BASRAH PROVINCIAL COUNCIL MEMBERS AND THE BRITISH CONSUL

S E C R E T BASRAH 000015 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/2/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL IZ SUBJECT: BASRAH PROVINCIAL COUNCIL MEMBERS AND THE BRITISH CONSUL GENERAL MEET AT THE U.S. REGIONAL EMBASSY OFFICE TO DISCUSS THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION REF: (A) BASRAH 0010 (B) BASRAH 0012 (C) BASRAH 0013 (D) BASRAH 0014 CLASSIFIED BY: Mark Marrano, Deputy Regional Coordinator, Basrah Regional Embassy Office, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: On February 01, the Deputy Regional Coordinator (DRC),the Basrah Deputy Provincial Council (DPC) Chairman Nusaeef Jasim Ali (Fadheela Party) and the Head of the Supervisory Committee of the Provincial Council, Mr. Hakim, met to discuss the current political situation in Basrah (see refs). The DRC took the opportunity to invite the British Consul General (CG) to the meeting to open a dialogue between all the concerned parties and begin the search for a resolution. The meeting was cordial, but tense. The PC members reiterated their immediate request for evidence on the detainees and the establishment of a procedure to be informed of such arrests in the future. The CG stated he was working on providing the evidence and deferred the subject of an established procedure to future meetings. The meeting gave both sides the opportunity to talk, but did not provide any resolution of the immediate issue of the detainees. End Summary. ¶2. (S/NF) DPC Chairman Ali stressed to the British CG that the British military arrests showed a lack of respect for the Basrah Provincial Council. He stated, that the PC was not informed beforehand of the arrests and has not been informed after of the evidence that led to the arrests. The DPC Chairman stated that the Provincial Council continues to feel embarrassed by the entire issue and that the boycott would stay in effect until the British complied with their requests. The British CG stated that the British military was under no obligation to inform the Provincial Council prior to conducting such arrests and had in fact, informed the Minister of Interior in Baghdad prior to these particular arrest operations. The DPC Chairman pointed out that the British continue to deal with the central government on provincial issues while ignoring the provincial councils. Mr. Hakim added that the Provincial Council could not have the respect of the people if they see the British continuing to ignore it. ¶3. (S/NF) The DPC Chairman stressed that there are around 55 Iraqis detained by the British on which there has been no evidence provided of their crimes. The DPC added that the American military routinely releases detainees after they have finished with their investigations. He stated that this generates considerable good will among the local population and asked the British CG to consider doing the same. Mr. Hakin pointed out that the individuals the British arrested are from the two largest tribes in Basrah and that these tribal people are simple and uneducated. As a result, they only can see that the British arrested two of their tribal members without reason. Mr. Hakim warned that such actions by the British make these tribes ripe for recruitment by the insurgents. The British CG reiterated that evidence would be provided on the detainees, but it would be a few days more before it was ready. ¶4. (S/NF) The British CG stated that Brigadier Patrick Marriot, Commander of the 7th Armored Brigade, had spoken to the Governor on the phone and informed him of the evidence the British military had on the detainees. According to the British CG, as a result of the telephone conversation, the Governor understood why the individuals were arrested and would communicate the information to the Provincial Council later that day. (Note: the Provincial Council meeting was subsequently cancelled that day since most members were in Baghdad.) ¶5. (S/NF) Comment: The meeting ended with nothing being resolved although all parties agreed that such opportunities for frank dialogue were important. It was clear that both sides were talking, but not really listening, understanding or seeking a resolution. In addition, the fact that UK Brigadier Marriot was able to talk to the Governor on the phone the day after the Governor's meeting at the REO, is significant. The Governor had stated at that meeting that he wanted to see the evidence and the British CG had told the DRC that the evidence would be "blunt." Apparently, the Brigadier communicated the information in a manner that clearly showed the Governor being linked to a number of crimes. As a result, this may have "convinced" the Governor to accept the arrests and stop the boycott and anti-British rhetoric. End Summary. MARRANO