Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIJING8788
2006-05-11 08:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beijing
Cable title:  

CHINESE MUSLIM COMMUNITY MARKED BY DIVISIONS,

Tags:  PGOV PREL PARM KISL CH 
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DE RUEHBJ #8788/01 1310856
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 110856Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4987
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY PRIORITY 1802
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 1207
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0200
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 6344
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0529
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1923
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0620
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 008788 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL PARM KISL CH
SUBJECT: CHINESE MUSLIM COMMUNITY MARKED BY DIVISIONS,
MUSLIM WORLD'S INFLUENCE STILL SIGNIFICANT

REF: A. FBIS 20050819000148

B. 04 BEIJING 20186

C. BEIJING 07353

D. STATE 74399

Classified By: Classified by Acting Political Internal Unit Chief
Susan Thornton. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 008788 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2026 TAGS: PGOV PREL PARM KISL CH SUBJECT: CHINESE MUSLIM COMMUNITY MARKED BY DIVISIONS, MUSLIM WORLD'S INFLUENCE STILL SIGNIFICANT REF: A. FBIS 20050819000148 ¶B. 04 BEIJING 20186 ¶C. BEIJING 07353 ¶D. STATE 74399 Classified By: Classified by Acting Political Internal Unit Chief Susan Thornton. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The most significant trend in Chinese Islam is the rise in factions within the Muslim community, largely due to increasing domestic migration and closer ties with the Muslim world, several Chinese Islam scholars observed recently. The Saudi Arabian- influenced Salafiyya, for example, advocate returning to a "purist" form of Islam and are highly critical of other Muslim orders. Another growing sect, the Sala movement, is opposed by the Chinese Government and other Muslim groups because its leaders preach a "doomsday" theory and manipulate congregants into donating all their possessions. The influence of South and Central Asia on Chinese Muslims has been felt in the increasing number of Chinese Hizb ut- Tahrir followers, most notably in Xinjiang. In contrast to the often heavy-handed treatment of Xinjiang's Uighurs, Ningxia, Gansu and Qinghai officials approach religious affairs more cautiously and are reluctant to overtly interfere in Muslims' activities. End Summary. Fragmentation of Muslim Community -------------- ¶2. (C) The underlying trend in contemporary Chinese Islam is increasing division within the Muslim community, especially in China's heavily Muslim northwest provinces, Central University of Nationalities Professor Yang Guiping told poloff in a recent meeting. Closer ties with the Muslim world and greater internal migration are transforming the traditional nature of Chinese Islam and spawning numerous smaller factions. The traditional Qadim order, which follows the Hanafi School of Islam and originated in China over a thousand years ago, is still the dominant Islamic group in the country. In recent years, however, newer sects such as the Saudi Arabian-influenced Salafiyya, which broke away from the Ikhwan movement in the early 20th century, have witnessed the fastest growth, Yang observed. ¶3. (C) The Salafiyya, Yang pointed out, advocate returning to a "purist" form of Islam and modeling their lives strictly in accordance with the lif
e of the Prophet Mohammed. Some of their unique characteristics, such as the long beards grown by most Salafi men, are viewed by non-Muslim Chinese as conflicting with China's trend toward modernization. The Salafiyya are highly critical of the mystic Sufi orders and have occasionally clashed with the Sufi due to disagreements over rituals. Yang noted that the Salafiyya appear to have significant financial resources to construct mosques and other projects. While remarking that the source of the funding is unclear, she said that Muslim countries have been allowed to contribute financially to infrastructure projects in Chinese Muslim areas as long as there are "no strings attached." Sala Preach Doomsday Theory -------------- ¶4. (C) Asked about media reports that Xinjiang authorities had banned the Sala, a Sufi sub-order (Ref A),Yang did not directly confirm the reports but remarked that local authorities object to the practices of certain Sala communities. She noted that the Sala, who consist of only 10-20 thousand followers, primarily ethnic Hui Muslims, began expanding in the northwest provinces in the 1980s. Dispersed across the region, some Sala community leaders preach a "doomsday" theory and have convinced congregants to donate their entire livelihoods to the BEIJING 00008788 002 OF 003 community. This has