BEIJING SCHOLARS ON DPRK DEVELOPMENTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 021796 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MARR CH KS KN SUBJECT: BEIJING SCHOLARS ON DPRK DEVELOPMENTS Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Daniel Shields. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) China's issuance of a tough statement in reaction to the DPRK claimed nuclear test reflected President Hu Jintao's anger over Pyongyang's defiance, according to Beijing think tanker An Hongquan (protect). The Chinese leadership was particularly "shocked and angered" by the timing of the DPRK test, which came during the Communist Party Plenum and on the heels of Japanese Prime Minister Abe's visit to Beijing, said Party School scholar Qin Zhilai (protect). An said China's serious consideration of punitive measures against the DPRK will be tempered by China's desire to preserve the possibility of dialogue with Pyongyang by not being perceived as tracking too closely with the position of the United States. Party School scholar Liu Jianfei (protect) was sure that China would be willing to support some sanctions, but said China would have difficulty with some of the proposals made by the United States and Japan, particularly intrusive inspections and interdiction activities. Qin was "extremely pessimistic" about the possibility of resuming the Six-Party Talks, arguing that Pyongyang's objective is to establish itself as a nuclear power and that North Korea has no intention of abandoning its nuclear weapons. The USD 24 million in DPRK funds currently frozen in Macau are inflicting greater hardship on the North Korean regime than initially assumed, An said. End Summary. Hu Jintao's Ire Dictates Tough PRC Reaction -------------- ¶2. (C) China's issuance of a tough statement in reaction to the DPRK nuclear test was directly due to President Hu Jintao taking personal offense over Pyongyang's defiance of China's October 3 warning not to go through with the test, said State Council Institute of World Development Deputy Director An Hongquan (protect) in an October 13 discussion with poloffs. This was the second time the DPRK had defied President Hu in little more than three months, An added, the first being after the July missile test when Kim Jong-Il refused to meet with Hu's envoy Vice Premier Hui Liangyu in Pyongyang. Hu had personally requested the meeting through the North Korean Ambassador in Beijing, but Kim still "did not listen." ¶3. (C) The Chinese leadership was particularly "shocked and angered" by the timing of the DPRK test, said Central Party School Institute of International Strategic Studies scholar Qin Zhilai (protect) in a separate conversation with poloff on October 13. The nuclear test came on the heels of Japanese Prime Minister Abe's visit to Beijing and during the October 8-11 Communist Party Plenum, when China's senior leadership had neither the time nor ability to influence Pyongyang's decision. In a separate conversation on October 12, Central Party School scholar Liu Jianfei (protect) told poloff that many officials and scholars are calling for a tougher Chinese line toward the DPRK and Chinese opinion has begun to shift in this direction. ¶4. (C) According to Ma Licheng, former People's Daily editor and long-time Embassy contact, China's adoption of a harder line toward North Korea is "one of Hu Jintao's three most important accomplishments" to date (the other two being restarting a real China-Japan dialogue and sacking of Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Liangyu). Nevertheless, even though it is a substantive change, its practical impact may not be that great. Ma said there has long been no love lost between Chinese leaders and Kim Jong-Il, claiming that even Jiang Zemin has long been frustrated with Kim. Ma related a series of past incidents in which Kim reportedly exasperated the Chinese leadership, including constantly changing his mind on whether and when he would visit China or talk to the Chinese leadership and insisting that he get off his train and be greeted at locations of his choosing, and not those of Hu Jintao's, when Kim previously visited China. ¶5. (C) The scale of the DPRK claimed nuclear blast was smaller than it should have been and measured only 1,500 tons, An stated, noting the DPRK might conduct another test. The test prompted a Chinese government-wide emergency action meeting to assess potential threats to China from the test, both in terms of possible radiation drift and possible North Korean refugees seeking shelter at the Chinese border crossing in Dandong, said An. Both An and Qin noted a growing anxiety among many government and think tank analysts over North Korea's unpredictable nature and both expressed their reservations regarding China's ability to influence North Korea. Sanctions: Will China Support? BEIJING 00021796 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶6. (C) China's serious consideration of punitive measures being discussed by the UNSC, the United States, and regional players will be tempered by China's desire to preserve opportunities for dialogue within the China-DPRK relationship and to avoid being perceived as tracking too closely to the position of the United States, An said. In reality, China's position towards the DPRK has actually moved much closer philosophically to that of the United States as a result of the test. An believed the shift may become more evident in the future, but for now China will look for a resolution that expresses its full displeasure with Pyongyang's actions, but that is more symbolic in nature and has a specified time limit. ¶7. (C) Lamenting the "dilemma" that China faces on the sanctions issue, Qin said voting for a sanctions resolution is a difficult choice. Pyongyang's insecurity is part of what is driving its behavior, and some in Beijing believe that Chinese support for sanctions would only further destabilize the situation. China at all costs wants to avoid a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula, which would likely lead to refugee flows that could impact China's domestic stability and could even draw in China, given its treaty obligations to North Korea. The "influential interest groups" affiliated with the state-owned enterprises that supply North Korea with oil strongly oppose the imposition of sanctions on the DPRK. ¶8. (C) Liu was sure that China would be willing to support some sanctions, including those on luxury goods and possibly other products. He agreed, however, that China would have difficulty with some of the proposals made by the United States and Japan, particularly intrusive inspections and interdiction activities. Six-Party Talks: Possibility of Resumption? -------------- ¶9. (C) Even though Beijing still hopes it can persuade Pyongyang to return to the talks, Qin said he was "extremely pessimistic" about the likelihood of that happening. The international community's and Pyongyang's objectives are diametrically opposed: the world still hopes to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program, while the DPRK's objective is to establish itself as a nuclear power that has no intention of abandoning its nuclear weapons, he declared. ¶10. (C) The DPRK's reaction to the USD 24 million in funds frozen in Macau illustrates how desperate the DPRK government has become, An stated. DPRK's triage attempts on several converging problems, including rural flooding, government bankruptcy and the leadership's weakening domestic control, may have pushed DPRK toward the nuclear test, An said. He claimed the DPRK had even suggested that if China would just lend them the USD 24 million, they would return to the Six-Party Talks. China has declined to take the offer seriously, An said. Randt