Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BEIJING5355
2006-03-23 14:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beijing
Cable title:
PRC/NEPAL: AFTER TANG'S VISIT, PRC READY TO WORK
how-toVZCZCXRO9338 OO RUEHCN DE RUEHBJ #5355/01 0821419 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 231419Z MAR 06 FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0922 INFO RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 3716 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 4030 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 005355
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2031
TAGS: PREL PGOV NP CE CH
SUBJECT: PRC/NEPAL: AFTER TANG'S VISIT, PRC READY TO WORK
WITH U.S. TO ENCOURAGE RECONCILIATION IN NEPAL
REF: KATHMANDU 000768
Classified By: Deputy Political Chief Robert Griffiths.
Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 005355
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2031
TAGS: PREL PGOV NP CE CH
SUBJECT: PRC/NEPAL: AFTER TANG'S VISIT, PRC READY TO WORK
WITH U.S. TO ENCOURAGE RECONCILIATION IN NEPAL
REF: KATHMANDU 000768
Classified By: Deputy Political Chief Robert Griffiths.
Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
Summary
--------------
1. (C) China is interested in taking a more active role in
working with the United States to encourage reconciliation
talks between the King and Nepal's political parties,
according to MFA Asia Department Deputy Director General
Luo Zhaohui. In a March 21 meeting with visiting U.S.
Ambassador to Nepal James Moriarty, Luo suggested that the
PRC and U.S. Ambassadors in Kathmandu take the lead in
hosting talks between the three major political parties and
the government. Stressing that India would need to be
included in any such process, the Ambassador expressed
interest and noted that a coordinated approach by the U.S.,
Indian and PRC Ambassadors would send a very powerful
signal. Luo discussed State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan's March
16-18 visit to Nepal, calling attention to Tang's meetings
with the leaders of the three main opposition parties as
being a first. The Ambassador's assessment of India's
influence in Nepal "surprised" Luo, who maintained that
China is closer to the U.S position on Nepal than to
India's and expressed concern about New Delhi's links to
the Maoist rebels. Luo informed Ambassador Moriarty that
Nepal has requested an invitation for the King to visit
China in May; Ambassador Moriarty warned that, under the
current circumstances, the Nepali government would try to
spin such an invitation into Chinese support for the King's
policies. End Summary.
PRC Policy of Noninterference. . .
--------------
2. (C) In a March 21 meeting, MFA Asia Department Deputy
Director General Luo Zhaohui briefed Ambassador Moriarty on
State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan's March 16-18 trip to Nepal.
Luo took care to state the discussions covered bilateral
relations and Nepal's domestic situation. In terms of
bilateral relations, Tang stressed the importance to China
of Tibet and Taiwan. Tang then reaffirmed China's Nepal
policy of supporting an independent and stable Nepal, while
pledging not to interfere in Nepal's internal affairs. At
the same time, Tang also stressed the importance of the
international community helping to create a favorable
environment for Nepal to resolve its political crisis.
But Engages Opposition Parties
--------------
3. (C) DDG Luo confirmed that State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan
met with the leaders of the major political opposition
parties during his visit. While China has maintained
contact with the political parties since the early 1990's,
this was the first time a senior Chinese official has held
talks with them in Nepal. Luo said the Chinese delegation
was surprised by the large spectrum of views held by the
parties. The Nepali Congress-Democratic (NC-D) appeared to
be the most moderate of the three major political parties
according to Luo, while the Communist Party of Nepal -
United Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) held the strongest desire
to see a mass movement to overthrow the Monarchy.
And the King Complains of Meddling
--------------
4. (C) The King told Tang that he was willing to work with
the political parties but viewed the Maoists as terrorists.
The King complained that foreign countries engaging with
the political parties are giving them greater legitimacy
and interfering with Nepal's internal affairs. At the same
time, Luo reported that the King complained that India and
China are not providing the Royal government with enough
support. Tang briefed the party leaders and the King on
the importance of maintaining stability and suggested they
learn from China's own years of turmoil, citing the
Cultural Revolution and the Anti-Rightist campaign as
examples of political instability that set back China's
development.