sparked anger among other Muslim groups and led to government censure of the Sala's practices. Yang remarked, however, that this is not true of all Sala, and that in some localities, such as southern Gansu's Linxia Prefecture (Ref B),they are accepted as a mainstream group. Duality of Islamic Affairs Management -------------- ¶5. (C) While echoing Professor Yang's view of the growing schism within the Muslim community, Peking University Islamic Studies Professor Sha Zongping, himself a practicing Hui Muslim, highlighted the differences between two main strains of Chinese Islam. The first group, Xinjiang's Turkic Muslims, including Uighurs, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, is on the whole not as devout and learned in religious studies as the Hui Muslims in Ningxia, Gansu and Qinghai. Nonetheless, during recent trips to Xinjiang, Sha perceived an increasing interest in religion among the Uighurs. Because Xinjiang is a border region that also faces a separatist threat, religious activity is strictly controlled by local government authorities. In contrast to the often heavy-handed treatment of Uighurs in Xinjiang, officials in other regions, such as Ningxia, Gansu and Qinghai, approach religious affairs more cautiously. They are reluctant to overtly interfere with the activities of local Muslis, except when a conflict arises and impacts social stability within the Muslim community, Sha stated. ¶6. (C) Comment: Sha's observation of greater Islamic scholarship among the Hui is probably linked to a much more open environment for religious study and practice in Muslim areas outside Xinjiang. End Comment. Christianity Gaining Ground in Xinjiang -------------- ¶7. (C) Sha recalled that Xinjiang religious affairs officials told him that Christianity is spreading rapidly in Xinjiang. These officials reported that the number of house churches is increasing largely due to the influence of Western missionaries, many of whom come to the region to serve as teachers. Christianity appeals to many locals, mostly Han but also a growing number of Uighurs, because it is viewed as a more "civilized" and "Western" religion than Islam. The Xinjiang Government is nonetheless concerned about any rapidly growing popular movement, Sha remarked. Foreign Influence on Chinese Muslims -------------- ¶8. (C) Despite the Chinese Government's close monitoring of financial assistance provided by Muslim countries to China's Muslim communities, financial and other forms of aid from the Muslim world have occasionally been funneled through unofficial channels, according to Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) Institute of West Asian and African Studies scholar Yin Gang (Ref C). In some cases the government has tacitly approved such assistance, especially to underdeveloped areas. However, because of Beijing's policy of channeling all financial aid through the semi-official Islamic associations, assistance has often taken the form of supplying Islamic texts, many of which originate in Pakistan. In the past years, Yin recalled, police raids in Xinjiang have uncovered unsanctioned versions of the Koran and various other "illegal publications" printed in Pakistan. The influence of the Muslims from South and Central Asia on Chinese Muslims has been particularly evident in the increasing number of Hizb ut-Tahrir followers, most notably in Xinjiang. Although they maintain a low profile, a number of Uighur Hizb ut-Tahrir followers have been detained, and police recently raided the dormitories of several Xinjiang university students who were suspected of belonging to the movement, Yin noted. Information Age Heightens Interest, Ties BEIJING 00008788 003 OF 003 -------------- ¶9. (C) Increasing access to information, through both the television and electronic media, is posing significant challenges to the Chinese Government's ability to manage Muslims' affairs, Sha indicated. For example, detailed media reporting of the 2003 Iraq War prompted groups of Muslims throughout the country, even in central China's Hubei Province, to petition to fight alongside the Iraqis. This sparked alarm within the government, which naturally denied their request. The modernization of the media has caused Chinese Muslims to take a much greater interest in the affairs of the Muslim world, Sha remarked. ¶10. (C) In order to address these problems, the Chinese Government has mandated a nationwide training course for imams, which should be completed within about five years, Sha reported. This program, which was launched in 2002, he recalled, aims to guide Muslim leaders in helping their communities adjust to the information age and other problems posed by modernization. The training focuses on techniques to handle conflicts within the community arising from events in the outside Muslim world. Imams will be better equipped to resolve or prevent a local backlash over outside events after the training, Sha indicated. RANDT

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