PACOM COMMANDER ADMIRAL FALLON'S DIALOGUE WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 008836 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC PLEASE PASS WILDER E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2016 TAGS: PREL MOPS CH TW KN JP SUBJECT: PACOM COMMANDER ADMIRAL FALLON'S DIALOGUE WITH CHINESE ACADEMICS ON REGIONAL SECURITY Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Daniel Shields. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Pacific Command Commander Admiral Fallon stressed the importance of transparency and engagement between militaries in the Asia-Pacific region during a May 10 discussion with Chinese academics hosted by the Ambassador. Admiral Fallon reviewed U.S. commitments and responsibilities in the area and the challenges facing the region. Chinese scholars asked about U.S. views on Taiwan and about the role of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The Admiral responded that he has a legislative responsibility under the Taiwan Relations Act to help Taiwan defend itself. U.S.-Japan cooperation benefits the region, including the PRC. Chinese participants asked whether the reorientation of U.S. forces to the Pacific is focused on China. Admiral Fallon, pointing out the significant reduction of U.S. forces worldwide since the end of the Cold War, reviewed the growing importance of the Asia-Pacific region and the challenges to regional security. Turning to the U.S.-China mil-mil relationship, Admiral Fallon stressed the need for greater transparency and military cooperation, contrasting the lack of regular communication between him and PLA leaders to the frequent discussions he holds with other regional military leaders. Ambassador Randt noted that President Bush and President Hu agreed to contacts between U.S. Strategic Command and PLA Second Artillery as well as between the NASA Administrator and Chinese counterparts. End Summary. Taiwan -------------- ¶2. (C) During a May 10 lunch hosted by the Ambassador, PACOM Commander Admiral Fallon met with a group of PRC academics to discuss regional security issues. The academics stressed the PRC's continuing emphasis on Taiwan. Zhang Tuosheng from the China Foundation for International Strategic Studies (CFISS, a PLA-affiliated think tank) asked if the USG supports peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the Mainland. Cui Liru, President of the China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR, a Ministry of State Security-affiliated think tank),asked if the USG sees Taiwan as a strategic asset. Admiral Fallon reviewed the USG's "one-China" policy and stressed our hope that people in the PRC and on Taiwan mutually accept seeking a peaceful way forward, building on already extensive interaction across the Strait. As PACOM Commander, he added, he has a legislative responsibility under the Taiwan Relations Act to help Taiwan defend itself. As for whether the USG sees Taiwan as a strategic asset, Admiral Fallon said we see helping Taiwan defend itself as a strategic challenge. Japan -------------- ¶3. (C) Ruan Zongze of the China Institute for International Studies (CIIS, an MFA-affiliated think tank) raised PRC concern that Japan has mentioned Taiwan in the context of Japanese strategic objectives. He asked about Japan's increasing overseas military deployments. Admiral Fallon noted that the U.S. role in defending Japan since 1945 had helped start the process of Japan's peaceful, democratic and non-militarized economic development path, which has benefited China. Japan's overseas deployments are limited and closely scrutinized, he noted. Posture of the Pacific Command -------------- ¶4. (C) Several Chinese scholars raised concerns that the United States is reorienting its strategic forces towards the Pacific. Cui Liru asked about changes in the forces, missions and contingency plans of U.S. Pacific forces. Gong Xianfu of the China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS, a PLA-affiliated think tank) asked if the redeployment of U.S. forces toward the Pacific is focused on China. Chu Shulong of Peking University asked about the shift to the Pacific of carrier and submarine forces outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Jin Canrong of Renmin University asked about reports that China was excluded from a recent international BEIJING 00008836 002 OF 003 anti-terrorism seminar hosted by the Defense Department. ¶5. (C) Admiral Fallon pointed out the significant reduction in U.S. forces worldwide since the end of the Cold War. The strategic situation of the Cold War era required an approximate 50-50 division of U.S. forces between the Atlantic and Pacific regions. That situation has changed. The post-Cold War reduction in U.S. naval forces from about 580 to 283 ships drew down equally in the two regions. U.S. forces in both Japan and Korea have been reduced. In Europe and the Atlantic, threats have diminished. The Pacific Command area of responsibility is huge, encompassing 60 percent of the world's population and 50 percent of global GDP. The Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean areas face security challenges involving North Korea, the Taiwan Strait and terrorism. Admiral Fallon, noting that forty-two of