BEIJING 00005355 002 OF 004
MFA Ready to Cooperate with U.S. on Getting Talks Started
-------------- --------------
5. (C) At the conclusion of his readout, Luo asked
Ambassador Moriarty how the United States and China could
work together to get the King and the political parties to
start reconciliation talks. (Comment: Luo did not bother
to try to square this request with China's long held
position not to involve itself in the internal political
debates of other countries. End comment.) The MFA was
open to all suggestions, Luo said. Ambassador Moriarty
welcomed greater cooperation and said that U.S. relations
with China and India will to a large extent determine U.S.
foreign policy success in the 21st century. Washington is
concerned that instability in Nepal could hurt regional
stability and damage relations between the United States,
China and India. The failure by the King and the political
parties to start the reconciliation process has been
frustrating, with the only real winners being the Maoists,
who appear to be making progress towards their goal of
achieving absolute power in Nepal. Ambassador Moriarty
stressed the U.S. view that the King and the political
parties must work together to end the Maoist insurgency.
A Possible Visit by Dr. Kissinger
--------------
6. (C) The high level of mistrust between the parties and
the King has prevented a meeting between representatives
from the parties and the Palace, according to Ambassador
Moriarty. At the same time, Party leaders and the King are
unwilling to meet directly unless both sides believe the
talks will be a success. Ambassador Moriarty suggested
that perhaps a respected outsider could help the two sides
save face and therefore facilitate contacts; Dr. Kissinger
might have some interest in playing such a role. Luo was
enthusiastic about this possible approach and said that Dr.
Kissinger was very respected in China.
Party-by-Party Approach
--------------
7. (C) Commenting on the lack of consensus among the
political parties on how to deal with the King and the
Maoists, Luo asked the Ambassador whether one-on-one talks
with each of the major parties and the King could help
start a reconciliation dialogue. The Ambassador pointed
out that the King is trying to split the parties from one
another, and is playing with the idea of isolating the UML,
Nepal's second-largest party, entirely. Since isolating
the UML could drive it into the hands of the Maoists, there
is a danger to holding one-on-one talks.
China, U.S. and India Should Approach the Three Parties
-------------- --------------
8. () Luo then suggested that the U.S. and Chinese
Ambassadors in Nepal invite the three political parties and
Palace representatives to informal talks. Ambassador
Moriarty said this might be a useful idea, while stressing
the importance of Indian participation in such a process.
If India is not involved in the proposed talks, it would be
able to prevent any joint U.S.- China efforts from going
forward, he cautioned, noting that India has a large
footprint in Nepal, 60 percent of Nepal's trade is with
India and the Nepal government recognizes that it must work
with India. Luo professed surprise that India has that
strong an influence over Nepal.
India Likely First Victim of Maoist Victory
--------------
9. (C) India would be the first victim of a Maoist victory
in Nepal, Ambassador Moriarty stated. Maoists in Nepal and
India work together and have even signed an agreement to
establish a revolutionary base stretching from Bhutan
through Nepal to India. A Maoist victory would destabilize
India, cautioned Ambassador Moriarty, who pointed out that
the number of Indian districts with a Maoist presence has
grown rapidly. He suggested that India would likely be
forced to take strong actions in response to a Maoist
takeover in Nepal.
BEIJING 00005355 003 OF 004
10. (C) The President raised the Nepal issue with Prime
Minister Singh during his visit to India to ensure that
India is on the right track, Ambassador Moriarty told Luo.
The President and PM Singh publicly agreed that the Maoists
must renounce violence and that the King must reconcile
with the political parties. This was a very careful
formulation because of India's role in hosting talks
between Nepal's political parties and the Maoists. Under
this formulation India cannot treat the Maoists as a normal
political party if the Maoists continues to use violence
and terrorism to achieve its political goals, pointed out
Ambassador Moriarty.
Beijing's Position Closer to Washington's
--------------
11. (C) China is closer to the U.S. position on
reconciliation talks than it is to India's, according to
Luo. China and the United States share a common goal and
attitude toward the Maoists and the Royal family, he
stated. While Beijing and New Delhi discussed the Nepal
situation during their second round of their strategic
dialogue, the PRC still needs more time to work with the
Indian side on Nepal, according to Luo. Commenting that
since New Delhi would likely be unhappy to see China play a
larger role in Nepal, Luo suggested that perhaps the United
States should try to host the first round of possible
reconciliation talks. The Ambassador responded that if
India can be convinced to join in the talks, a very
powerful message would be sent to the King and the
political parties and offered to engage his Indian
counterpart on the possibility of talks. Luo said that
China and the United States should "informally give it a
try," saying that he would instruct the PRC Ambassador in
Kathmandu to work with Ambassador Moriarty.
