO countries' concern over the issue, an escalation in the situation could force the SCO to adopt a common position in BEIJING 00009673 003.2 OF 004 the future. ¶10. (C) Logvinov commented that the SCO "does not support" Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons, pointing out that as an observer Iran is obligated to uphold the principle of nonproliferation. He also said that Iran is expected to uphold the principle of mutual respect for all nations, cultures and civilizations. The SCO Will Not Serve as a "Security Haven" -------------- ¶11. (C) While some member states hope the SCO will focus more on security, Wang asserted that the SCO will not become a military alliance or an organization that provides a "security haven" for its members. Remarking that the SCO must expand into a wide range of fields, she stated that security cooperation is nonetheless the foundation for further development in Central Asia, particularly through combating the "Three Forces" of terrorism, extremism and separatism, as well as drug trafficking. Central Asian countries also want to see China and Russia play a greater role in their development through increased economic and trade cooperation. Wang stated that at the June Summit China will announce some large-scale bilateral assistance projects funded with the USD 900 million in preferential credit loans pledged by Beijing last year. No New Membership, New Observers Unlikely -------------- ¶12. (C) Responding to poloff's question about a possible announcement of new members during the Summit, Du noted that he is frequently asked about plans for SCO expansion. Echoing previous MFA statements (Ref B),he highlighted that the SCO lacks the legal foundation for and a common stance on absorbing news members. The topic will not be "officially" included in the Summit agenda. Du acknowledged that there is strong interest among current observers to obtain full membership and remarked that observers are theoretically "one step closer" to becoming full members. Noting that the four current observers all border SCO member states, he asserted that geographic proximity is a necessary precondition for potential new members. Du expressed doubt that new observers will be admitted in the near future, remarking that the organization still requires some time to "digest" its current observers. The SCO is now formulating an agreement that will standardize the relationships between member and observer nations. Logvinov said that it is "impossible" to expand the SCO at present and noted that drafting the legal procedures for expansion has been "hell work." Logvinov claims that despite pressure to expand, the SCO will not address this issue at the Summit. Other Summit Participants -------------- ¶13. (C) In addition to the six member and four observer countries, representatives from Afghanistan, ASEAN, CIS and possibly the UN, in which the SCO possesses observer status, will attend the June Summit, Du stated. Wang reported that Pakistani President Musharraf, CIS Executive Secretary Rushailo and an unspecified ASEAN Deputy SIPDIS Secretary General have already responded positively to the SIPDIS SCO's invitations. China is still discussing participation with Mongolia and India. Foreign Ministers' Meeting: Focused on Internal Regulations -------------- -------------- ¶14. (C) Wang stated that the May 15 SCO Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Shanghai focused on preparations for the June Summit, although the agenda and schedule will be finalized at a vice foreign minister-level meeting a few days prior to the Summit. The May 15 Foreign Ministers' Meeting approved several draft documents for the heads-of-states to endorse at the Summit, the first of which standardized the BEIJING 00009673 004 OF 004 procedures and strengthened the legal framework for the SCO election observer mechanism. While the SCO has already begun to send observers during member countries' presidential elections, this agreement discusses procedures for forming observer committees and standard reporting practices, she said. The Foreign Ministers also approved a document regulating cooperation and interaction between members and observer states. The third draft approved was an internal SCO document on enhancing coordination between Afghanistan and the various SCO institutions, including the Secretariat, building on the 2005 establishment of the SCO- SIPDIS Afghanistan Contact Group. Wang stated that SCO countries have provided significant assistance to Afghanistan in counterterrorism and counter-narcotics over the past few years and highlighted the importance the SCO places on Afghanistan's stability. ¶15. (C) Logvinov claims that the Foreign Minister's meeting approved 10 draft documents for approval at the Summit. In addition to the drafts on SCO's internal mechanizations, the Summit will announce statements on education, economic development and cooperation, energy cooperation, and joint law enforcement activities. Logvinov also noted that the SCO observers have requested that English be adopted as the third formal language of the organization after Chinese and Russian. China's Future Role in Secretariat Undecided -------------- ¶16. (C) According to SCO procedures, Kazakhstan will be offered the role of Secretary General at the Summit, Wang noted. It is unclear whether China will retain a deputy- level position within the Secretariat. Wang said that member states have still not reached a final decision on which country will receive the next Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) directorship. RANDT