BASRAH COUNCIL MEMBER ON MAYSAN FIGHTING AND OPERATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000166 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ SUBJECT: BASRAH COUNCIL MEMBER ON MAYSAN FIGHTING AND OPERATION SINBAD REF: A) BASRAH 160 B) BASRAH 158 C) BASRAH 47 CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b) 1) Summary: On October 22, the Regional Coordinator (RC) and poloff met with Basrah Provincial Council (BPC) member Aquil Talib to discuss the recent fighting between Badr and JAM in al-Amarah. Aquil said that he and Basrah Governor Wa'eli traveled to Maysan on October 21 to assist in mediation between the warring factions. Fighting broke out when the Chief of Intelligence, Kasim al-Timimi, was assassinated on September 18. Aquil also discussed Operation Sinbad and said that it is not having any effect on the security situation in Basrah. End summary. FIGHTING AND MEDIATION IN AL-AMARAH 2) (C) Aquil Talib, member of the BPC and close Regional Embassy Office contact, met with the RC and poloff on October ¶22. Aquil said he recently returned from al-Amarah where he, Basrah Governor Mohammed al-Wa'eli and tribal leaders assisted in mediating among the warring factions in the capital of Maysan province. According to Aquil, the trouble in Maysan began a couple of weeks ago with an increase in assassinations in Maysan (Refs A and B). The event that set in motion the eruption of bombings and firefights in al-Amarah was the assassination of the Chief of Intelligence of Maysan province, Kasim al-Timimi, on October 18. Aquil said that al-Timimi had evidence on the individuals responsible for the violence and sought support from the Governor and local council to arrest these individuals. Two days after meeting with them, al-Timimi was assassinated. Fighting broke out after the Chief of Police, Ismail Arrar Al Majidi, arrested the individuals named by al-Timimi. (Note: The Badr Organization dominates the security forces in Maysan, and its members include the Chief of Police and Chief of Intelligence. The local government, including the Governor and Chairman of the provincial council, are affiliated with the Office of the Martyr Sadr. For more on Maysan province see Ref ¶C. End note.) 3) (C) Aquil reported that the situation in Maysan is currently calm due to a 20-day truce brokered by a delegation sent by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a delegation sent by Muqtada al-Sadr and the delegation from Basrah. He told the RC that Governor Wa'eli strongly believed that he should help end the fighting before it spread to Basrah. He said that the OMS representatives insisted that Iranian intelligence was present at the beginning of the fighting and helped to increase its intensity. When asked how the friction between Badr and OMS/JAM could be eased, Aquil opined that a new, independent Chief of Police should be appointed and JAM should give up its weapons and obey the law. Aquil cautioned that the situation in Maysan "remains very dangerous" and trouble could spread to Basrah. OPERATION SINBAD 4) (C) In describing the effects of Operation Sinbad to the RC, Aquil said that it had absolutely no effect on the security situation in Basrah. Aquil said he believed the British were failing in everything in the south from reconstruction to security. He claimed that the British have "zero influence" in Basrah and that relations with the local government are not good. However, Aquil stressed that he did not believe that Coalition Forces should leave Basrah. He added that if Coalition Forces left Basrah in the current situation "it would be suicide;" he urged that Coalition Forces needed to involve local government authorities more and to work closer with local communities. COMMENT 5) (C) Comment: Aquil, a member of the Fadillah party and close supporter of Governor Wa'eli, is open and positive in discussions, but evidenced increasing concern with the deteriorating security situation in Basrah. This is the first time we have heard him be so critical of UK forces, and his frustration with lack of progress in improving security was apparent. Though his claims that he and the governor helped resolve the crisis in Maysan are vastly overblown, his apprehension about the violence spreading was real. Aquil made an interesting point on security in the south - he chided the coalition for looking at security on a province-by-province basis. He said that with the tribal web and family connections throughout the south, it made more sense to view Maysan, Dhi Qar and Basrah as one region for security purposes. End Comment. GROSS