U.S. Views on High-level Visits to Nepal
--------------
12. (C) Luo asked whether the United States views Tang's
recent trip to Nepal positively and how Washington would
respond to the King's request to visit China in May.
Ambassador Moriaty said that Tang's trip was important
because it maintained pressure on the King to start
reconciliation talks. He also cautioned Beijing to
seriously consider the timing of the King's trip and
suggested that the PRC put off the King's request until
progress is made in starting reconciliation talks. The
King would use a visit to Beijing to demonstrate that he is
still in control and does not need to reconcile with the
political parties. Luo said that China has "taken note" of
the King's request but has not accepted it yet. Ambassador
Moriarty suggested that China wait until it became clearer
whether the King was genuinely interested in
reconciliation, and stressed that it is important to keep
pressure on the King. He noted that April could be a very
crucial month for the Nepal government.
Nepal's Future
--------------
13. (C) Responding to Luo's question on Nepal's future,
Moriarty said that a compromise must be reached in the
coming weeks or Nepal faces a very dark future. If the
brittle government falls, the Maoists will likely come out
on top. Ambassador Moriarty pointed to January 14th as a
key turning point for the Maoist insurgency. Before then,
Nepal's government ministers were confident that Nepal
would overcome the Maoist insurgency. After the January 14
Maoist attack on a Royal government police post in the
Katmandu Valley, the Ministers began moving their assets
out of Nepal and openly began sharing their concerns.
After the attack, the Royal government realized that the
Maoists could carry out military strikes any where in
Nepal. The political parties are weak and have no weapons,
little money and are unable to generate popular protests
without Maoist support, because of the population's fear of
possible Maoist reprisals.
Comment
--------------
14. (C) Given China's important role in Nepal, it is worth
BEIJING 00005355 004 OF 004
exploring whether the GOI will veto out of hand any role by
the Chinese in pushing the King and political parties
towards reconciliation. Luo was a member of State
Councilor Tang Jiaxuan's delegation to Nepal March 16-18.
During the late 1990's, Luo served at the PRC Embassy in
Washington and worked on the India-Pakistan nuclear issue.
15. (U) This cable was cleared by Ambassador Moriarty.
RANDT
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2031
TAGS: PREL PGOV NP CE CH
SUBJECT: PRC/NEPAL: AFTER TANG'S VISIT, PRC READY TO WORK
WITH U.S. TO ENCOURAGE RECONCILIATION IN NEPAL
REF: KATHMANDU 000768
Classified By: Deputy Political Chief Robert Griffiths.
Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
Summary
--------------
1. (C) China is interested in taking a more active role in
working with the United States to encourage reconciliation
talks between the King and Nepal's political parties,
according to MFA Asia Department Deputy Director General
Luo Zhaohui. In a March 21 meeting with visiting U.S.
Ambassador to Nepal James Moriarty, Luo suggested that the
PRC and U.S. Ambassadors in Kathmandu take the lead in
hosting talks between the three major political parties and
the government. Stressing that India would need to be
included in any such process, the Ambassador expressed
interest and noted that a coordinated approach by the U.S.,
Indian and PRC Ambassadors would send a very powerful
signal. Luo discussed State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan's March
16-18 visit to Nepal, calling attention to Tang's meetings
with the leaders of the three main opposition parties as
being a first. The Ambassador's assessment of India's
influence in Nepal "surprised" Luo, who maintained that
China is closer to the U.S position on Nepal than to
India's and expressed concern about New Delhi's links to
the Maoist rebels. Luo informed Ambassador Moriarty that
Nepal has requested an invitation for the King to visit
China in May; Ambassador Moriarty warned that, under the
current circumstances, the Nepali government would try to
spin such an invitation into Chinese support for the King's
policies. End Summary.
PRC Policy of Noninterference. . .
--------------
2. (C) In a March 21 meeting, MFA Asia Department Deputy
Director General Luo Zhaohui briefed Ambassador Moriarty on
State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan's March 16-18 trip to Nepal.
