Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BASRAH53
2006-04-11 15:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

BASRAH GOVERNOR ON HIS WAY OUT?

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR IZ 
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VZCZCXRO9669
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHBC #0053 1011542
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 111542Z APR 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0303
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0321
C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000053 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR IZ
SUBJECT: BASRAH GOVERNOR ON HIS WAY OUT?

REF: BASRAH 52

CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah,
State Department.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah,
State Department.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000053 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/11/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR IZ SUBJECT: BASRAH GOVERNOR ON HIS WAY OUT? REF: BASRAH 52 CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah, State Department. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah, State Department. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) The Regional Coordinator (RC) for the Regional Embassy Office (REO) Basrah met with local Iraqi National Accord (INA) chairman and Basrah Provincial Council (BPC) member Sayid Ghali Najim on April 11. Sayid Ghali told the RC that he wanted to "consult" with him on the continuing stagnation at the BPC and suggest a possible resolution of the problem. ¶2. (C) Sayid Ghali related a plan to replace Governor Muhammad with Hassan al-Rashid, a fellow BPC member and the leader of Badr Organization. (See Reftel for more background on al-Rashid.) He said that members of the BPC met three days ago to ascertain if they had the two-thirds majority necessary to replace Governor Muhammad and to work out the details of their takeover. Sayid Ghali said that this group, composed of Badr/SCIRI, Da'wa, Basrah Islamiya, and National Accord members, had the 26 votes needed to sack the governor and replace him with al-Rashid. (Comment: Our calculations are that it would take 27 votes to remove the governor, but Sayid Ghali was adamant that he had the necessary votes. End Commment.) ¶3. (C) The plan, according to Sayid Ghali, would start with demonstrations in the streets of Basrah critical of the impasse in the BPC and critical of the governor. The demonstrators would be supporters of the parties in mentioned in para 2. Simultaneously four mosques in Basrah would issue calls for change. He named them as the Alhakim, Syed Emad Hammed Al-Wajed and Sheik Mohammad Fallak mosques. The BPC would meet in emergency session, discuss the situation and vote to replace Governor Muhammad. When asked what actions the governor and the Fadillah party would take to oppose the BPC vote, Sayid Ghali opined that the demonstrations and calls from the mosques would ease the way for the vote to take place without a violent reaction. Any aggressive action, he said, most likely would be only against individuals like him who did not support the governor. Sayid Ghali also said that he believed that two or three Fadillah party BPC members would vote against Governor Muhammad. ¶4. (C) Sayid Ghali never asked the RC for approval of the plan, but simply wanted to make sure we were informed. He said that there was no specific timeframe to start this action against the governor. However, the BPC members involved in planning for it would meet on April 12 to sign agreements (on coordinating actions and on BPC committee assignments) and "swear to these agreements on the holy Koran." The BPC putsch could take place at any time after the agreements are signed. ¶5. (C) The RC asked Sayid Ghali for his opinion of Hassan al-Rashid and whether he would be a better governor than the incumbent. Sayid Ghali answered that "Hassan has a good head on his shoulders," and the positives outweigh the negatives. Hassan, he said, worked closely with other BPC members when he previously served as governor and acted as a representative for all the communities in Basrah. He followed the law and was serious about improving the security situation. The only possible negative, Sayid Ghali said, is Hassan's connection with Iran. That did not cause problems during Hassan's previous tenure as governor, but Sayid Ghali wanted to ensure that the RC understood that Hassan had a long-term association with Iran. ¶6. (C) Comment: In the tumultuous netherworld of Basrah's politics, nothing is ever quite as it appears. The REO recently heard sketchy details of rumors to supplant Governor Muhammad from both our Danish and British colleagues, and they had inferred something was looming from conversations with Hassan al-Rashid. In a luncheon hosted by the REO for Hassan and more junior Badr colleagues on April 10, he hinted at a possible change at the BPC (See Reftel). We judge it likely that an attempt to unseat Governor Muhammad will occur soon. ¶7. (C) Comment continued: As Sayid Ghali said, Hassan's tie to Iran is a negative. But Hassan is the best candidate for governor among the BPC members. Governor Muhammad is linked to assassinations, oil smuggling and other crimes, and though Hassan's Iranian connections are a cause for concern, we believe that he would be an improvement over the current governor. GROSS

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