MOVERS AND SHAKERS IN THE BASRAH COMMUNITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000049 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/7/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PINR SOCI KISL IZ SUBJECT: MOVERS AND SHAKERS IN THE BASRAH COMMUNITY REF: A) BASRAH 43, B) BASRAH 38, C) BASRAH 45, D) 05 BASRAH 142 BASRAH 00000049 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO BASRAH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Wielders of power and influence in Basrah outside of the local government can be classified into three general categories: highly respected sheikhs and imams, thugs and militia leaders, and a nebulous third category of individuals in positions of power but whose influence on the Basrah community is neither definitively positive nor negative. The current security situation in Basrah, however, discourages any but the most powerful and wealthy from taking an active role in civil society. By no means an exhaustive list of community leaders in Basrah, this cable builds on Ref A in identifying some of Basrah's key players and how they affect the province's current economic and security situation. End Summary. Sheikhs and Imams: Benefactors and Businessmen -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Seyid Ali Al Musawi is the most prominent Shia imam in Basrah and one of the wealthiest individuals in the city. He is the spiritual leader of the Al Shakheyah sect, a minority Shia sect founded by Sheikh Ahmad Al Insa'i in the nineteenth century that has followers in several countries in the Middle East. Al Musawi's political leanings are moderate; he shows tolerance toward Sunni and Christian minorities, and he is not actively engaged in local politics. He owns and runs a private hospital, a construction company and a handful of small stores in central Basrah, in addition to leading the largest mosque in the city (Comment: Al Musawi describes his mosque as the largest in Iraq in terms of square footage and available prayer space. End comment). His mosque attracts an unknown amount of funding from Shia communities outside Iraq, but the massive and ornate chandeliers, air conditioning in every room, and wall-to-wall carpeting inside the huge mosque suggest that these funds are considerable. ¶3. (C) Al Musawi is described by contacts as a "shrewd businessman" who "takes care of his followers." His private hospital in Basrah supplies much-needed medical services in Basrah. Another contact pointed out, however, that Al Musawi's hospital only performs expensive surgical operations and technical procedures and not routine health care. The private hospital enhances Al Musawi's image as benefactor to society, but it is above all a moneymaking enterprise. Al Musawi likely could have a positive impact on Basrah's political leadership if he diverted his attention in that direction. Because of his advanced age and health problem (he suffers from diabetes and has had prostate problems),his son, Seyid Abd Ali Al Musawi, is now the driving force behind the Al Musawi business empire and eventually will take over the spiritual leadership of the Al Shakheyah when his father passes from the scene. ¶4. (C) Sheikh Mohamed Falik Al Malkee is a prominent Shia cleric who represents Ayatollah Sistani in Zubair, a town located 30 miles outside of Basrah, and whose influence extends to Basrah. His sister, Seknaa, serves on the Basrah Provincial Council (BPC) as a political independent (Reftel A). Openly critical of the political extremists in control of the BPC, he has attributed the recent decline in security in Basrah to the poor performance of the local government. ¶5. (C) Sheikh Mansour Al Kanaan is the leader of the Al Kanaan tribe and a former member of the Transitional National Assembly representing the Iraqi Unified Alliance. Though no longer serving as an elected official, Sheikh Mansour wields considerable influence in the community because of his tribal leadership. The Al Kanaan tribe, one of the largest, is known for looking after the interests of its members and providing them with a measure of security from militias and other tribes. A lawyer by training, Sheikh Mansour acted as a tribal judge, and his good relations with other tribes in Basrah enhances his reputation. He also is a businessman and owns a newspaper, "Al Ashar," a construction company, Al Rahila, and an organization that promotes human rights called Al Rahmah. A harsh critic of the dysfunctional BPC, Sheikh Mansour is seeking to establish a sort of counterweight, a movement that would have representation from a wide variety of non-political interests from "the best groups in Basrah." It would be an informal council that could present its views, suggestions and criticisms to the BPC and, because of its membership, would assume some moral authority. The idea, while intriguing, is