Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BASRAH59
2006-04-19 15:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:
PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE OF GOVERNOR -- A CONTRARY VIEW
VZCZCXRO7948 OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS DE RUEHBC #0059 1091500 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O P 191500Z APR 06 FM REO BASRAH TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0315 RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0333
C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000059
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE OF GOVERNOR -- A CONTRARY VIEW
REF: (A) BASRAH 49: (B) BASRAH 53 (C) BASRAH 58
CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah,
State Department.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000059
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE OF GOVERNOR -- A CONTRARY VIEW
REF: (A) BASRAH 49: (B) BASRAH 53 (C) BASRAH 58
CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah,
State Department.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (C) Sheikh Mansour al-Khanaan, leader of the al-Khanaan
tribe, met with the Regional Coordinator (RC) of the Regional
Embassy Office in Basrah on April 18 to review the current
political picture in Basrah (for background on Sheikh Mansour
see Ref A). After a quick discussion of the unprecedented
deterioration of the security environment, Sheikh Mansour
addressed the plan to vote Governor Muhammad out of office by
certain Basrah Provincial Council members and their allies (see
Refs B and C for more on this scheme).
2. (C) Sheikh Mansour said that the plan to unseat the governor
would not work and added that he was "100 percent sure it will
not be successful." He believed that divisions and divergent
interests among the main conspirators - Sayid Yusif, Majed
al-Sari and Hassan al-Rashid - were too deep to allow them to
cooperate effectively. Besides this, he asserted, they did not
have the two-thirds majority on the Provincial Council to
replace the governor with Hassan al-Rashid.
3. (C) If such an attempt took place, Sheikh Mansour said that
the governor's forces and al-Rashid's Badr Organization would
fight it out on the streets. Sheikh Mansour warned that ousting
the governor, without choosing the correct successor, would not
improve the political or security situation. No one presently
on the Basrah Provincial Council, in his view, would be a good
candidate for governor.
4 (C) Comment: Sheikh Mansour's opinions on the likelihood of
success of the plan to replace the governor and the possibility
of violence following such an attempt are at odds with those of
Provincial Council member Sayid Ghali and Ministry of Defense
advisor Majed al-Sari. Perhaps this illustrates how murky the
political waters of Basrah are - there is no shortage of
political seers, but not everyone's crystal ball shows the same
scenario. What all parties agree upon is that security in
Basrah, with daily reports of assassinations and killings, has
deteriorated so much that life for the common citizen is
becoming untenable.
GROSS
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE OF GOVERNOR -- A CONTRARY VIEW
REF: (A) BASRAH 49: (B) BASRAH 53 (C) BASRAH 58
CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah,
State Department.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (C) Sheikh Mansour al-Khanaan, leader of the al-Khanaan
tribe, met with the Regional Coordinator (RC) of the Regional
Embassy Office in Basrah on April 18 to review the current
political picture in Basrah (for background on Sheikh Mansour
see Ref A). After a quick discussion of the unprecedented
deterioration of the security environment, Sheikh Mansour
addressed the plan to vote Governor Muhammad out of office by
certain Basrah Provincial Council members and their allies (see
Refs B and C for more on this scheme).
2. (C) Sheikh Mansour said that the plan to unseat the governor
would not work and added that he was "100 percent sure it will
not be successful." He believed that divisions and divergent
interests among the main conspirators - Sayid Yusif, Majed
al-Sari and Hassan al-Rashid - were too deep to allow them to
cooperate effectively. Besides this, he asserted, they did not
have the two-thirds majority on the Provincial Council to
replace the governor with Hassan al-Rashid.
3. (C) If such an attempt took place, Sheikh Mansour said that
the governor's forces and al-Rashid's Badr Organization would
fight it out on the streets. Sheikh Mansour warned that ousting
the governor, without choosing the correct successor, would not
improve the political or security situation. No one presently
on the Basrah Provincial Council, in his view, would be a good
candidate for governor.
4 (C) Comment: Sheikh Mansour's opinions on the likelihood of
success of the plan to replace the governor and the possibility
of violence following such an attempt are at odds with those of
Provincial Council member Sayid Ghali and Ministry of Defense
advisor Majed al-Sari. Perhaps this illustrates how murky the
political waters of Basrah are - there is no shortage of
political seers, but not everyone's crystal ball shows the same
scenario. What all parties agree upon is that security in
Basrah, with daily reports of assassinations and killings, has
deteriorated so much that life for the common citizen is
becoming untenable.
GROSS