CHINESE SCHOLARS, MEDIA REACT TO DPRK MISSILE TESTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 014218

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2031
TAGS: PGOV PREL MCAP CH KN
SUBJECT: CHINESE SCHOLARS, MEDIA REACT TO DPRK MISSILE TESTS

REF: A. BEIJING 14173

B. BEIJING 14109

Classified By: Political Section Chief Robert
Griffiths. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) The DPRK's July 4/5 missile tests will likely
not significantly alter China's policy toward North
Korea and the nuclear issue, scholars and media
contacts told us. The United States can expect a
tougher tone from Beijing toward the DPRK but no
willingness to take concrete action such as imposing
tighter sanctions. China is engaged in a balancing
act, one scholar said, attempting to prevent North
Korea from committing provocative actions while also
trying to keep the United States from "going too far"
and taking measures that China believes could
destabilize the region. At the same time, the tests
probably do not mean the DPRK intends to abandon the
Six-Party Talks. Rather, the test may constitute a
DPRK effort to improve its negotiating position for
future rounds. Media coverage has been
straightforward, but the missile tests have not been
front page news. Contacts said the Propaganda
Department has issued guidelines banning opinion
pieces in the press and restricting content to
official Xinhua wire service copy. End Summary.


2. (C) Most of our regular interlocutors on North
Korea are as yet unwilling to engage in discussion
with us, pending a clear indication from central
authorities as to the direction in China's policy.
They noted that they had seen little so far regarding
the missile launches from Chinese sources and had to
rely primarily on U.S. and Japanese news sources.
Even so, we were able to get some sense of how the
issue is resonating with Chinese intellectuals.

No Dramatic Shift Likely
--------------


3. (C) The United States should not expect a dramatic
shift in China's North Korea policy in the wake of the
July 4/5 missile tests, said Shi Yinhong (protect),
Director of the Center for American Studies at Renmin
University. China is unlikely to take significant
concrete action beyond "going in the direction of
being harsher" in its statements about the launches.
In Shi's view, Chinese Ambassador to the United
Nations Wang Guangya's comments that the missile tests
have had a "non-beneficial" effect on security and
stability in northeast Asia reflect the tougher tone.
Nonetheless, China's views on how to handle the DPRK
weapons programs have not changed. China wants to
achieve a denuclearized Korean peninsula through
peaceful negotiation. Shi predicted that China will
remain unwilling to support using tougher tools, such
as tighter sanctions, to influence the DPRK's
behavior, Shi predicted.


4. (C) As for how the missile tests might influence
China's approach to ties with the United States, the
Government is engaged in a difficult balancing act,
Shi said. On one hand, China wants to prevent the
DPRK from taking highly provocative actions. On the
other, China wants to keep the United States from
"going too far" in terms of sanctions or other
measures that might threaten regional stability.
There is no doubt China would prefer not to have a
nuclear-armed North Korea as a neighbor, but does not
believe it can go beyond negotiations to achieve this.

Negotiating Tactic?
--------------


5. (C) What the missile tests mean in terms of moving
forward with the Six-Party Talks is hard to gauge,
said Tao Wenzhao (protect),a former scholar from the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and frequent
television commentator. He added that it is hard to
imagine what the North Koreans think they will gain
from the launches, speculating that the tests do not
necessarily indicate North Korea has given up on
negotiations. More likely the DPRK is trying to
position itself more advantageously for the next round
of talks. The DPRK may have taken inspiration from
the Iranians, who appear to be getting more attention,
and a better deal, via threatening behavior and being
tough.

BEIJING 00014218 002 OF 002




6. (C) Tao speculated that Pyongyang is intentionally
attempting to annoy and provoke the United States and
Japan, partly because of frustration over the
financial sanctions issue. In this connection, North
Korea may also simply be feeling anxious and
impatient. The missile tests could signify a sense in
the DPRK government that something needed to be done
to change the dynamic ahead of the next round of
talks. Nonetheless, Tao acknowledged that even if the
DPRK actions amount to posturing, the unintended
result could be a deterioration in the security
situation in Northeast Asia.

Launch Further Slows 2005 Momentum
--------------


7. (C) Vice President of the China Institute for
International Studies Ruan Zongze (protect) said the
DPRK launch was very unfortunate and a continuation of
actions that have harmed the Six-Party process. Ruan
expressed his personal view that the financial
sanctions placed on the DPRK had also slowed the
momentum of the Talks that peaked last year following
the Joint Statement. The DPRK action should be viewed
as Pyongyang wanting to attract attention because it
believes that the United States has been pro-occupied
with other international issues and is no longer
interested in making progress in the Six-Party Talks.
He speculated that VFM Wu Dawei would make a strong
effort to calm tensions and move the DPRK back to the
table when he visits Pyongyang next week, accompanying
Vice Premier Hui Liangyu in his visit there to
celebrate the forty-fifth anniversary of the China-
DPRK Friendship Treaty.

Media Hews to Official Line
--------------


8. (C) Chinese media have presented straightforward
but hardly blanket coverage of the DPRK missile tests.
China Central Television news broadcasts have repeated
impartial news dispatches featuring the DPRK's
confirmation of the launches, reactions from foreign
countries (including the United States),activity at
the United Nations and the Chinese MFA's official
statement. Most major dailies have relegated the
story to inside pages, running only official Xinhua
wire service copy. Internet news sites were slightly
more colorful. Xinhua included on its website front
page a small section with a graphic of a DPRK missile
and links to previous reports on the facts of the
launch. CCTV's website reported DPRK's confirmation
of the launch but carried fewer links to other reports
than Xinhua, while the People's Daily site carried no
visible links to the missile story on its front page.


9. (C) The Propaganda Department has issued
guidelines banning opinion pieces regarding the
missile launches in the press and restricting content
to official Xinhua wire service copy, said Zhou
Qing'an (protect),who regularly contributes
commentary on international issues to the progressive
daily Beijing News. Zhou said that writing commentary
about the DPRK is difficult even beyond the context of
the missile tests because censors normally forbid
critical pieces about the North Korean regime. As a
result, he has decided not try to contribute anything
on the missile tests to the Beijing News. "If you
want to write the truth, it will never get published,"
Zhou complained.
RANDT