C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000153

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/24/2016
TAGS: ASEC PTER IZ AMGT
SUBJECT: REGIONAL EMBASSY OFFICE BASRAH EMERGENCY ACTION MEETING ON
09/22/2006

CLASSIFIED BY: Bryan T. Bachmann, RSO, REO Basrah, Department of
State.
REASON: 1.4 (g)



1. (C) The Regional Coordinator (RC) chaired a meeting of the
Emergency Action Committee (EAC) on September 22, 2006, to
discuss the latest indirect fire (IDF) attacks against the
Regional Embassy Office (REO) and the general security
situation. The EAC was prompted by a rocket attack on the REO
that killed a Department of State contractor while he was in his
residential trailer. Attending the meeting were the Regional
Security Officer, Management Officer, Political Officers, and
representatives from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Triple
Canopy, Strategic Counter-Intelligence Directorate, Kellogg
Brown and Root and the Office of Regional Affairs.


2. (C) Indirect fire (IDF) attacks on Basrah Palace have
occurred on an almost daily basis during the past three weeks.
But only recently have the attacks become more accurate and more
dangerous. Many of the rockets used in previous attacks were
duds that did not explode, and they did not land near facilities
on the U.S compound. Recently, however, rocket attacks have
impacted near housing and offices in the REO. Rockets in the
two attacks on September 22 landed directly on one housing
trailer and near the gym.


3. (C) There is no overhead cover for REO personnel in many of
the offices and in all of the residential trailers. Because of
this vulnerability, the EAC agreed that it would be prudent to
reduce the overall number of personnel on the REO by 20-30
percent through a temporary redeployment of personnel in country
and extensions of leave for those out of country. REO Basrah
will work closely with Embassy Baghdad in coordinating these
efforts.


4. (C) In addition to temporarily relocating personnel, the REO
is again carefully looking at all measures it can take to
improve the safety of its employees. By separate communication,
the REO will send Embassy Baghdad a list of small projects that,
if funded, would enhance the security of its personnel. These
include more protective t-walls, blast-proof doors for the main
REO building and blast curtains for windows. The REO is
scheduled to receive additional bunkers, and an overhead cover
project is scheduled to begin construction during the last week
of October. Both of these projects will improve security from
IDF substantially, and the REO requests that these projects move
ahead as expeditiously as possible.


5. (U) REO Basrah is working in close coordination with Embassy
Baghdad's EAC to reduce the REO's footprint and improve the
security situation in Basrah.

GROSS