Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BASRAH65
2006-05-04 16:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

HASSAN AL-RASHID ON SECURITY, THE BASRAH GOVERNMENT AND THE

Tags:  PGOV PREL ASEC KDEM IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4388
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHBC #0065/01 1241632
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 041632Z MAY 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0322
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0006
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0005
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
INFO RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0341
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000065 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/4/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: HASSAN AL-RASHID ON SECURITY, THE BASRAH GOVERNMENT AND THE
BOYCOTTS

REF: (A) BASRAH 53; (B) BASRAH 58; (C) BASRAH 59; (D) BASRAH 60

BASRAH 00000065 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000065

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/4/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: HASSAN AL-RASHID ON SECURITY, THE BASRAH GOVERNMENT AND THE
BOYCOTTS

REF: (A) BASRAH 53; (B) BASRAH 58; (C) BASRAH 59; (D) BASRAH 60

BASRAH 00000065 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: In a May 3 meeting with Badr Organization
chief Hassan al-Rashid, the Regional Coordinator (RC) discussed
the threats against the employees of the Regional Embassy Office
(REO) in Basrah and suggested that splinter groups could be
responsible. Hassan believes that the Basrah Provincial Council
(BPC) soon may vote to remove Governor Muhammad, but a sticking
point is a legal question over whether 26 or 28 BPC members'
votes are needed to do so. Concerning the boycotts against the
British and the Danes, Hassan said that they should be lifted in
the very near future. End Summary.


2. (SBU) Hassan al-Rashid, the Basrah leader of Badr
Organization and BPC member, met with the RC of the Basrah REO
on May 3 and discussed the threats against the REO's local
staff, a possible change in the governorship and the BPC's
boycotts against the Danes and the British. The Deputy RC and
Poloff also attended the meeting.


3. (C) The RC began by describing the threats made against the
REO's local staff and showing Hassan a copy of a leaflet
distributed outside the compound's main gate on April 30 that
promised death to people working for the coalition. Hassan said
he was aware of recent threats made against some of the REO's
employees and sympathized with Post employees' plight. He said
he believed that the threats did not emanate from a particular
ideological group of Shia or Sunni Arabs, but were from people
wanting to churn up the political situation. Many other groups
and individuals have been threatened, according to Hassan,
including Sheik Muhammad Falak, Ayatollah Sistani's
representative in Zubair and a critic of Governor Muhammad, and
BPC Chairman Obadi.


4. (C) When the RC asked him who was responsible for these
threats, Hassan replied that he had received word that a former
Badr member, Hayder Hassan Yusef, had been detained by the

British military and had been complicit in some of these
threats. Approximately 60 members of the Serious Crimes Unit
(SCU) of the Basrah police, according to Hassan, are known for
participating in assassinations and may have some connections to
the threats. Hassan hastened to add that these groups do not
direct their activities solely against the American and British
forces, but act against anyone or any group that stands in their
way. These groups are not affiliated with any particular
political party or structured organization, Hassan said, and
countering them is a complex issue. He was not more specific
about the groups who could be responsible for the threats.


5. (C) Hassan al-Rashid agreed that the key to improving
security in Basrah is having a responsible local government and
said that there should be a change in the Basrah government.
Alluding to a plan for BPC members to vote to oust Governor
Muhammad (see Reftels),Hassan said that although he believes
the required two-thirds of the BPC members would vote to unseat
the governor, there is not complete agreement, and some BPC
members are afraid to vote against the governor.


6. (C) Hassan also said there was uncertainty of the meaning of
Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 71 - whether
two-thirds of the total number of council members must vote to
unseat the governor or whether the governor and deputy governor
would not vote. If the latter, 26 votes are necessary, but if
the former, 28 votes would be required, according to Hassan. He
said that clarity is needed on this issue and asked that the
United States Government offer its opinion since the order
originally was written in English. In any case, Hassan said
that the security situation would improve if a new government
were installed in Basrah. (Note: Section 2.5 of Order No. 71
allows dismissal of Governors and Deputy Governors for cause
upon a two-thirds vote of the Governorate Council. Section 3.3
states that Governors and Deputy Governors may attend the
regular meetings of the Governorate Councils as non-voting
members. End Note.)


7. (C) Turning to the BPC's boycotts of the Danes and the
British, Hassan said the BPC has decided to resolve them.
However, Hassan emphasized, the boycotts must be ended in a way
that explains to the average person why the boycotts began and
what has occurred that permits the BPC to return to normal
business with the Danes and the Brits. For this, Hassan said,
the BPC decided there must be a media event.


BASRAH 00000065 002.2 OF 002



8. (C) Hassan described the boycott against the Danes as being
"semi-solved," and the British boycott would require one more
BPC meeting. The Deputy RC asked Hassan if any BPC members were
against terminating the boycott, and he replied, "Yes," without
providing much more information other than opaquely saying that
the boycott started because a police officer associated with the
Fadillah party was detained by the British military.


9. (C) Comment: Hassan put the threats against the REO's local
staff in context by noting that unfortunately threats are common
in Basrah against many different groups and individuals,
including politically based threats against him personally.
Hassan's solution, though never voiced clearly, is for the BPC
to vote to remove the governor and install Hassan in the
governor's chair. A new Basrah government, possibly with some
change in the powers of the BPC chairman and the governor, would
be able to improve security in Basrah in Hassan's view. He well
may be correct - personal security has reached a nadir, and many
people in Basrah hope that there will be a new administration to
tackle the problem. Hassan's information on the imminent end of
the boycotts against the Brits and the Danes jives with what the
REO has heard - the Danish mission was told by the BPC on April
30 that the boycott is substantially over except for a media
event to publicize it, and the UK consulate believes that the
May 3 BPC meeting may set the stage for another meeting and
media event on May 4 to lift the boycott against the British.
End Comment.
GROSS