Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BASRAH66
2006-05-05 10:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

MODM BASRAH OFFICIAL ON IDP CAMP FOR DISPLACED SHIA

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM PTER PREF SMIG SOCI EAID KISL IZ 
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VZCZCXRO5083
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHBC #0066/01 1251000
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 051000Z MAY 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0324
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0343
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BASRAH 000066 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/5/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PTER PREF SMIG SOCI EAID KISL IZ
SUBJECT: MODM BASRAH OFFICIAL ON IDP CAMP FOR DISPLACED SHIA
ESTABLISHED IN ZUBAIR

REF: BASRAH 51

BASRAH 00000066 001.2 OF 004


CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah,
State Department.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BASRAH 000066 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/5/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PTER PREF SMIG SOCI EAID KISL IZ SUBJECT: MODM BASRAH OFFICIAL ON IDP CAMP FOR DISPLACED SHIA ESTABLISHED IN ZUBAIR REF: BASRAH 51 BASRAH 00000066 001.2 OF 004 CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah, State Department. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On April 30, the Basrah Regional Coordinator (RC) and PolOffs met with Abdul Kareen Salman, Director of Human Affairs from the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM) for the Southern Region to discuss the issue of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in southern Iraq. Abdul Kareem reported that the Basrah Provincial Council (BPC) had formed a joint committee made with the MoDM and the Iraqi Red Crescent to deal with the issue of IDPs, and that the Zubair municipal council had decided to establish an IDP camp in the town of Zubair at the Youth and Sports facility, a public building owned by the Ministry of Youth that Abdul Kareem described as abandoned and unused. Committee members had been reluctant to establish the camp, Abdul Kareem said, but they saw no other way to provide basic needs to displaced families living in the streets. USAID/OFDA has deployed assessment teams to the South but has not yet assessed IDP assistance needs in the region. REO believes that existing organizations in Basrah are providing adequate assistance to the displaced families and there is no IDP crisis in the region, although new families continue to arrive on a daily basis. The camp is not being touted as a solution to the problem of displacement due to sectarian violence. Local officials indicate that displaced families should return to their places of habitual residence when the security situation permits and say that this is the desired outcome of the families themselves. Establishment of a predominantly Shia camp in an area of Basrah known for its large Sunni population could exacerbate sectarian tensions. Although the IDPs populations in Zubair is not yet sufficient to affect demographics, the influence of Sunnis on local politics could be diluted if enough new IDPs continue to arrive. End Summary. IDP Camp Established in Zubair -------------- ¶2. (C) On April 30, the Basrah RC and PolOffs met with Abdul Kareem Salman, Director of Human Affairs from the MoDM for the Southern Region, to discuss the issue of IDPs in southern Iraq. Abdul Kareem's office covers the provinces of B
asrah, Maysan, and Dhi Qar. Migration of Shia from other Iraqi provinces into Basrah began shortly after the fall of Saddam's regime, Abdul Kareem said, but they came in numbers "small enough to count on your fingers." In the period since the February 22 attack on the Samarra mosque, Abdul Kareem stated that 735 mainly-Shia families moved into Basrah province, mostly from predominantly Sunni areas. Abdul Kareem stated that most of the IDPs found shelter with friends and relatives, but that there were also a substantial number of families who had no support and were camping out in front of the MoDM office in Basrah. He characterized displacement into Basrah as growing-- "new families come in every day"-- although the rate of migration into the area had decreased since the massive influx that occurred immediately after the February 22 Samarra mosque attack. ¶3. (C) About two weeks ago, the BPC formed a joint committee with representatives from the MoDM, the Zubair mayor and city council, the local police, and representatives from the local branches of the Ministries of Health and Human Rights to deal with IDP issues. Members of the BPC on the committee include: Seyid Baha Jamal Al Deen (Da'awa),Sheikh Fadil Abdul Mahdi (Islamic independent),and Sheikh Salah Al Batat (Islamic independent). The joint committee held a conference for about 400 displaced families in the area, asking them what their major concerns were. The families reported that employment and education were their biggest concerns, and they requested to remain at the Youth and Sports facility in Zubair, a town located about 30 miles southeast of Basrah, where many of them had already taken up informal residence. ¶4. (C) Last week, the Zubair Municipal Council held a session in which it decided to grant the