MAYSAN PROVINCE CONTACTS SAY IT IS NOT READY FOR PIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000176 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ SUBJECT: MAYSAN PROVINCE CONTACTS SAY IT IS NOT READY FOR PIC REF: A) BASRAH 47 B) BASRAH 158 C) BASRAH 160 D) BASRAH 166 BASRAH 00000176 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Andrea F. Gastaldo, Acting Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah, DOS. REASON: 1.4 (b) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On December 5 and 10, the Acting Regional Coordinator (ARC) and poloff met with frequent contacts Hussein Jaloob al-Saadi and Abdul Kareem Mahod respectively, from Maysan province. Both men told the ARC that following days of fighting between Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) and the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) in al-Amarah in late October that things in the city are quiet but that JAM is in complete control of security. JAM has taken over the area by intimidation, on-the-spot Sharia judicial punishments, and targeted killings. Both men echoed each other's sentiments that the province is not ready for Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) in the near future. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) According to two of the REO's regular contacts from Maysan Province, the province is not ready for turnover to Provincial Iraqi Control. The ARC and poloff met with Hussein Jaloob al-Saadi (Abu Muslim) on December 5 and with Abdul Kareem Mahod (Abu Hatem) on December 10. Both men have previously voiced the same sentiments to REO personnel (see refs B and C). According to both, following the October 18-21 fight in the provincial capital al-Amarah between members of JAM and the Badr Corps-dominated IPS, which left 30 dead and 206 injured, the situation in al-Amarah is quiet but not necessarily peaceful or stable. Abu Hatem was specific in stating that "quiet should not be confused with stability" and added that the security situation was "crumbling".(For background information on Abu Muslim and Abu Hatem, see Ref A.) JAM's Control of the Streets ¶3. (C) Following the skirmish in October, a truce was brokered between the two groups (see ref D). A three-person emergency security committee (ESC) was sent down by Prime Minister al-Maliki and is currently still in al-Amarah. Although things have been quiet in al-Amarah since the truce, the reality on the ground, according to both Abu Muslim and Abu Hatem, is that JAM is now in control of the streets and overall security in the capital. Both separately reported instances where JAM picked up both men and women in the streets and instituted their version of Sharia street justice for alleged crimes. In one instance a man, his brother, and a cousin were shot to death for the man's public intoxication; a crime that Abu Muslim reaffirmed was not punishable by death. In another account, women who were not properly dressed (NFI) were beaten in public to set an example for others. ¶4. (C) Abu Muslim told the ARC that the IPS were not out on the streets but sitting idle in police stations and noted that since the October skirmish JAM has increased its interactions with Iran through increased training, arms supplies, and funding. Abu Hatem stated that the ESC is ineffective and that they cannot even agree among themselves how the situation in Maysan should be handled. He added that with one member of the ESC being a JAM member, one moderate, and one pro-government, decisions were not being made and they were not responding to reports of killings and increased violence. However, the ESC has submitted a proposal to Baghdad to have the Chief of Police, Ismail Arrar al-Majidi (Abu Maythem) (ref A) removed from office but there has been no response from Baghdad to date. Not Ready For PIC ¶5. (C) When asked about the transfer to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) both men stressed to the ARC that Maysan is not ready. If the transfer were to happen in the near future, Abu Hatem questioned who the responsibility would be transferred to - the militias, the Iraqi Security Forces, or the ESC. He said that with 13,000 IPS officers and 4500 Iraqi Army (IA) they still cannot secure the province. He believes that Maysan will be ready for PIC when Coalition Forces or international non-governmental organizations can drive freely around the province without being attacked. As for central government intervention to help secure the province, Abu Hatem repeated what he had said during his last meeting with the REO, that since the central government could not even secure the International Zone, how could it be expected to help out anywhere else. Abu Muslim said that the security forces, both IPS and IA, still had a ways to go in terms of taking responsibility for the province. He cited the example of the IPS "running away" and leaving the city during the fighting with JAM. When asked if there was any intervention by the IA during the days of fighting, Abu Muslim replied that they did not play a role during the incident but were seen in the days afterwards manning checkpoints. BASRAH 00000176 002.2 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Comment: Since their last meetings with the REO in early October when both men described a deteriorating security situation in Maysan, things did indeed take a turn for the worse with the fight between JAM and IPS later that month. Although things in al-Amarah are "quiet" it is of great concern that the reason for the current state of calm is due to total security control of the city by JAM. The question of who the security will be turned over to if the province retains an ESC has yet to be worked out. It seems clear to both our contacts and the REO that if there is a need for an ESC in a province, then that province is not ready for PIC. It is a question for Maysan province now but Basrah province also has an ESC and a premature turnover to PIC is likely to escalate the violence and bloodshed. End comment. GASTALDO