Luo took care to state the discussions covered bilateral
relations and Nepal's domestic situation. In terms of
bilateral relations, Tang stressed the importance to China
of Tibet and Taiwan. Tang then reaffirmed China's Nepal
policy of supporting an independent and stable Nepal, while
pledging not to interfere in Nepal's internal affairs. At
the same time, Tang also stressed the importance of the
international community helping to create a favorable
environment for Nepal to resolve its political crisis.
But Engages Opposition Parties
--------------
3. (C) DDG Luo confirmed that State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan
met with the leaders of the major political opposition
parties during his visit. While China has maintained
contact with the political parties since the early 1990's,
this was the first time a senior Chinese official has held
talks with them in Nepal. Luo said the Chinese delegation
was surprised by the large spectrum of views held by the
parties. The Nepali Congress-Democratic (NC-D) appeared to
be the most moderate of the three major political parties
according to Luo, while the Communist Party of Nepal -
United Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) held the strongest desire
to see a mass movement to overthrow the Monarchy.
And the King Complains of Meddling
--------------
4. (C) The King told Tang that he was willing to work with
the political parties but viewed the Maoists as terrorists.
The King complained that foreign countries engaging with
the political parties are giving them greater legitimacy
and interfering with Nepal's internal affairs. At the same
time, Luo reported that the King complained that India and
China are not providing the Royal government with enough
support. Tang briefed the party leaders and the King on
the importance of maintaining stability and suggested they
learn from China's own years of turmoil, citing the
Cultural Revolution and the Anti-Rightist campaign as
examples of political instability that set back China's
development.
BEIJING 00005355 002 OF 004
MFA Ready to Cooperate with U.S. on Getting Talks Started
-------------- --------------
5. (C) At the conclusion of his readout, Luo asked
Ambassador Moriarty how the United States and China could
work together to get the King and the political parties to
start reconciliation talks. (Comment: Luo did not bother
to try to square this request with China's long held
position not to involve itself in the internal political
debates of other countries. End comment.) The MFA was
open to all suggestions, Luo said. Ambassador Moriarty
welcomed greater cooperation and said that U.S. relations
with China and India will to a large extent determine U.S.
foreign policy success in the 21st century. Washington is
concerned that instability in Nepal could hurt regional
stability and damage relations between the United States,
China and India. The failure by the King and the political
parties to start the reconciliation process has been
frustrating, with the only real winners being the Maoists,
who appear to be making progress towards their goal of
achieving absolute power in Nepal. Ambassador Moriarty
stressed the U.S. view that the King and the political
parties must work together to end the Maoist insurgency.
A Possible Visit by Dr. Kissinger
--------------
6. (C) The high level of mistrust between the parties and
the King has prevented a meeting between representatives
from the parties and the Palace, according to Ambassador
Moriarty. At the same time, Party leaders and the King are
unwilling to meet directly unless both sides believe the
talks will be a success. Ambassador Moriarty suggested
that perhaps a respected outsider could help the two sides
save face and therefore facilitate contacts; Dr. Kissinger
might have some interest in playing such a role. Luo was
enthusiastic about this possible approach and said that Dr.
Kissinger was very respected in China.
Party-by-Party Approach
--------------
7. (C) Commenting on the lack of consensus among the
political parties on how to deal with the King and the
Maoists, Luo asked the Ambassador whether one-on-one talks
with each of the major parties and the King could help
start a reconciliation dialogue. The Ambassador pointed
out that the King is trying to split the parties from one
another, and is playing with the idea of isolating the UML,
Nepal's second-largest party, entirely. Since isolating
the UML could drive it into the hands of the Maoists, there
is a danger to holding one-on-one talks.
China, U.S. and India Should Approach the Three Parties
-------------- --------------
8. () Luo then suggested that the U.S. and Chinese
Ambassadors in Nepal invite the three political parties and
Palace representatives to informal talks. Ambassador
Moriarty said this might be a useful idea, while stressing
the importance of Indian participation in such a process.
If India is not involved in the proposed talks, it would be
able to prevent any joint U.S.- China efforts from going
forward, he cautioned, noting that India has a large
footprint in Nepal, 60 percent of Nepal's trade is with
India and the Nepal government recognizes that it must work
with India. Luo professed surprise that India has that
strong an influence over Nepal.
