DOE OLYMPIC RADIATION SECURITY WORKSHOP IN BEIJING

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 BEIJING 005618 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS USDOC FOR 6000/ITA/TD/RPACE USDOE FOR OFFICE OF SECRETARY USDOE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DS/P/PL FOR MIKE VANBUSKIRK S/CT FOR TIM WALSH EAP/CM FOR NOAH ZARING E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PTER KNNP MNUC ENRG ECON ETRD BTIO RGY CH, KOLY SUBJECT: DOE OLYMPIC RADIATION SECURITY WORKSHOP IN BEIJING PROMPTED MANY QUESTIONS FROM PRC OFFICIALS Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA),in conjunction with the China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), held an Olympic Radiation Security Workshop on February 28. DOE officers made two presentations titled: "The DOE's Emergency Response Capabilities and Support Provided at the 2004 Olympics" and "Second Line of Defense Prevention and Preparedness Support to the 2004 Olympics and Possibilities for Supporting the 2008 Olympics". Each presentation was followed by an extensive question and answer period where Chinese officials from many agencies peppered the DOE delegation with a wide range of questions, exposing the concerns of China's security apparatus and their understanding of how to provide security for a large international event. NNSA Delegation Head Admiral Krol congratulated the Beijing Organizing Committee for the 29 Olympiad Games (BOCOG) for its forward leaning approach to tackling Olympic Security issues, noting that in Greece this process began only one year before the opening of the Games. He also reiterated the USG's offer to send an assessment team to evaluate opportunities for security cooperation. End Summary. Security Needs Assessment Process -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Beijing Olympic Games Organizing Committee, Coordinating Office for Olympic Security Division Chief Zhang Jian was interested in the process for assessing a venue's vulnerabilities to nuclear or radiological attacks and how should responses to these types of emergencies be organized. Admiral Krol emphasized that China must determine its own nuclear oversight structure and the approach it takes to handling a crisis. The DOE has a search capability to check venues before events and to monitor them during the events. In cooperation with Beijing's Olympic Committee, the DOE is ready to provide appropriate assistance. Beijing must take into careful consideration how it will handle public perception of its ability to provide a safe and secure environment for the Games. A prank phone call claiming that a radiological device has been set off inside a venue could be just as damaging to the Games as an actual attack if China cannot assuage public perceptions that venue security is weak. Timeline for Security Needs Assessment -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Beijing People's Police College Vice President Zhang Wenping requested more details on the actual assistance programs DOE provided the Government of Greece (GOG) during the 2004 Olympics. In particular, he wanted to know how far in advance DOE and the GOG began collaborating, what specific training DOE provided the Greek police and what was the Greek Government's feedback. Admiral Krol congratulated BOCOG for its forward-leaning approach to tackling Olympic Security issues, noting that in Greece this process began only one year before the opening of the Games. He stressed that the host country must first request assistance and then a joint assessment of the threat situation will be created. ¶4. (SBU) During the Greek Olympics, joint assessments were conducted of the various venues as well as the hosting cities. The FBI, DOD and local police worked together to draw up plans for various contingency situations. Krol said that having an outside entity assess your security situation provides you with a different perspective and often can reveal previously overlooked risks. ¶5. (SBU) The United States is willing to provide a Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) tailored to China's needs should the PRC request such assistance through the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and after completing an initial joint assessment. DOE Response and Exercise Program Manager Steven Buntman pointed out that during the 2004 Games, DOE provided the Greek police with radiological pagers, isotopes analysis and training of various protocols for interviewing individuals who set off radiological detectors. BEIJING 00005618 002 OF 006 ¶6. (SBU) Beijing People's Police College Vice President Zheng Weiping asked what specific methods he should employ when planning exercises for his police team. Mr. Buntman replied that DOE together with the State Department held a tabletop exercise in Athens with GOG agencies where the parties involved walked through responses to 20 emergency scenarios. The exercise exposed interagency command and cooperation issues. Admiral Krol suggested that a similar exercise could be held in preparation for the 2008 Games. Guidelines For Conducting an Assessment -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Beijing People's Police College Vice President Zheng Weiping stated that China should cooperate with United States to ensure the safety of the Games. To that end what kind of documents and what type of data does the United States need from China to make an assessment? Admiral Krol responded that the assessment process should be completed together. Working together would provide the best information for both sides to identify vulnerabilities. The assessment should address current responses to crisis situations, the overall response to the Beijing Olympics in terms of how many people, from how many different countries, will be attending as well as a review of all venues, transportation and services associated with the Games. Airport Security and Assessments -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Beijing Capital