wish of the displaced families and allow them to remain officially at the Youth and Sports Facility, as well as to provide tent accommodations for several hundred more families. The Youth and Sports facility in Zubair is a public building belonging to the Ministry of Youth, described by Abdul Kareem as abandoned and not in use. He said that 50 displaced families were already living in the building, and that the camp would accommodate an additional 200-300 families in tents. BASRAH 00000066 002.2 OF 004 ¶5. (C) Abdul Kareem said that he personally felt sad that a camp had to be established in Zubair for the displaced families. He said that the building had electricity, but it was not up to living standards. However, he also said that there was no room for a camp in the city of Basrah itself, where most of the displaced currently are living on the streets. The city council of Zubair proposed allowing the families to stay in the Youth and Sports facility and enlarging camp facilities, as this was where the families themselves had elected to reside. PolOff countered that camps were not considered to be a good solution to the problem of displacement because they entailed substantial administrative, security, and sanitary support. In addition, camps attracted even more families and had a tendency to become permanent establishments. PolOff mentioned that at an April 6 Humanitarian Sector Working Group meeting (Reftel),local Iraqi officials and humanitarian organizations all agreed that they did not wish to establish an IDP camp in Basrah for these reasons. Abdul Kareem said that he agreed with all of these assessments, but that the situation had become untenable for the displaced families in Basrah. The local government could not turn their backs on the needs of the displaced and leave them living in the streets. ¶6. (C) Abdul Kareem stated that local Iraqi police are providing security for the IDP camp in Zubair. These police had been provided on request of the displaced families living in the Sports and Youth facility after the camp was attacked by a group of men about ten days ago, he said. The attackers were pushed off by youths in the camp, and no further attacks had occurred since then. Abdul Kareem said he did not know who had attacked the camp or if the perpetrators had been caught. ¶7. (C) When PolOff asked if the displaced Shia families were concerned for their security in Zubair since the town was known to have a large Sunni population, Abdul Kareem stated that security was not a problem because the Sunni residents of Zubair were peaceful, unlike the "Sunni terrorists" in the north. PolOff pushed back, disputing the charge that all Sunnis in the North were terrorists, and when pressed, Abdul Kareem admitted that he had no hard facts about the activities of the Sunnis in the north. Sunnis comprised only about 50 percent of Zubair's population, Abdul Kareem stated, and were not a majority there as some people believed. (Comment: We have heard estimates that the Sunni population in Zubair ranges from 10 to 80 percent. There are no reliable figures, although we believe Sunnis to comprise roughly ten percent of the population of Basrah province, concentrated mostly in Basrah and Zubair. End Comment). Abdul Kareem asserted that Sunnis in Zubair took an active role in protecting the IDP camp. He said that the vast majority of those moving into Basrah were Shia, but asserted that some Sunni families also moved into Basrah after having run into problems with multi-national forces elsewhere in the country. ¶8. (C) When asked if he thought the camp would solve the problems caused by the displacement, Abdul Kareem answered firmly that it would not. The long-term solution would be for the families to return to their homes when it was secure enough for them to do so. The displaced families indicated that they wished to go home as soon as possible and did not intend to remain in Basrah any longer than they had to. When asked if he would permit us to visit the camp, Abdul Kareem said that this would not be a problem and that we were welcome to do so. MODM Basrah: Needs for the Displaced Being Met -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Abdul Kareem depicted the problem of displacement of families into Basrah as significant, but our current assessment is that the situation is not unmanageable. A number of sources of assistance for the displaced exist in Basrah and are actively dispersing aid. The central government has sent boxes of food to the local ministries' offices in Basrah for distribution. Many private organizations and businesses have donated food and clothing to the families as well. Abdul Kareem said that Sheikh Mansour, a long-time REO Basrah contact, had donated food, clothing, water tanks, and air conditioning units to the Sports and Youth facilities families in Zubair. He noted that the Red Crescent, World Food Program, and the Shia Endowment had all contributed significant assistance to the families. PolOff stressed the U.S. government concern for the wellbeing of all those displaced from their homes and in need of assistance and said that our policy was to channel further aid through existing organizations. Abdul Kareem thanked us for our concern and said he would keep us informed about developments. ¶10. (C) While the pressing day-to-day problems of food and BASRAH 00000066 003.2 