India Likely First Victim of Maoist Victory
--------------
9. (C) India would be the first victim of a Maoist victory
in Nepal, Ambassador Moriarty stated. Maoists in Nepal and
India work together and have even signed an agreement to
establish a revolutionary base stretching from Bhutan
through Nepal to India. A Maoist victory would destabilize
India, cautioned Ambassador Moriarty, who pointed out that
the number of Indian districts with a Maoist presence has
grown rapidly. He suggested that India would likely be
forced to take strong actions in response to a Maoist
takeover in Nepal.
BEIJING 00005355 003 OF 004
10. (C) The President raised the Nepal issue with Prime
Minister Singh during his visit to India to ensure that
India is on the right track, Ambassador Moriarty told Luo.
The President and PM Singh publicly agreed that the Maoists
must renounce violence and that the King must reconcile
with the political parties. This was a very careful
formulation because of India's role in hosting talks
between Nepal's political parties and the Maoists. Under
this formulation India cannot treat the Maoists as a normal
political party if the Maoists continues to use violence
and terrorism to achieve its political goals, pointed out
Ambassador Moriarty.
Beijing's Position Closer to Washington's
--------------
11. (C) China is closer to the U.S. position on
reconciliation talks than it is to India's, according to
Luo. China and the United States share a common goal and
attitude toward the Maoists and the Royal family, he
stated. While Beijing and New Delhi discussed the Nepal
situation during their second round of their strategic
dialogue, the PRC still needs more time to work with the
Indian side on Nepal, according to Luo. Commenting that
since New Delhi would likely be unhappy to see China play a
larger role in Nepal, Luo suggested that perhaps the United
States should try to host the first round of possible
reconciliation talks. The Ambassador responded that if
India can be convinced to join in the talks, a very
powerful message would be sent to the King and the
political parties and offered to engage his Indian
counterpart on the possibility of talks. Luo said that
China and the United States should "informally give it a
try," saying that he would instruct the PRC Ambassador in
Kathmandu to work with Ambassador Moriarty.
U.S. Views on High-level Visits to Nepal
--------------
12. (C) Luo asked whether the United States views Tang's
recent trip to Nepal positively and how Washington would
respond to the King's request to visit China in May.
Ambassador Moriaty said that Tang's trip was important
because it maintained pressure on the King to start
reconciliation talks. He also cautioned Beijing to
seriously consider the timing of the King's trip and
suggested that the PRC put off the King's request until
progress is made in starting reconciliation talks. The
King would use a visit to Beijing to demonstrate that he is
still in control and does not need to reconcile with the
political parties. Luo said that China has "taken note" of
the King's request but has not accepted it yet. Ambassador
Moriarty suggested that China wait until it became clearer
whether the King was genuinely interested in
reconciliation, and stressed that it is important to keep
pressure on the King. He noted that April could be a very
crucial month for the Nepal government.
Nepal's Future
--------------
13. (C) Responding to Luo's question on Nepal's future,
Moriarty said that a compromise must be reached in the
coming weeks or Nepal faces a very dark future. If the
brittle government falls, the Maoists will likely come out
on top. Ambassador Moriarty pointed to January 14th as a
key turning point for the Maoist insurgency. Before then,
Nepal's government ministers were confident that Nepal
would overcome the Maoist insurgency. After the January 14
Maoist attack on a Royal government police post in the
Katmandu Valley, the Ministers began moving their assets
out of Nepal and openly began sharing their concerns.
After the attack, the Royal government realized that the
Maoists could carry out military strikes any where in
Nepal. The political parties are weak and have no weapons,
little money and are unable to generate popular protests
without Maoist support, because of the population's fear of
possible Maoist reprisals.
Comment
--------------
14. (C) Given China's important role in Nepal, it is worth
BEIJING 00005355 004 OF 004
exploring whether the GOI will veto out of hand any role by
the Chinese in pushing the King and political parties
towards reconciliation. Luo was a member of State
Councilor Tang Jiaxuan's delegation to Nepal March 16-18.
During the late 1990's, Luo served at the PRC Embassy in
Washington and worked on the India-Pakistan nuclear issue.
15. (U) This cable was cleared by Ambassador Moriarty.
RANDT