TAKEDOWN OF SHANGHAI PARTY BOSS GETS ATTENTION OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 020986 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2031 TAGS: PGOV CH SUBJECT: TAKEDOWN OF SHANGHAI PARTY BOSS GETS ATTENTION OF OTHER LOCAL DONS AND SETS TONE FOR PARTY PLENUM REF: A. BEIJING 20360 ¶B. BEIJING 20677 ¶C. SHANGHAI 6381 ¶D. SHANGHAI 6344 Classified By: Political Internal Unit Chief Susan Thornton. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The significance of the sacking of Shanghai Party Secretary and Politburo Member Chen Liangyu this week lies in SIPDIS the shock effect it will have on headstrong local leaders who put their parochial (and sometimes personal) interests ahead of their responsibilities to the central leadership, Beijing-based contacts asserted. While they allowed that Chen has long been targeted for removal by President Hu Jintao and that his ouster clearly shows that Hu's authority is ascendant, they stressed that viewing Chen's sacking as a power play aimed at cutting down the Shanghai faction is oversimplified. Chen himself had come to symbolize the problem of local Party dons who flout the center's directives, and run their fiefdoms with impunity. Implication in a serious corruption scandal was a pretext for bringing Chen down, but had the added benefit of making him indefensible and dovetailed with the Party's continuing anti-corruption mantra, lending popular support to the ouster and drowning out any speculation about power politics. All contacts with whom we spoke said Chen's dismissal was a consensus decision done with the approval of Jiang Zemin and other leaders. What President Hu might have offered to get others' support remains an open question. Regardless, the Center now has local leaders' attention on the eve of the October Party Plenum and has set the tone for what will be seen as the Hu era. End Summary. BEIJING ABUZZ WITH TALK OF CHEN'S DISMISSAL -------------- ¶2. (C) Political circles in Beijing are abuzz with talk about the dismissal of Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Liangyu. Contacts with whom poloffs have spoken this week were unanimous is arguing that Chinese leadership politics is a highly complex game. They saw a variety of motives behind Chen's takedown and were generally dismissive of media reports that focused solely on Chen's demise as a power play by Hu Jintao to smash the Shanghai faction and move his cronies into place in advance of next fall's leadership shuffle at the 17th Party Congress. CENTER'S REASSERTION OF AUTHORITY -------------- ¶3. (C) Chen's sacking was designed to reassert the center's authority and send a clear message to local leaders that flouting of central directives, especially on economic retrenchment, will no longer be tolerated, according to two contacts. According to Zhang Xiantang (protect),a senior editor at the State Council Development Research Center paper China Economic Times, Chinese society and its political interest groups are increasingly complex and fragmented. Everyone is out for themselves, Zhang said, and no one looks out for the interests of the entire country or the "common man." Hu Jintao and the collective leadership have recognized that they are in danger of losing control, Zhang argued, so they decided to act decisively to reassert the Central Government's authority. ¶4. (C) In a separate conversation with Huang Shan (protect), journalist at Caijing magazine, which wrote a prominent investigative article on the Shanghai pension fund scandal in August, Shanghai set the "worst example" by blatantly ignoring central directives on economic retrenchment, especially in its real estate market. Shanghai is far from the only locality guilty of ignoring the center's directives, Huang averred, but humbling that city's Party Secretary is perhaps the most effective way to get the attention of other unruly local leaders elsewhere in China. Referring to the Chinese idiom, "kill the chicken to scare the monkeys," Zhang asserted that taking down the Party Secretary of China's largest city sends a clear message to other local leaders that if they continue to defy Beijing, the center will not hesitate to use the "crudest of means" to bring them down. WHEN CORRUPTION IS BEAUTIFUL -------------- ¶5. (C) Contacts differed on the role that the corruption charges against Chen played in his downfall, but the official spin is clearly tied to the anti-corruption angle. Zhang and BEIJING 00020986 002 OF 003 Huang said the focus on the corruption charges was merely "propaganda" designed to cover the center's real motives and gain public support for Chen's removal. Toppling a corrupt leader is sure to win popular support, they noted, acknowledging that corruption is a major issue that presents a real threat to Party legitimacy. Nevertheless, there are hordes of corrupt leaders in China, Huang asserted, so corruption alone can not explain Chen's downfall. The corruption scandal makes it a "neat and beautiful package," Zhang argued. ¶6. (C) Cao Huayin (protect),Deputy Secretary General of Zheng Bijian's China Reform Forum, hewed more closely to the Party line, arguing that corruption is precisely the reason that Chen was dismissed. The Party is truly serious about cracking down on corruption, he declared. Removing Chen, just before next month's Plenum, sends a clear message to other leaders that, this time, the Party is serious about stamping out corruption. He dismissed factional politics as a motive. If Hu really wanted to "smash" the Shanghai faction, Cao argued, there are "bigger fish to go after" than Chen Liangyu. ¶7. (C) Journalist for China Newsweek Wang Gang (protect) asserted that the Shanghai case comes amid a stepped-up Central effort to combat corruption following scandals in Tianjin and Beijing. Wang, who is from Shanghai and previously worked on Shanghai Party Committee-controlled newspaper, railed against Chen, citing his arrogance, cronyism and iron-fisted control of the Shanghai political machine. Wang stated that the scandal would continue to unfurl, netting many other important Shanghai officials before it was over. On September 28, Chinese media reported that the head of Chen's office, Sun Luyi, had been detained and was "assisting investigators." Huang insisted, however, that it would go no higher than Chen. Politburo Standing Committee members are "gold plated," he