SUNNI MOSQUES CLOSE IN BASRAH AGAIN AS VIOLENCE SURGES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000089 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/30/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM SOCI SMIG KISL IZ SUBJECT: SUNNI MOSQUES CLOSE IN BASRAH AGAIN AS VIOLENCE SURGES REF: A) BASRAH 46, B) BASRAH 78, C) BASRAH 35, D) BASRAH 54 BASRAH 00000089 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Mark Marrano, DEPUTY REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO BASRAH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Since the end of March, violence targeting the Sunni minority in Basrah has produced sensational headlines in the local news and a growing stack of bodies in local morgues. With a new rash of high-profile killings since May 10, the Sunni Endowment closed its mosques in Basrah from May 26 to 28. One of the most moderate Sunni imams in Basrah and an outspoken advocate for tolerance and nonviolence, Sheikh Khalid al Mullah, has fled the city temporarily out of concern for his safety. The number of displaced Sunni from Basrah continues to grow. End Summary. Sunni Mosques Close Again in Basrah -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) On May 26, the REO received media reports that the Basrah Sunni Endowment had closed all Sunni mosques in Basrah. Nathim Hammad, the head of the Sunni Endowment security committee, confirmed this information to the REO by telephone on May 29. Nathim said that the Sunni mosques were closed in response to the assassination of Sheikh Wafiek Al Hamdani, an elderly imam at one of the better-known Sunni mosques in Basrah, an hour before Friday prayers on May 26. Sunni mosques reopened on Monday, May 29. Nathim said that the Sunni Endowment had closed the mosques out of concern for the safety of its imams and congregations. This is the second closure of Sunni mosques in the past two months. The Basrah Sunni Endowment closed mosques in Basrah for two days, on April 5 and 6 (see reftel A) as a form of non-violent protest against sectarian violence. The mosques reopened on Friday, April 7. ¶3. (C) On May 25, eleven murders were reported to the Basrah Police Joint Operations Center (PJOC); eight of the eleven were confirmed to be Sunnis. These murders follow closely the high-profile killings of Sunni Sheik Khalil Jaber Abdul Ali and his eleven-year-old son on May 12 in Basrah and the assassinations of Sunni leaders, Sheik Khalid Abdullah Jarad al-Saadon and Tarik Ali Sultan on May 10 in Al Zubair (see reftel B). ¶4. (C) Sheikh Khalid al-Mulla, Sunni imam of the Al Abayachi mosque and one of the most moderate Sunni leaders in Basrah, informed the REO by telephone on May 27 that he will soon depart Basrah for Jordan. He said he expected to be gone for about two weeks, until the security situation improved. Sheikh Khalid has spoken out against terrorism and violence frequently in the past (see reftel C). Sunni Displacement from Basrah Continues -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) According to International Organization for Migration (IOM) data from May 10, the numbers of Sunnis displaced from Basrah has increased to 749 families (279 to Salah Al Din and 470 to Anbar) from 624 families reported on April 2 (see reftel D). This represents a 20 percent increase in Sunni displacement from Basrah over the most recent five-week reporting period. BPC Theory on Why Sunni Mosques Were Targeted in Basrah -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) In a May 27 meeting, Basrah Provincial Council member Dr. Wathib Al Amood told Poloff that outside influence from Iraq's neighbors was behind most of the violence targeting Sunnis in Basrah in order to prompt sectarian warfare and keep Iraq divided and unstable. Although he did not explicitly say it, Dr. Wathib alluded to Iran being the primary outside influence on rising sectarian violence in Basrah. ¶7. (C) Dr. Wathib opined that he believed Sunni mosques in Basrah were specifically targeted for violence because there are a disproportionate number of them. During Saddam's era, construction licenses were issued only for building Sunni mosques. Dr. Wathib estimated that 90 percent of the mosques in Basrah were Sunni, while only 10 percent were Shia, even though Basrah had far more Shia than Sunnis. There were Sunni mosques in neighborhoods that were nearly 100 percent Shia, Dr. Wathib said, and the only people who prayed in these mosques were the Sunni imam and his staff. All of these factors contributed to feelings of resentment toward Sunnis. Because the construction of mosques with government money was so sensitive, Dr. Wathib said that no new mosques had been built in Basrah, either Sunni or Shia, since 2003. BASRAH 00000089 002.2 OF 002 ¶8. (C) Comment: Sectarian violence against Sunnis in Basrah remains a significant concern as Sunnis continue to fall victim to assassination campaigns and leave the city en masse. We faced considerable difficulty in verifying information about Sunni mosque closure because many of our Sunni contacts had fled the city out of concern for personal safety. Although it could be true that sectarian violence in Basrah was originally triggered by outside influence, the degree and persistence of violence against Sunnis in Basrah that we have seen for the past two months point to significant domestic resentment and hostility against Sunnis in Basrah. End Comment. MARRANO