INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS, SECURITY ARE CASUALTIES AS BADR AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000024 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/22/2016 TAGS: PGOV ECON EAID ETRD EINV IZ SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS, SECURITY ARE CASUALTIES AS BADR AND OMS FIGHT FOR PORTS, PROFIT REF: 05 BASRAH 125 BASRAH 00000024 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: KEN GROSS, REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO BASRAH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE. REASON: 1.4 (b),(e) ¶1. (C) Summary: On February 20, the Basrah Regional Coordinator (RC) and Deputy Regional Coordinator (DRC) met with Captain Hussain M. Abdallah, the Director General of the Iraqi Port Authority (IPA). Captain Hussain described Umm Qasr port operations as being at full capacity. He acknowledged delivery of laboratory equipment at Umm Qasr for food testing and said there is a disagreement over whether to install the food-testing lab at Umm Qasr or in the city of Basrah. A Japanese loan package for port rehabilitation is on track and funds should be available in April 2006. The Iraqi ports still have not attained International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) standards, although Lloyd's of London visited Umm Qasr in January to review certification. The politicization of the ports between Badr and OMS shows no signs of abating, as they battle over control of the lucrative and strategically important ports in southern Iraq. End Summary. Port Operations at Maximum Capacity -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) On February 20, the Basrah RC and DRC met with Captain Hussain M. Abdallah, the Director General of the IPA. Captain Hussain said that Umm Qasr is currently operating at maximum capacity. He said he had been contacted by the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) with a request to use Umm Qasr instead of Kuwait for shipments. Captain Hussain would like to accommodate their request, but there are not enough cranes for unloading containers to meet current demand. He said that some ships must wait up to 10 days to unload and some grain shipments are now coming in overland because of port congestion. He said a project to relocate cranes from the north to the south port was delayed because the cranes do not fit through the gates. Port operations are further hampered because there are only four workable jetties and a shortage of grain evacuators. He is in contact with the PCO regarding additional equipment for the ports. U.S.-Funded Food Testing Laboratory Still in Storage at Umm Qasr -------------- -------------- -------------- -- 
 ¶3. (C) Captain Hussain said he had seen equipment for a food testing laboratory purchased by the PCO in May 2005 and that this equipment is currently in storage at Umm Qasr. He said that he would like to install the lab at Umm Qasr and has made space available. The Ministry of Health, according to Captain Hussain, prefers the lab be installed in Basrah instead so that it would be accessible to all four southern ports: Umm Qasr, Khor az Zubair (KAZ),Abu Floos, and Al Basrah. Captain Hussain said that nearly all grain is imported through Umm Qasr, so it would be better to install the lab there. Installing the lab in the city of Basrah would involve delays while grain samples were transported back and forth from the port to Basrah. He believed that the Ministry of HEALTH (MoH) wanted the grain lab installed in Basrah to avoid having its officials make the 50-mile commute between Basrah and Umm Qasr and pass through the extensive port security. (Comment: This is the first time that REO Basrah has heard mention of the MoH in connection with the food-testing lab. End Comment.) Japanese Loan Ready in April 2006 -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Captain Hussain said that a Japanese assistance package to remove wrecks, dredge the ports to a 12.5-meter depth, and procure equipment and utilities for the ports is on track (see reftel). He estimated the project would take three to four years to complete. He said that the loan should be ready in April 2006, and he has been working with the Japanese to prepare tender statements so that the project can be tendered out immediately after the loan is received. Iraqi Ports Still Do Not Meet ISPS Standards -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) None of the four ports in Iraq (Umm Qasr, KAZ, Abu Floos, Al Basrah) have attained ISPS standards. Captain Hussain mentioned that Lloyd's of London had toured the ports in January and described the delegation as "surprised at the quality" of the ports. He hoped a positive report from Lloyd's would result BASRAH 00000024 002.2 OF 002 in a lowering of sky-high insurance rates for docking at Iraqi ports, described as being located in an active war zone. Even if the ports do not have ISPS certification, he said, they had attained "certain standards," and he hoped this would be recognized. (Comment: Captain Hussain appeared more interested in obtaining a favorable report from Lloyd's that would result in lower insurance fees rather than in actually attaining ISPS standards. End Comment.) Port Security Questionable and Political -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Captain Hussain said that there were currently 500 Iraqi police (IPS) at Umm Qasr port, 280 at Khor az Zubair, and about 200 at Abu Floos and Al Basrah. If true, these numbers represent a sizeable increase in police presence at the ports from October 2005, when former KAZ port manager Basil Abdul Majeed reported that there were 160 IPS appointed to KAZ (see reftel). IPS, under the Ministry of Interior, function in the capacity of customs officers at the ports. Captain Hussain said that all police at the ports take their instructions from him, even if their salaries come from the MoI. "Many people tried to get involved in security," he said, "but we are in control." Nevertheless, he said that security would be even better if he had his own "police force," under the authority of the Minister of Transportation. (Comment: Facility Protection Services, provided by the Ministry of Transportation, are also present at the ports. The OMS-controlled Ministry of Transportation has been consolidating its control over port operations over the past six months, while the MoI has been increasing police presence at the ports. End comment.) ¶7. (C) When specifically asked about security at the ports, Captain Hussain described security as "good." He was quick to add, however, that he bears no responsibility for security outside the gates of Umm Qasr port, which he said is provided by "private companies." He made no mention of the two British soldiers who were killed in an IED attack on January 31 near the main gate of the port. Vague on Boycott, Iranian Interest -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) When asked if the February 13 suspension of communication between the Basrah government and the British were affecting work at the ports, Captain Hussain answered in vague terms, saying only that he had to "postpone" ONE meeting with the British regarding project work. Captain Hussain was also vague when asked if other countries, and Iran in particular, were interested in investing in Iraq's ports. He avoided giving a definitive answer and only said that many dhows came in to Iraq daily transporting fruits, vegetables, and dairy products, which were cheaper in Iran than in Iraq. Most of these dhows, he said, came in to Abu Floos port, which is smaller, located directly across the Shatt al Arab River from Iran, and is a twenty-minute drive from the markets of Basrah. Badr and OMS Fight for Iraqi Ports, Profits -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Comment: Captain Hussain does not appear to be overly concerned about obtaining ISPS standards, and instead hopes that a favorable report from Lloyd's will result in lower insurance rates. This attitude is worrisome, as it will be difficult for Iraqi ports to become economically competitive with those of Iran and Kuwait without ISPS certification. His dismissal of security concerns at Umm Qasr port is also disturbing. It is difficult to see how Umm Qasr will attain international security standards and a lower insurance rating when Coalition forces were killed recently outside Umm Qasr's main gates. ¶10. (C) Comment Continued: The battle between Badr and OMS to win control over Umm Qasr, Iraq's largest, most profitable, and most strategically located port, shows no sign of abating. This battle for control over ONE of Basrah province's major cash cows (the others being the Basrah International Airport and oil) is being mirrored in local politics, as OMS, Badr and SCIRI are engaged in political maneuverings to win influence on the Basrah Provincial Council and position themselves for success during the upcoming provincial elections. End comment. GROSS