DAS CHRISTENSEN DISCUSSES NORTH KOREA AND TAIWAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 023883 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION TAGS: PREL PGOV CH KN KS JA SUBJECT: DAS CHRISTENSEN DISCUSSES NORTH KOREA AND TAIWAN WITH CHINA REFORM FORUM SCHOLARS Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David S. Sedney. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The North Korean nuclear problem should be the focus of the Six-Party Talks and we should not let other issues interfere with the primary goal of denuclearizing the DPRK, Vice Chairman of the China Reform Forum (CRF) DING Kuisong (strictly protect),told visiting EAP DAS Thomas Christensen on November 7. Failure to achieve progress on the nuclear issue in the next round of Six-Party Talks would likely lead to the Talks' failure, an outcome that would entail great political risk for China, as President HU Jintao himself has been managing the DPRK problem, Ding stated. YU Meihuan (strictly protect),Director of CRF's Center for Korean Peninsular Peace Studies, stressed that the DPRK nuclear issue cannot be solved overnight and therefore argued that the Six-Party Talks should act as a "crisis-management" mechanism while the parties work toward a final resolution. As a first step, Yu said the United States should compromise on financial "sanctions" in exchange for a "freeze" of the North Korean nuclear program. She proposed an eventual "high-value exchange" in which Washington would agree to normalization of relations and a permanent peace treaty in exchange for Pyongyang's denuclearization. In reply, DAS Christensen emphasized that the Six-Party Talks are not a crisis-management mechanism but rather a mechanism to denuclearize North Korea. Pyongyang needs to implement its commitments contained in the September 2005 Joint Statement and carry out a complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization. China's role in this process is crucial, DAS Christensen asserted, stating that Beijing needs to continue to apply pressure on Pyongyang and fully implement UNSCR 1718. The conversation closed with Ding Kuisong commenting briefly on the situation in Taiwan. End Summary. -------------- --- DPRK: YU Meihua Advocates "High-Value Exchange" -------------- --- ¶2. (C) EAP DAS Thomas Christensen's meeting at the China Reform Forum (CRF) on November 7 began with YU Meihua (strictly protect),Director of CRF's Center for Korean Peninsular Peace Studies, providing her views on the North Korean nuclear problem. Yu, a Korea expert who lived in North Korea for more than 25 years, emphasized that because the nuclear issue cannot be solved overnight, the Six-Party Talks should act as a "crisis-management" mechanism while the parties work toward a final resolution. She advocated a step-by-step process, whereby both the United States and North Korea would make compromises. Unless Pyongyang can be given "something," the talks will be "over," Yu stated. As a first step, Yu proposed that the United States compromise on "financial sanctions" in exchange for a "freeze" of the North Korean nuclear program. She proposed an eventual "high-value exchange" in which Washington would agree to normalization of relations and a permanent peace treaty in exchange for Pyongyang's denuclearization. ¶3. (C) Although pessimistic about the chances of North Korea giving up its nuclear weapons anytime soon, Yu said the situation is not completely hopeless. She argued that the DPRK's concern about the "security threat posed by the United States" was the primary reason for its developing nuclear weapons, and that, therefore, the United States carries the greatest responsibility for solving the nuclear problem. Therefore, for Pyongyang, developing nuclear weapons has enhanced its security, provided it with a negotiating card, raised its international position and increased domestic unity. As a result, the DPRK will not easily give up these weapons. There are, however, certain scenarios under which it might do so. The first would be Kim Jong-Il's death or removal by some sort of domestic rebellion. (Even this would not guarantee North Korea's denuclearization, however, as that would depend on who succeeded Kim and whether that person was one of the "very few" pro-American (qinmei) North Koreans.) The second possible scenario is an external overthrow of the Kim Jong- Il regime. The third is the "high-value exchange" Yu mentioned above, in which Washington would trade normalization of relations and a comprehensive peace for Pyongyang's denuclearization. She considered this third approach by far the most likely to succeed but said its prospect for success was less than 100 percent. ¶4. (C) While China shares the goals of denuclearizing North BEIJING 00023883 002 OF 003 Korea and will continue to implement UNSCR 1718, its tactics on dealing with Pyongyang differ from the United States, Yu said. Regarding the use of pressure, Yu told DAS Christensen that even though China can "understand" U.S. requests for increasing pressure on North Korea, China's "long history" of relations with Pyongyang has taught it that the more one pressures the Koreans, the more they resist. Nevertheless, Yu conceded that pressure had played a role in bringing the DPRK back to the Six-Party Talks, though she argued that Pyongyang's increased "confidence" following its successful nuclear test was also a significant factor. Chinese and American views on the nature of the North Korean threat also differ, Yu stated. North Korea is located far from the mainland United States, but it sits right on China's border. Beijing fears that an unstable North Korea could lead to large refugee flows into China. Under such circumstances, even