BASRAH POLICE - A WORK IN PROGRESS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000063 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/1/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM ASEC IZ SUBJECT: BASRAH POLICE - A WORK IN PROGRESS REF: (A)05 BASRAH 0049; (B) 05 BASRAH 0056; (C) 05 BASRAH 105; (D) 05 BASRAH 112; (E) 05 BASRAH 120; (F) BASRAH 0017; (G) BASRAH 0019; (H)BASRAH 0054 BASRAH 00000063 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Basrah police force is a barometer to gauge the ability of the local government to govern in the south, and a viable police force is essential to curb internal security threats. The police force has received large amounts of assistance from the Coalition and has made some progress. However, corruption and the large number of police officers with links to militia groups prevent the police from being viewed by the average citizen as anything more than an extra-legal entity that serves its own interests. The dysfunctionality of the Provincial Council adds to the problem (Reftels C, E),allowing political groups to commandeer parts of the force for its own interests. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) The Basrah police force is a natural choice for the Coalition to use to build law enforcement capability. However, the police traditionally had little institutional experience in performing law enforcement duties. During the Saddam regime the force numbered less than 10,000 and was mandated by the Ministry of Interior to enforce laws. It was not an investigative arm and served only as a way to exert control over the local population. The police suffered from institutional neglect except during periods of trouble when it received support from the Iraqi Army. ¶3. (SBU) Until recently the Basrah provincial police was organized into 5 districts that were divided into 37 neighborhood police stations. In early March 2006 the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) instituted a change in the structure of the Iraqi police. The reorganization puts the 14 stations in Basrah city under the City District and the remaining stations under the Rural District. The MOI determined that Basrah province requires a police force of 15,000 to establish an acceptable per capita police to population ratio. The reasons for the reorganization were to streamline the authority within the MOI to assert better control over the subordinate sector headquarters. ¶4. (SBU) Though the Ministry of Interior had theoretical control of a national police force during the former regime, leaders in Basrah province were left to their own devices to manage a largely ineffective police force. Professional development and leadership suffered as a result. The task of training a national police force after the fall of Saddam was given to the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) and the Civilian Police Advisory Training Team (CPATT). CPATT officials stationed at the Regional Embassy Office in Basrah who participated in the effort revealed that the majority of police currently in service in Basrah worked for the former regime, and MNSTC-I decided to retrain existing members instead of recruiting an entirely new force. The police force has recruited the numbers needed to increase its size, though experienced personnel to increase the talent pool of its force have not been hired. The Joint Training Academy located at the Shaibah Logistics Base has produced a basically qualified graduate, but one that remains unskilled in forensics, investigation, or special tactics. ¶5. (C) In discussions with CPATT officials and British police trainers, one of the biggest hurdles they face in creating an effective force is corruption. In an area where elected officials primarily seek self-enrichment, the police are expected to turn a blind eye. For their own safety many police officers participate in smuggling or at least authorize the safe passage of goods to their intended destination. Corrupt police officers are an institutionalization of corruption based on certain police units' links to militia groups that are stronger than their loyalty to the police force. Police links to militia groups are especially noticeable in the smaller, specialized units. ¶6. (C) Specialized units are an important part of the Basrah police force due to the unwieldy size and the low skill level of most police officers. The MOI established smaller units to develop specialized skills and increase accountability and provided these units with a level of autonomy uncommon in the police force. This resulted in a reporting chain that often excludes the Chief of Police. These small units have been implicated in extrajudicial killings that have plagued the province. The most notorious example was the Department of Internal Affairs (DIA). ¶7. (S/NF) Created in March 2004, the DIA was given the task to increase accountability and deter abuse of authority, but did BASRAH 00000063 002.2 OF 003 little to achieve its stated goals. The DIA was accused of committing torture, kidnapping, and murder for the benefit of the political parties, especially Fadillah and the governor. On September 18, 2005, members of the DIA were implicated in the incident involving the detention of two British soldiers at the Al Jameat police station. (Reftel D.) DIA personnel attempted to transfer the detained soldiers to militia members. The Governor, Muhammad Musbih Al-Wahili of the Fadillah Party, obstructed an MOI order to disband the DIA by claiming it was British interference in local affairs. The Governor stalled until pressure from the central