still in the developmental stage. Thugs and Militia Leaders -------------- ¶6. (C) Ismail Al Wah'il, brother to Governor Mohammed Moassibh BASRAH 00000049 002.2 OF 002 Al Wah'il (Fadillah),wields undeniable influence over Basrah's local government and is even rumored to occupy an office in the governorate building despite not being an elected official or an employee. He is rumored to take over the Governor's role when Governor Mohammed is out of Basrah. Contacts report that Ismail is in charge of the Fadillah party's militia in Basrah and is responsible for death squads in the city that conduct political assassinations. Ismail ran for a seat in Parliament in the December 15 election on his own ticket, but did not win enough votes to secure a seat. A thug with political aspirations and not much education, Ismail could wreak havoc on an already dismal political situation in Basrah should he win office in the provincial elections. ¶7. (C) Seyid Yusif Al Batat, head of the Thar Allah militia, is a notorious figure in Basrah, and may soon occupy a seat on the Basrah Provincial Council (BPC). Iranian funds reportedly supply his militia with uniforms and weapons. Seyid Yusif keeps the streets of Basrah busy by waging undeclared war on Governor Mohammed's private militia and by trying to take out the Governor himself. An arrest warrant was issued for Seyid Yusif in the fall of 2005 for the theft of a government vehicle but was subsequently removed when the car was returned to the local government. With two BPC members elected to Parliament in the December 15 election, Seyid Yusif's name is next on the list to take one of the empty seats at the provincial council level. He increasingly is insinuating himself into the political scene in Basrah and professes to have transformed Thar Allah from a militia into a political party that follows democratic ideals. Neither Here nor There -------------- ¶8. (C) South Oil Company (SOC) Director Jabbar Ali Husayn al-Lu'aybi wields enormous economic influence in Basrah (see reftels B, C and D),but his political leanings are unclear. With 25,000 employees and supplying most of the country's oil, SOC is the source of a significant percentage of the nation's, let alone the province's, income. At the helm of the SOC is Jabbar, who asserts that he has no political aspirations of his own, but on whom the economic survival of the region rests. Knowing that his skill set and experience make him indispensable to the success of the SOC, Jabbar is in a position to influence, rather than be influenced by, local politics. Still, he portrays himself as a non-political technocrat, only interested in running the company well. In meetings with REO Basrah staff, Jabbar has made it clear that he would accept financial assistance from any country with the wherewithal to rebuild Iraq's crumbling oil infrastructure -- whether from the United States, Iran or Russia. ¶9. (C) Chief of Police Hasan Sewadi Al Saadi describes himself as a political independent. He was appointed to his current position in January 2005 and has fought to retain it ever since. The BPC has repeatedly sought to remove him, but he somehow continues to cling to his position, perhaps through his growing affiliation with the Governor. Although he "talks the talk" of the need to replace most of the police force because of infiltration by militias, he is unable to effectively "walk the walk" and enforce much real change. Militia infiltration continues to hamper the efficiency of the Basrah police. Sewadi is well-respected and liked by the public, but his attempts to stop militia infiltration into the police and his role in disbanding Governor Wa'hil's internal affairs division in November 2005 have made him increasingly unpopular with local government leaders. Sewadi clings tenuously to his position and may not be able to achieve any further changes in the police force, which would suit political extremists and their militias just fine. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Influential members of the Basrah community are not limited to the pool of elected officials. Without effective leadership in the provincial government and competent council members, however, Basrah's few benevolent and moderate leaders cannot promote economic growth and responsible government alone. Worse, the rise in death squads and militias in Basrah makes wealthy and vocal figures prime targets for kidnapping and murder and dissuades them from taking a more active role in civil society. Murders and assassinations in Basrah have spiked in number and audacity over the past month, some occurring in broad daylight, and thus far the perpetrators go unpunished. A veil of fear and silence has fallen over Basrah, and the few vocal dissidents in the city risk their lives every time they open their mouths or appear in public. GROSS