OF 004 clothing for the displaced families were under control, Abdul Kareem said that the MoDM was also working on the thornier issues of food ration delivery, education, and employment. The MoDM was working through ministerial channels to arrange delivery of Public Distribution System food rations to the displaced families. The MoDM had also worked with the Ministry of Education to allow school children to take their final exams in Basrah in order not to disrupt their studies. The issue of employment was proving to be the biggest challenge. The MoDM was requesting that the Ministries of Oil, Industry, and Minerals employ those displaced to Basrah who had appropriate backgrounds in these fields. (Note: Giving scarce jobs to IDPs will not likely, in the end, turn out to promote community, let alone sectarian, harmony. Although anyone qualified should get a job - provided there is a need/vacant position -- and MODM's push for other ministries to employ IDPs seems noble at first glance, the actual effect may be padding payrolls for political purposes.) ¶11. (C) Abdul Kareem admitted that Sunni families were leaving Basrah. He said he believed that most of these Sunnis were leaving Iraq for Syria and the United Arab Emirates, although he admitted that he had no hard facts about their destinations. He said he was aware that some Sunnis were also leaving Basrah for Anbar province, but that he believed this was a much smaller number than those going abroad. (Note: The April 2 IOM report on displacement in Iraq due to sectarian violence lists that 372 Sunni families have left Basrah for Anbar province and 279 Sunni families have left Basrah and Dhi Qar provinces for Salah Al Din province. End Note.) He said that those leaving for other provinces in Iraq most likely had relatives in the area that they were staying with and that it was his opinion that these relatives were likely engaged in terrorist activities. Why else, he questioned, would a family move into such violent areas, unless they themselves were somehow connected to the violence? Again, when pushed, Abdul Kareem stated that he had no hard evidence of Sunni links to terrorism, and clarified that this was just his personal opinion. Other Southern Provinces -------------- ¶12. (C) According to MODM figures, a total of 440 Shia families have moved into Dhi Qar since the February 22 attack, settling in the Suk As Shuyk and Al Shatra areas, and the Al Fajr camp. The Al Fajr camp in Dhi Qar province is the only other IDP camp in the southern region of Iraq. Located about 100 miles north of Nassiriyah near the provincial border with Wasit, Al Fajr houses about 150 Shia families. MODM does not yet have figures for displacement in Dhi Qar. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates a total of 440 Shia families have moved into Maysan province following the February 22 attack. No MoDM IDP camps have been established in Maysan; most of the displaced in Maysan have moved in with relatives in rural areas. Abdul Kareem assessed the issue of displacement to be of greatest concern in Basrah due to numbers of the displaced, and that Dhi Qar and Maysan were less critical cases. Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) Comment: Displacement into the southern provinces of Basrah, Dhi Qar, and Maysan has reached a significant enough level for the local branch of MoDM and the BPC to determine that tent camps for displaced families in Basrah and Dhi Qar are essential, despite the pitfalls and limitations of camps. USAID/OFDA has only just received funding for additional assistance to IDPs in Iraq and is in the process of deploying reconnaissance teams to determine IDP assistance needs in the South. At this time, USAID/OFDA is not able to comment on the accuracy of assessments by ICRS, MODM-Basrah, and the local governments. REO Basrah believes that displacement has not yet reached a crisis stage, and that existing organizations appear able to adequately address the needs of the displaced. The preferred long-term solution is agreed by all stakeholders to be the return of the IDPs to their place of habitual residence. ¶14. (C) Comment continued: REO Basrah is concerned, however, that the establishment of a predominantly Shia IDP camp in an area of Basrah with a large Sunni population could spark further sectarian tension. We have heard Abdul Kareem's assumption that Sunnis who leave Basrah must be terrorists echoed by Seyid Hassanein Al Safi, the BPC Humanitarian Sector Chair, local media, as well as many of our other Shia contacts in Basrah. The BPC is made up entirely of Shia; no Sunnis are represented on the council. The current numbers of Shia moving in and BASRAH 00000066 004.2 OF 004 Sunnis moving out are not yet substantial enough to alter demographics and dilute the influence of Sunnis on local politics. However, the potential of the IDP camp in Zubair to further exacerbate sectarian violence in the period leading up to provincial elections warrants close monitoring. We will continue to dialogue with our Sunni contacts on the issue, as well as maintain relations with the joint committee on IDPs. If security conditions permit, we intend to take up Abdul Kareem's offer to visit the Zubair camp in order to more fully assess the scope of the IDP situation in Basrah. End comment. GROSS

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