PATRIOTIC EDUCATION FOR IMAMS IN XINJIANG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 011606

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2031
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PINS KISL CH
SUBJECT: PATRIOTIC EDUCATION FOR IMAMS IN XINJIANG

REF: A. 05 BEIJING 9382

B. BEIJING 8788

C. STATE 74399

Classified By: Classified by Acting Political Internal Unit Chief
Susan Thornton. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
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1. (C) Local authorities in the Xinjiang Uighur
Autonomous Region in China's far northwest are
stepping up efforts to cultivate "patriotic" religious
personnel through a second round of intensive
training, according to local officials. Following an
initial round of patriotic training from 2001-2005,
the current round includes classes on law, science,
Chinese language, Xinjiang's "achievements" and the
"proper" interpretation of the Koran. Stressing the
close relations between the Government and religious
figures in Xinjiang, officials noted that many
religious leaders enjoy government stipends and occupy
various official posts. Foreign Muslim communities
have not provided financial assistance to Uighur
communities nor produced the same factionalism among
the Uighurs that exists between the Arabian-influenced
Hui Muslims in China. End Summary.

Xinjiang Focuses on Patriotic Training
--------------


2. (C) Xinjiang has launched another round of
patriotic training aimed at cultivating current and
future local religious leaders, Xinjiang Religious and
Ethnic Affairs Commission Deputy Director Ma Jin told
poloffs during a late May visit to the Xinjiang Uighur
Autonomous Region (XUAR). During the first round of
training from 2001-2005, 9,780 training sessions were
held for patriotic religious personnel from southwest
Xinjiang's Khotan Prefecture alone as part of the
Government's "effort to protect religious freedom
while safeguarding national unity and reform,"
according to Khotan Ethnic and Religious Affairs
Commission Deputy Director Metnaz Moussa. The current
education campaign, which will run until 2008, aims to
train all of the XUAR's approximately 27,000 religious
personnel, Ma stated.


3. (C) Ma claimed that the training is not aimed at
fostering patriotism, but rather at "cultivating"
religious leaders who are "already patriotic." He
stated that the courses give religious leaders a
better understanding of Xinjiang's history, the
Government's "achievements" and the support the XUAR
has received from Beijing over the past 50 years. In
addition to these topics, the training offers
instruction in Chinese language, law and science.
Classes are being conducted in a range of
institutions, including at the Urumqi-based Xinjiang
Islamic Theological Seminary, at the XUAR's four
Islamic Institutes and smaller-scale "classes" in
mosques and imam's homes. The duration of the
training varies, depending on the needs of the local
Muslim community, Ma said.


4. (C) Training of Khotan prefecture's 4,997
registered religious practitioners, who service 4,330
mosques, has helped increase their religious, legal,
scientific and technical knowledge, stated Metnaz.
The curriculum, designed by the local Islamic
Association under the leadership of the Ethnic and
Religious Affairs Commission and United Front Work
Department (UFWD),has helped imams understand the
Koran "properly," he remarked. The training also
helps religious leaders to better understand and
explain the officially sanctioned "wo er ci" or
"Koranic Teachings," devised to avoid varying
interpretations of the Koran that might lead to
divisions within China's Islamic community (see Ref
A).

Imams As Politicians
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5. (C) The local government encourages religious

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practitioners to simultaneously pursue a secular
occupation, Metnaz stated, noting that 2,323 of
Khotan's religious leaders work in some sort of
business. Emphasizing the government's "attention" to
its religious workers, he reported that the Khotan
Government has distributed 6.56 million RMB (USD 820
thousand) to 4,180 religious personnel since 2005.
"Political positions" have been given to 435 religious
leaders, including one National People's Congress
(NPC) deputy and one Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference (CPPCC) deputy, four China
Islamic Association members and various local people's
congress deputies.


6. (C) Lei Xianling, Deputy Director of the Ethnic
and Religious Affairs Commission of the central
Xinjiang Bayingolin Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture,
which has small Buddhist and Christian populations,
remarked that religious affairs management is a
"service" provided to the religious community. He
reported that 61 percent of the prefecture's religious
personnel receive a government stipend. All religious
workers serving on a government body receive a salary
of 150-1,500 RMB (USD 19-190) per month. The
Bayingolin prefecture government has helped train 78
religious personnel between 2001 and 2005 and the
2005-2008 sessions will include 84 people, Lei noted.
He highlighted that the local government sent a young
Buddhist monk who was identified as a reincarnate
Buddha to train at the Labrang Monastery in Gansu
Province.

Training the "Next Generation"
--------------


7. (C) In order to cultivate Khotan's next generation
of religious leaders, 220 religious leaders are in the
process of training 841 "talibs" who range in age from
18 t 25. About one-fourth of these students have
already been assigned religious leadership positions,
Metnaz noted. Khotan Ethnic and Religious Affairs
Commission Party Secretary He Chengang explained that
in order to qualify as a teacher, the imam or khatib
must be approved by the local Islamic Association.
The teacher must also be "politically healthy,"
meaning that he is patriotic, does not possess any
terrorist or extremist views and is educated, He
remarked.


8. (C) A teacher generally does not accept more than
three students in order to avoid being "overburdened."
An apprenticeship usually lasts three years, which is
sufficient to prepare students for the qualifying
exam. The Khotan Islamic Association has sent 21
"advanced" religious students on three-month courses
at the Islamic Theological Seminary in Urumqi and 42
others to study on five-year programs in Urumqi or the
China Islamic Theological Seminary in Beijing. A few
Islamic students, including the current imam at the
main Jamai Mosque in Khotan, have studied at Al-Azhar
in Cairo through a regular program organized by the
China Islamic Association.


9. (C) Questioned about restrictions on religious
activities for those under 18, Party Secretary He
argued that minors under the age of 18 do not
understand the nature of religion and must first focus
on the study of science and culture. Parents are
responsible for their child's education and must
ensure their child receives a standard education in
accordance with Chinese law. In conversations with
Poloffs, many local Muslims confirmed the prohibition
on minors participating in any form of religious
activity, including prayer attendance, while noting
that religious education still frequently occurs
within the home. Highlighting the sensitivity of the
issue, officials from Kashgar Prefecture's Yarkand
County stopped a local UK Save the Children (SC) child
protection program once officials realized that the UN
Covenant on the Rights of the Child (CRC) distributed
by SC contained a clause protecting a child's right to
religion, according to Urumqi-based SC Xinjiang
Program Manager Mark Jenkins (protect).

Foreign Muslims Have Limited Influence

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10. (C) Asked if Khotan receives any financial
assistance from the outside Muslim world, He Chengang
remarked that according to the 2005 religious affairs
regulations, foreigners are theoretically permitted to
invest in local communities experiencing economic
hardships. The government, however, has seen no such
applications, he said. Regarding factionalism in the
Uighur community, Deputy Director Ma observed that
religious factionalism among Uighurs is much less
common than among the Hui (Ref B). The only non-Sufi
mosque in Khotan belongs to a small ethnic Tajik
community, which subscribes to Shi'a Islam, Khotan's
Metnaz noted. In separate conversations with Poloffs,
most Uighurs identified themselves simply as Sufi
Muslims and played down factionalism within the Uighur
community. Outside a large mosque in Korla, capital
of Bayingolin Prefecture, an elderly Uighur quietly
acknowledged, nonetheless, that 30 percent of the
Uighur population is Wahhabi, while adding that the
government does not recognize this group.
RANDT