said in an indirect reference to the ailing Executive Vice Premier Huang Ju, who was also rumored to be implicated in the scandal. ¶8. (C) Former Farmer's Daily editor-in-chef and political insider Zhang Guangyou (protect) told poloffs that while the scandal could not be viewed outside the prism of China's power politics, the current leadership is serious about fighting corruption in an attempt to ensure social stability. Shanghai had become a "cesspool" of corruption and abuse of power, Zhang stated. The problem became too blatant to gloss over, he said, but then stressed that even the act of removing the Shanghai Party Secretary would, in the long run, have little effect on corruption. JIANG'S CHOP -------------- ¶9. (C) Hu Jinto's positon is undoubtedly strengthened by Cen's downfall, but contacts argued that this was a decision that had broad-based approval, including from Jiang Zemin. Several posited that Hu had to cut deals to buy other leaders' agreement to Chen's sacking, though they said the details "will never be known." Zhang Xiantang guessed that Hu made a deal directly with Jiang Zemin, possibly over changes in the Politburo Standing Committee that will be unveiled at next fall's Party Congress. Huang Shan also thought that Hu would have been forced to "purchase" the agreement of other leaders, but he viewed the whole process as more complex. Interest groups among the leadership break down along overlapping lines defined by business interests, geographic ties, ideology, and old-fashioned cronyism, Huang stated. ¶10. (C) In any case, contacts we spoke with agreed that Hu Jintao could not have engineered Chen's sacking on his own as a blatant power play. Huang observed that such a move would simply not fit Hu's cautious style and would be "avenged" by Hu's opponents in the future. Hu understands that he will gain the most from this move by not overplaying his hand, Huang said, who predicted that Hu would appoint a "neutral" figure to take over the Shanghai leadership. ¶11. (C) Chen Liangyu may have been vulnerable for other reasons. Huang noted that the position of Chen's Shanghai protectors has weakened over the past year. With Jiang Zemin no longer occupying formal positions of authority, and Politburo Standing Committee member and Jiang ally Huang Ju ill with cancer, Chen probably looked like an easier target than before. In addition, Zhang claimed, Chen is widely disliked. He is known to be "overbearing and high-handed," and the Party has long received a stream of complaints about his behavior in Shanghai. That may have made other leaders reluctant to come to his defense. Zhang commented that it also is in the interests of all the top leaders, including BEIJING 00020986 003 OF 003 Jiang, to see that "things do not spin out of control." TIMING TIED TO PLENUM -------------- ¶12. (C) The timing of Chen's dismissal is directly tied to the Party's Sixth Plenum that will open on October 8, all contacts agreed. There is no doubt that the Party has the attention of local leaders now, Zhang Xiantang argued. Prior to Chen's sacking, local leaders would have been inclined to continue ignoring the center and not attach much importance to the Plenum. In light of Chen's "brutal" dismissal, he argued, Central Committee members will show up at the Plenum paying close attention to events and more inclined to follow orders. Both Cao and Huang Shan shared this assessment, noting that, regardless whether the objective was to reassert the center's authority or to tackle corruption, sacking Chen right before the Plenum was timed for maximum effect. MEDIA MUZZLED -------------- ¶13. (C) Media coverage of the Shanghai story has been carefully controlled and designed to emphasize the Party's anti-corruption campaign and the "unanimous" support Chen's dismissal has received from other leaders, including those in Shanghai, and from the general public. Media contacts state that on Monday the Propaganda Department issued strict guidelines for coverage of the Shanghai reshuffle. The rules centered around the "three don'ts": -- Don't disrupt relations among leaders; -- Don't disrupt relations between current leaders and past leaders; -- Don't disrupt relations between central leaders and local leaders. Several journalists have told poloffs that there is a blackout on coverage that strays from official Xinhua reports, even though many journalists are chomping at the bit to cover the story. One journalist noted that several bloggers had changed the title of their blogs to include the phrase "disrupt relations" in a show of black humor. STAGE SET FOR OPENING OF PLENUM ON OCTOBER 8 -------------- ¶14. (C) Having timed this to get the attention of Party members prior to the Party's annual gathering, the stage is now set for the Plenum to open October 8 in Beijing. While personnel discussions at Plenums are rarely made public, Zhang argued that any change in the membership of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) is unlikely and will occur only at next year's Party Congress. There will, however, likely be discussion of the general parameters of next year's changes, such as the size of the PBSC and qualifications for new Politburo members. Decisions regarding Chen's status as a Politburo member will also be discussed, he said. (Note: Chen is currently suspended from the Politburo. End note.) On policy changes at the Plenum, contacts said there would be no major departures from the current line, although the official theme, "Harmonious Society," will be further emphasized and clarified. The basic message will be, now that we've got your attention, here's the direction we want to go on policy and we expect you all to toe the line, Zhang said. COMMENT -------------- ¶15. (C) In China, every corruption case is political. The Chen Liangyu case is clearly no exception. With corruption so widespread, virtually any leader can be brought down at any time. Hu's desires to take out Chen have long been rumored and having done so clearly enhances Hu's stature. Nevertheless, Hu could not have achieved this stunning outcome without widespread support. Taking out Chen underscores the Center's seriousness on anti-corruption, strengthens Hu's position and reasserts the principle of localities' fealty to the Center. Hu has gotten the Party's attention and dramatically set the tone for what will be seen as the Hu era. SEDNEY