his own staff were killed in the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon, stressed that terrorists take advantage of insecurity and instability to draw recruits. These conditions exist in Southeast Asia. The Pacific Command tries to provide advice and resources to help counterpart militaries meet these challenges, he said. ¶6. (C) The Secretary of Defense, Admiral Fallon stated, is charged by Congress to review potential future problems through reports such as the QDR. China's growing economy and large military cannot be overlooked. The United States does not have sufficient dialogue and transparency with China. The Admiral said he was unaware of the specific circumstances with regard to China's not being invited to the DOD anti-terrorism conference. He stressed his desire for greater PRC participation in PACOM activities. Gaps in the Mil-Mil Relationship -------------- ¶7. (C) Admiral Fallon stated that the biggest lesson he has learned as PACOM Commander is that the people of the region understand the importance of security and stability. Engagement between regional militaries builds local capacity to solve security problems and gives people confidence about the future, although the Asian cultural and historical setting presents challenges for multilateral approaches. Opportunities exist for the United States and China to work together, said the Admiral, despite different backgrounds and past baggage. ¶8. (C) Admiral Fallon expressed concern that the United States and China do not have the degree of communication and transparency between their militaries that they should. For example, the growth of Chinese military forces makes likely more encounters on the high seas between American and Chinese ships and aircraft. The two militaries should have an agreed understanding on how to react. Talks under the existing U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) have been frustrating, according to Admiral Fallon, because they have not been able to reach agreements. ¶9. (C) The lack of high-level communication with the PLA, Admiral Fallon continued, is in stark contrast to U.S. relations with other militaries. He recounted that the uniformed defense chiefs of Australia, East Timor and Nepal recently called him to discuss security challenges in their regions. Such calls are frequent due to well-established working relationships between military leaders, exemplified in the annual Pacific Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) forums, which China has not attended. The lack of such a relationship with PLA leaders is a serious problem, Admiral Fallon said. Some Chinese academics responded that the presence of Taiwan at regional military gatherings precluded PRC participation. Admiral Fallon countered that Taiwan representatives did not attend these events. He intended to invite PLA leaders to participate in the next CHOD forum during his meetings at the Ministry of National Defense, the Admiral said. Meeting of President Bush, President Hu -------------- ¶10. (C) Ambassador Randt noted the very good conversations between President Bush and President Hu during their April 20 meeting at which they agreed to contacts between the U.S. Strategic Command and PLA Second Artillery (strategic nuclear forces) and between the NASA Administrator and PRC counterparts. BEIJING 00008836 003 OF 003 North Korea -------------- ¶11. (C) Ding Kuisong of the China Reform Forum remarked that the Six-Party Talks appeared stalled and that the North Koreans feel unable to move forward on the nuclear issue while being pressed by the United States on other issues. The United States, the Admiral stated, could not turn a blind eye to DPRK counterfeiting of U.S. currency to compensate for North Korea's own economic failures. The PRC, given its friendly relations with the North Korean regime, can play a useful role in convincing the DPRK that the United States is not planning to invade and that the DPRK should return to the Six-Party Talks, said Admiral Fallon. ¶12. (U) The delegation cleared this message. Participants -------------- ¶13. (U) U.S. Participants: Admiral William J. Fallon, Commander, United States Pacific Command Ambassador Clark T. Randt, Jr. Ravic Huso, Political Advisor, Department of State, United States Pacific Command Brig. Gen. Ralph Jodice, Defense Attache COL Bob Brown, Executive Assistant, United States Pacific Command CAPT Kevin Ketchmark, Navy Attache MAJ Roger Cavazos, China desk officer, United States Pacific Command Notetaker Chinese Participants: Chu Shulong, Director, Institute of Strategic Studies, Tsinghua University SIPDIS Cui Liru, President, China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) Ding Kuisong, Vice Chairman, China Reform Forum (CRF) MG (retired) Gong Xianfu, Vice Chairman, China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS) Jin Canrong, Professor of International Relations and Deputy Director of U.S. Studies, Renmin University Ruan Zongze, Vice President, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) Wang Jisi, Dean of the School of International Studies, Peking University Zhang Tuosheng, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, China Foundation for International Strategic Studies (CFISS) RANDT