PRC/SUDAN: LEVERAGING UN TROOP CONTRIBUTING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 006349 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2016 TAGS: PREL KPKO SU CH SUBJECT: PRC/SUDAN: LEVERAGING UN TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES TOWARD DARFUR REF: A. SECSTATE 52950 ¶B. BEIJING 6077 Classified By: DCM David S. Sedney. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The PRC is giving serious consideration to participating in the "possible" UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) in Darfur, MFA IO Department UN Division Director Yang Tao told Poloffs in response to Reftel A points. The PRC does not want to a Darfur UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) without the Sudan Government's acquiescence. The African Union (AU),not the Security Council, is best positioned to win the Sudan Government's support for a Darfur UN PKO. Any PRC military contributions must be approved by President Hu Jintao and the Central Military Commission (CMC),Yang added, though noting that a civilian police contribution from the Ministry of Public Security would not need approval at such high levels. Poloffs stressed the urgent need for a timely, robust Darfur UN PKO and urged China to give serious consideration to joining the United States in supporting an expanded and enhanced UN PKO in Darfur. We assess that China would only cautiously and slowly even consider a military contribution to a Darfur PKO, but might provide civilian policy more quickly. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Poloffs met April 5 with MFA IO Department UN Division Director Yang Tao to deliver ref A points. Yang said the PRC is giving serious consideration to participating in the "possible" UN PKO in Darfur but stressed that any PRC military contribution would need to be decided by President Hu and the Central Military Commission (CMC). He noted that even in the case of a positive decision, the process is very slow, pointing to the delays in deploying China's contribution to the existing Sudan PKO. Yang commented that a contribution of civilian police elements from the Ministry of Public Security would not require a decision at such a senior level. He noted that the MFA has more latitude to discuss Civ-Pol contributions with the Ministry of Public Security than troop contributions with the PLA. China would not contribute troops unless the Sudan Government agreed to a PKO, Yang stressed. ¶3. (C) The PRC is waiting for the UN to provide more details of its requirements, though he noted Beijing's understanding that SYG Koffi Annan had discussed the need for highly mobile contingents capable of rapid response. Commenting that the PLA would need to assess whether it is capable of supplying the desired forces should it receive a formal request, Yang reiterated (Ref B) that the PRC does not want to see a UN PKO in Darfur without the Sudan Government's consent. The PRC understands prior planning is necessary to facilitate the possible deployment of UN PKO troops in Darfur and will not block such planning, although the PRC still has concerns and would be more comfortable if Sudan supported the possible operation. The PRC views U.S. participation in the planning as important for ensuring a successful Darfur UN PKO and is watching closely U.S. involvement to determine the level of U.S. commitment to supporting a PKO. The PRC does not have expectations one way or the other of U.S. troop contributions, Yang added. ¶4. (C) The PRC does not want to set a precedent for deploying a UN PKO without in a country (or region) without the host country government's consent, Yang said. The PRC position reflects practical realities, he argued. In Somalia lack of host country support created a disaster for peacekeepers, said Yang, who acknowledged that the lack of central authority created a unique situation. If the Sudan Government strongly opposes a Darfur UN PKO, China does not want to be pushed to agree to the Darfur PKO, he said. The PRC believes that the African Union (AU) must drive the process of obtaining Sudan Government acquiescence to a Darfur UNPKO, not the UN Security Council. Rejecting the position that the AU has already done so, Yang said that the AU is capable of an unambiguous statement if it sees the need. If South Africa and Nigeria press hard enough, the PRC is certain that the Sudan Government will permit a "re-hatting" of African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) troops under UN PKO auspices. President Obasanjo, in particular, can significantly influence the AU position, Yang posited. The United States strongly urges the PRC consider contributing troops and otherwise joining the United States in supporting and expanded and enhanced UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur, Poloffs stressed. ¶5. (C) The Sudan Government's decision to bar UN Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland from BEIJING 00006349 002 OF 002 visiting Darfur sent a negative signal to the international community, Yang said. The PRC does not have any plans to rebuke publicly the Sudan Government for this incident but will press the Sudan Government for greater cooperation with the international community through private diplomatic channels. The PRC Embassy in Khartoum has not yet raised its concerns with the Sudan Government, Yang added. Poloffs urged the PRC to press the Sudan Government to allow unrestricted UN access to Darfur. Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) Our assessment is that the PRC will not contribute forces absent the clear approval of the Sudanese Government and even then a military contribution to a Darfur PKO would require careful high-level consideration and likely be slow in appearing. On the other hand, China might be able to contribute civilian police on a more rapid basis. Beijing's decision is unlikely to be linked to China's existing commitments to other PKOs or limitations in numbers of available forces. RANDT