PRTS IN THE SOUTH: U.S. AND U.K. DISCUSS WHEN AND HOW THEY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000021 SIPDIS SBU SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SUBJECT: PRTS IN THE SOUTH: U.S. AND U.K. DISCUSS WHEN AND HOW THEY WILL OPERATE BASRAH 00000021 001.2 OF 002 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: On February 15, Ambassador Speckhard visited the U.S. Regional Embassy Office (REO) and the British Embassy Office in Basrah to discuss the formation of southern Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). TheU.K. is well-advanced in their planning, with the meetings taking place in the PRT headquarters building. The U.K side underlined its readiness to move swiftly to support to support the stand-up of the PRT. The discussion highlighted the challenges facing the Basrah PRT due to the current unstable security situation and a dysfunctional Governor and Provincial Council. End Summary. Participants -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The meeting was hosted by the U.K. on the British side of the Basrah Palace compound, in the building that will serve as the Basrah PRT headquarters. Ambassador Speckhard met with representatives from the U.K. Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) in Basrah, the Department for International Development (DFID) and MND-SE to discuss the Provincial Reconstruction Team concept in southern Iraq. The main participants also included Greg Bates, Director, National Coordination Team (NCT),James Tansley, Her Majesty's Consul General and Maj. Gen. John Cooper, General Officer Commanding, MND-SE as well as representatives from the REO and USAID. Overall Assessments for Transition -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The Consul General (CG) began the meeting with an overview of each of the four southern provinces. The overviews covered current situations regarding security, economics and governance, achievements to date and an assessment of readiness for transition. Both Muthanna and Maysan were judged to be ready for transition by April/May and Dhi Qar was assessed to be ready for transition later in 2006. Of the four southern provinces, Basrah was determined to be the most problematic in terms of governance and security. Maj. Gen. Cooper said that recent efforts to clean up the police force in Basrah have been successful and they will continue to do so although it creates political difficulties with the Governor and Provincial Council. GOC Cooper comments on Maysan -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Ambassador Speckhard asked about the security situation in Maysan and if lawlessness there had the potential to spread to other provinces following the transition. Maj. Gen. Cooper said that it would not. Cooper said that the British would not withdraw entirely but would leave an element there and he was confident that re-entering the province to quell violence would not be a problem. He said that the threats and violence found in Maysan result from the province's independent nature and issues that typically arise are generally contained amongst the local tribes and various political factions. He said that this situation has been the norm in Maysan prior to the arrival of coalition forces and would continue to be the situation long after coalition forces leave Iraq. Cooper stressed that the issues in Maysan would have to be solved by Iraqis at the national, local and tribal levels. A layered approach, according to Cooper, would be more effective and coalition forces would support the Iraqis in the background, but resolution would have to come from the Iraqis themselves. He said he would not involve his troops in conflicts between Iraqis. But could move to contain conflicts if necessary. The Consul General reaffirmed that Maysan should not be seen as unstable, but as independent. Basrah PRT -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The CG stated that the U.K. team would continue to push ahead on projects that have already begun. He said that the PRT would be operational in six weeks and fully staffed and functional three months from that time. He added that the U.K. model anticipates 40 international staff supported by a large number of locally engaged staff and mentioned that the PRT team leader would report through the FCO to the NCT. Ambassador Speckhard questioned the reporting line, noting the need for direct reporting to the NCT. The CG clarified his statement that the PRT would report to him mainly on administrative and managerial issues. He added that it was important to have open lines of communication for reporting purposes and that life support needs for staff members should be provided by each member's own country. Greg Bates clarified that all administrative and operational costs of the PRT should be borne by the host country and that funding from the NCT to the PRTs would be for reconstruction projects/programs. BASRAH 00000021 002.2 OF 002 For the Near Future -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Ambassador Speckhard said that it would be a good idea for those involved in the Basrah PRT to make a trip to Baghdad to discuss and finalize administrative details. The CG also expressed an interest in visiting one of the three PRTs that is already functioning. Other issues to be clarified involve the chain of command in terms of reporting. There is also the issue of determining the location from which support would be provided to Muthanna province, assuming that it is not a Coalition-led PRT. The CG suggested that the Muthanna PRT could be supported out of Basrah province, although he was open to US suggestions that Dhi Qar province might be better positioned to provide this support and engagement. Comment -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Comment: The visit of Ambassador Speckhard to Basrah was a success. A number of participants commented that having all the players in one room to discuss the implementation of southern PRTs was very useful. The U.K is clearly committed to standing up the PRT. The U.K. representatives were pleased to learn of the significant contribution that the U.S would make to this effort.. End Comment. ¶8. This cable has been cleared by Ambassador Speckhard. GROSS