International Airport Public Security Director of the General Office Li Xuha was interested in how the United States provided assistance to monitor Greece's international airport. Dr. Charles Massey responded that DOE conducted an assessment one year prior to the Olympic Games focusing on the flow of people, luggage and cargo. Based on this assessment the two countries developed a system to screen all people and cargo moving through the airport. The program was implemented well in advance of the Games to prevent terrorists from attempting to move radiological devices into Greece ahead of the Games. Securing Ground Transportation and Responding to Incidents -------------- -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Deputy Director of the Beijing Subway Command Center Wang Haiying requested information on how to best monitor the subway and local ground traffic. He also wanted to know how to handle a suspected radiological device and whether or not he should cover it with a box or blanket until experts could assess the situation. Wang went on to explain that he was not familiar with radiological devices and is concerned that calling in radiological specialists to inspect each suspicious item would disable the subway system. Admiral Krol said the best way to handle a suspected radiological device is to put as much space as possible between it and people by closing the immediate area around the suspicious device. In the United States, first responders such as the police and fire companies have basic equipment that can determine whether or not the suspect item is radioactive. Admiral Krol stated that the subway system and local transportation, particularly into the Olympic Village, should be monitored. One way to do this is by setting up checkpoints were several roads or trains converge. Dirty Bombs and Special Teams -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Beijing Olympic Games Organizing Committee Coordinating Office for Olympic Security Division Chief Zhang Jian requested information on how to handle a dirty bomb and whether or not each specific type of radiological device needs a special dedicated team to handle it. Admiral Krol said that DOE has not inactivated an actual dirty bomb but has conducted numerous exercises. The United States has teams of specialists that include weapons designers and engineers that respond to all radiological events. Speed Requirements for Train Detectors -------------- BEIJING 00005618 003 OF 006 ¶11. (SBU) Zhang Jian wanted to know the maximum speed at which a radiological detector could effectively monitor a train. He noted that train transportation is still the backbone of China's transportation infrastructure and could not handle long delays without interrupting services across the country. Dr. Charles Massey replied that the slower the train passes through the detector the better and noted that eight km per hour is the optimal speed. Detectors are usually placed along the rail lines in places where trains are starting or stopping so that the optimal speed is built into the system and does not impede normal train operations. Terrorist Radiological Attacks by Underwater Explosives -------------- -------------- ¶12. (SBU) China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) Assistant President Yang Mingjie wanted to know if the United States had the capability to detect radiological bombs attached to the bottom of ships and said that he believed that this was an easy scenario with high probability. Dr. Robert York from the U.S. DOE Oak Ridge National Laboratory explained that four feet of water provides a shield for gamma particles and neutrons, making it impossible to detect a radiological device at that depth or deeper. The water acts as a perfect shield. Admiral Krol stated that swimmers or divers could be used to inspect suspect ships. Intranet Vice Internet -------------- ¶13. (SBU) CICIR Assistant President Yang Mingjie wanted to know if Second Line of Defense detectors are linked together by using computers operating on the Internet, noting that this would make the system very vulnerable to hackers. Dr. Charles Massey said the host government is responsible for how it sets up its network. Most governments use intranets or resident systems. Managing Public Perception of a Crisis -------------- ¶14. (SBU) CICIR President Yang Mingjie asked for best practices in managing the public's desire to know details about an incident. Yang said that without an official government statement, the media tends to speculate and create panic surrounding a suspected event. Yang wondered if the United States uses a national broadcast system to issue official statements regarding possible radiological events. Admiral Krol responded that the DOE is a "response" organization but before responding to public concerns careful analysis of the situation is conducted to alleviate public fears. Concerns Over Cost -------------- ¶15. (SBU) The Beijing Municipal Counter terrorism Office Division Chief Jin Yujie asked directly how much DOE provided radilogical equipment would cost and whether the DOE was willing to provide any equipment without charge. Jin noted that recently Beijing has bcome concerned over the rapidly escalating costs of hosting the Games. Admiral Krol said that Beijing has two options: DOE could provide comprehensive training and equipment but at a significant expense, or based on the joint assessment, DOE could provide basic training, planning and some equipment that would then be supported by a FEST. At no expense to China, a FEST would deploy highly-trained and experienced people as well as sensitive detection equipment for the duration of the Games. The FEST members and the equipment would return to the United States upon the conclusion of the Games. Furthermore, during the Greece Games, under the Second Line of Defense program the United States installed in several ports and border crossings radiological detection equipment and trained personnel how to use them at no