terrorists and suicide bombers could enter China, Yu asserted. Though China has an important role to play, it is the United States and North Korea that will determine the outcome of the Six-Party Talks, Yu averred. The North Koreans do not want anything from China, she argued, what they want is to deal directly with the United States. ¶5. (C) Responding to Yu's "high-value exchange" comments, DAS Christensen emphasized that what Pyongyang needs to do is to implement its commitments contained in the September 2005 Joint Statement and to carry out a complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization. That agreement already contains security guarantees, as well as positive economic and diplomatic incentives for North Korea. Therefore, it makes no sense to propose that the United States make some sort of compromise in exchange for possible DPRK denuclearization. The DPRK must first start to carry out the denuclearization to which it has already committed itself. DAS Christensen said the Six-Party Talks are not a crisis-management mechanism but rather a mechanism to denuclearize North Korea. China's role in the talks will continue to be crucial. Beijing must continue to both implement UNSCR 1718 and apply pressure to the DPRK. Noting Yu's comments on China's concerns about the "threat" of DPRK refugee flows, DAS Christensen told her that the threat to China from continued North Korean development of nuclear weapons is certainly greater still. The consequences of the threat these weapons pose to Japan, the United States, the East Asian region and the entire world are unpredictable and extremely serious. Moreover, failure to solve the DPRK nuclear problem carries great opportunity costs, as successful Six-Party Talks could create a precedent for future multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia. -------------- -------------- DPRK: DING Kuisong Urges Focus on Denuclearization -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Vice Chairman of the China Reform Forum DING Kuisong (strictly protect),who joined the meeting in progress, emphasized that it is essential to must remain focused on the North Korean nuclear problem and not to allow other issues to interfere with the ultimate goal of the Six-Party Talks, which is the denuclearization of the DPRK. Denuclearizing North Korea is far more important than financial issues or concerns over refugees. Furthermore, the goal should not be regime change. If what we seek is regime change, we will find it very difficult to get North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons, Ding stated. Failure to achieve progress on the nuclear issue in the next round of Six-Party Talks would likely lead to the Talks' failure, an outcome that would entail great political risk for China, as President HU Jintao himself has been managing the DPRK problem, Ding stated. Although Beijing will resolutely implement UNSCR 1718, we must think of comprehensive, creative measures, apart from pressure, to bring about a diplomatic solution to the DPRK nuclear problem. ¶7. (C) DAS Christensen replied that the U.S. goal in the Six-Party Talks is not regime change, but the denuclearization of the DPRK through diplomatic means. The September 2005 Joint Statement is a comprehensive agreement that contains the elements necessary to solve the problem and enable the DPRK to improve the economic situation for the North Korean people. But Pyongyang must first fulfill its promises contained in that agreement. Pyongyang is merely using the "financial sanctions" issue as an excuse to avoid carrying out its commitments, DAS Christensen stated, warning Ding and Yu not to believe DPRK excuses. At the time of the September 2005 Joint Statement, our financial measures had not yet begun to affect North Korea, yet Pyongyang rejected that agreement within 24 hours of BEIJING 00023883 003 OF 003 its signing. He stressed that if the DPRK does not denuclearize, U.S. measures will become stricter. If such measures lead to instability in North Korea, China would have Pyongyang, not the United States, to blame. -------------- Taiwan: The "Second Crisis" Facing China -------------- ¶8. (C) Ding Kuisong described the situation in Taiwan as the "second crisis," along with North Korea, that China faces in East Asia. Ding said it would be best for Taiwan and its democratic future for Chen Shui-bian to resign peacefully. If that were to happen, Annette Lu would succeed Chen and then the KMT would likely come to power in ¶2008. Nevertheless, several variables make the situation unpredictable. First, Shi Ming-teh, former DPP leader and head of the recall Chen movement, is ill with cancer and near death. Were he in fact to die soon, he could become a "hero" or "martyr" to the recall Chen campaign. Furthermore, Chen Shui-bian's wife, Wu Shu-chen, is also quite ill, Ding claimed, and some say she may die before the year's end, which also could change the Taiwan political dynamic. Lee Teng-hui is another factor that must be taken into account. Though suffering from heart trouble, Lee might take advantage of a Chen resignation to try to attract some DPP support to himself, Ding said. While Beijing hopes the United States will take action to get Chen Shui-bian to "do something," China itself will not attempt to exert any influence in Taiwan, Ding said. DAS Christensen said the United States would nt be attempting to influence the outcome of the current political disputes in Taiwan. We support democracy and the rule of law, but we do not support any individual leader. We hope to see stability in Taiwan and the avoidance of violence by the parties involved, DAS Christensen stated. ¶9. (U) DAS Christensen cleared this message. Randt