government forced the closure of the DIA in November 2005. ¶8. (C) While the closure of the DIA has stopped activity of officers assigned to DIA, police involvement in criminal activity continues, and the British response to it has led to recent political turmoil. Many of the personnel from the DIA were transferred to the Criminal Intelligence Unit (CIU),and the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU). A string of IED attacks in January 2006 led to an arrest operation on January 23 that targeted 14 policemen associated with the CIU and the SCU. Chief among them was Major Jassim Hassan, from CIU and Captain Abbas Munis Abdulaal. The political response was immediate. Sheikh Abu Salam al SA'EDY, provincial council member from the Fadillah Party, organized protests and was successful in persuading the Provincial Council to adopt a boycott against MND-SE that continues to the present. (Reftel G) ¶9. (C) After the January arrests, the murder rate increased substantially in Basrah. The victims have been police, Sunni religious leaders, teachers, and other civilians. The term "debathification" has been used to describe the current murder campaign due to a purported list of names associated with the former regime and its use in targeting victims. A common thread of many of the incidents in February and March is the reported sighting of Iraqi police vehicles at the scene of the kidnapping of individuals later found murdered. (A recent intensified murder campaign against Sunni citizens is discussed in Reftel H.) ¶10. (C) Though the smaller police groups might be the most notorious examples of malfeasance, the civilian population views the entire Basrah police force with mistrust. Despite this stigma the Basrah police presided over several elections within the province without incident. The individual often singled out for praise for this performance is the Chief of Police, General Hasan Sewadi al-Saad. (See Reftels A, B, and E for more on General Hasan.) A frequent visitor to the REO, the Chief of Police had a meeting with the Regional Coordinator on March 23 to discuss the current state of affairs within the Basrah Police. General Hasan reiterated his often repeated statement that he is not in control of the police force. He said that "the parties" were in control of large portions of his force and the Provincial Council interfered in law enforcement matters because they had their own agenda. When questioned about how to rectify the problem he quickly answered, "Arrest them!" ¶11. (C) In addition to political interference, he said that another reason for his lack of control, and presumably poor police performance, was the administrative and personnel system of the MOI. General Hasan said that he had no use for the 15,000 officers in his force and would prefer 7,000 well-qualified policemen instead. He also stated that he is unable to fire poor performers because of the administrative process centrally controlled at the MOI. He revealed that he trusts several units, chiefly the Tactical Support Unit (TSU), and the City Reaction Force (CRF). He said that in the recent restructuring these units have been put under a common district commander. (Comment: TSU is the most used force in the Basrah police for critical missions. For the most part TSU has been considered a trusted force by MND SE. However, the commander of TSU, Lt Colonel Shakir, accompanied the Governor to a REO SIPDIS meeting and members of the TSU reportedly have been involved in serious crimes. Although he often speaks of desiring more power to gain control of the police, Gen Hasan has done little to confront the interference in police matters by the Governor. The Chief of Police has amazed many outside observers by retaining his job for as long as he has. He blames Basrah's problems on the Provincial Council who, in turn, blame the British. His future relevance relies on cooperation with both. If the Provincial Council ever becomes functional the Chief of Police would have to deliver on his promises of effective law enforcement. End Comment. ¶12. (C) MNF-I has created a police force with only basic training. Baswaris do not trust the police. Recent attacks on Sunni leaders have been ignored by the police due to indifference, involvement, or fear. Comment: A possible reason for this is that the large scale infiltration of the police has resulted in groupings that are fairly balanced. That is, no BASRAH 00000063 003.2 OF 003 militia wishes to interfere with another's business for fear of reprisal. Therefore when incidents are reported that hint of militia participation the police is slow to react. End Comment. ¶13. (C) Comment: MNF-I is training the Basrah police force to become a large, minimally qualified law enforcement unit. Political parties established themselves as centers of power through the use of militias financed by criminal activities such as smuggling. There is an increasing need for funds by local parties in the run-up to provincial elections later this year and therefore a presumed need for increased smuggling and criminal police involvement. Links between the Shia militias and the police, especially small specialized units such as SCU and CIU, are very strong and any attempt to act against them will have political repercussions as evidenced by the latest boycott by the Provincial Council against the British. Ironically the best solution for conferring authority within the police and winning the respect of Baswaris lies in the establishment of a functional Provincial Council that does not rely on militia support and concomitant police corruption. GROSS