charge to the GOG. First Line and Second Line of Defense -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Beijing Municipal Counterterrorist Office Division BEIJING 00005618 004 OF 006 Chief Jin Yujie requested an explanation of the different roles of the DOE's First Line of Defense and Second Line of Defense programs. Dr. Charles Massey explained that the DOE provides assistance to countries that need help protecting their nuclear materials and weapons to prevent them from illegally crossing borders. The Second Line of Defense is then used to monitor international borders throughout the world to prevent the illegal spread of radiological materials. Currently there are thirty countries participating in the program. The program concentrates on air, land and sea crossings. The portals monitor the crossing points 24 hours a day and the host country responds to any suspect readings. Loopholes in Megaports -------------- ¶17. (SBU) CICIR researcher Xu Feibao assessed that the Megaports program is a passive prevention technique because it only targets large ports while leaving smaller or less traveled crossing points unscreened. Dr. Charles Massey responded that DOE uses a prioritization methodology for determining which ports should participate in the Megaports program. This includes analyzing maritime trade routes. The goal is to take away convenient large routes that offer some protection for illegally transporting radiological materials because of the large volume to containers that pass through them. This forces terrorists to use less obvious paths through smaller ports making it easier for intelligence and security services to detect. Effective Cooperation? -------------- ¶18. (SBU) Mr. Zhang Jian was also interested in what was more effective and efficient at the Greece Games, bilateral cooperation or multilateral cooperation? Admiral Krol responded that both types of cooperation are necessary. China must work with international organizations such as the IAEA while at the same time working with individual countries to guarantee the safety of their citizens, athletes and dignitaries. During the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, the United States reached out to the IAEA and other countries for support. China should look for assistance not because it needs it but because the world wants a successful event and all countries and international organizations have a stake in making sure the Games are safe. Mr. Zhang raised the security brief the United States provides to its Olympic athletes and was interested in what role the DOE plays in composing the report. DOE stated that it does not write the report or contribute directly to it. The State Department authors this report based on all-source intelligence analysis. DOE and Intelligence Sharing -------------- ¶19. (SBU) CICIR Deputy Director Ouyang Liping noted that intelligence sharing can be very complicated between different agencies and governments and wondered how intelligence derived from the radiological screening process is shared. Admiral Krol stated that once the detection equipment is installed it is turned over to the host government. The host government has to decide how it will introduce the intelligence component into the screening program. The equipment package is a confidence building measure that naturally leads to more intelligence sharing. Admiral Krol pointed out that after all we share the same goal, to stop the illegal transportation of nuclear material. Seminar Participants -------------- ¶20. (SBU) U.S. Participants: Head of Delegation Admiral Joseph Krol Associate Administrator for Emergency Operations, National Nuclear Security Administration, DOE Dr. Charles Massey Principal, Marsec Government Services LLC BEIJING 00005618 005 OF 006 Daniel Hartnett Second Line of Defense Program, National Nuclear Security Administration, DOE Steven Buntman Response and Exercise Program Manager, National Nuclear Security Administration, DOE Rob York Technical Working Lead Group, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, DOE Wendy Bashnan Deputy Olympic Security Coordinator, U.S. Embassy Beijing Melissa J. Lan Olympics Coordinator, U.S. Embassy Beijing Don Rogers U.S. Embassy Beijing Brian C. Chang Transportation Administration, U.S. Embassy Beijing Note taker Interpreters ¶21. (SBU) Chinese Participants: Institute of Strategic and Security Studies, CICIR Mr. Yang Mingjie Assistant President Ms. Ouyang Liping Deputy Director Ms. Gao Ying Mr. Sun Bo Mr. Xu Feibao Department of International Exchanges, CICIR Ms. Du Yanjun Director Mr. Liu Bo Deputy Director Coordinating Office for Olympic Security, Beijing Olympic Games Organizing Committee Mr. Zhang Jian Division Chief Mr. Liu Wei Deputy Division Chief Mr. Hu Xueshan Deputy Division Chief Mr. Wang Guiqing Deputy Division Chief Mr. Li Jianhua Staff Member Mr. Zhao Haifei Staff Member Mr. Cheng Yongwei Staff Member Mr. Yuan Jinghui Staff Member Mr. Han Dong Staff Member Public Security Bureau, Beijing Capital International Airport Mr. Li Xuhua Director of General Office Mr. Wang Ming Staff Member, General Office Mr. Jiang Huawei Staff Member, General Office Mr. Wan Changming Guardhouse Mr. Pan Jianqiang Security Office China National Nuclear Industrial Group Mr. Duan Jiaqing Department of Security Beijing People's Police College Mr. Zheng Weiping Vice President Security Coordination Group for Sailing Competitions Mr. Ye Jianwen Division Chief Mr. Teng Xuyou Division Chief SWAT College of China People's Armed Police Forces Mr. Qin Yumin Editor, Special Police of China Mr. Chang Ping National Counterterrorism Office Ms. Jiang Liyun Beijing Municipal Counter-Terrorism Office Mr. Jin Yujie Division Chief BEIJING 00005618 006 OF 006 Intelligence Center for Olympic Security, Beijing Olympic Games Organizing Committee Mr. Zhao Hongqing Mr. Zhang Hongtian Mr. Zang Xiangjun Mr. Zhang Shaoning Mr. Liang Zhiwei Ms. Liu Rufang Command Center of Beijing Subway Mr. Wang Haiying Deputy Director RANDT