Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BASRAH123
2006-07-24 10:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE- REO BASRAH 07/23/06

Tags:  ASEC AMGT PTER IZ 
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VZCZCXRO9010
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0123 2051012
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 241012Z JUL 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0417
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0436
C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000123 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/24/2016
TAGS: ASEC AMGT PTER IZ
SUBJECT: EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE- REO BASRAH 07/23/06

REF: A) BASRAH 121, B) BASRAH 120

CLASSIFIED BY: Mark Marrano, DEPUTY REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO
BASRAH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (g)

C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000123 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/24/2016 TAGS: ASEC AMGT PTER IZ SUBJECT: EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE- REO BASRAH 07/23/06 REF: A) BASRAH 121, B) BASRAH 120 CLASSIFIED BY: Mark Marrano, DEPUTY REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO BASRAH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE. REASON: 1.4 (g) ¶1. (C) The Deputy Regional Coordinator (DRC) chaired a session of the Emergency Action Committee (EAC) on July 23 to discuss the continued threat of sustained indirect fire (IDF) attacks and the lack of adequate hardened protection for all of the 419 personnel on the Regional Embassy Office (REO) Basrah Palace compound. Attending the meeting were representatives from U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Joint Contracting Command Iraq (JCCI), Triple Canopy, Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT), Department of Justice, Strategic Counter Intelligence Directorate (SCID),Kellogg Brown and Root, the United Nations, and the Danish Mission. The EAC decided to enact a temporary limited redeployment of REO personnel to reduce existing personnel on the REO compound to roughly 250. ¶2. (C) On July 22 at 0230, a single rocket launched at the Basrah Palace compound hit the Office of Regional Affairs (ORA) office/residential area located on the British compound. The rocket traveled through five HESCO barriers and completely through one trailer before embedding itself in the living area of a second trailer. The occupant of the bed that the rocket destroyed was on duty and not present at the time of the attack. The occupant of the other bed in the trailer was shaken but uninjured. The rocket did not detonate. ¶3. (C) On July 23 at 2315, six mortars were fired at the Basrah Palace compound and all six landed within the compound. One mortar landed near the REO fuel point, one outside the REO gym, two in the pond behind the MWR theater, one at the MWR theater, and one on the British side of the compound. The mortar that landed at the MWR theater set the outdoor seating area on fire and caused shrapnel damage to the building. Security personnel put out the fire. No injuries were caused to REO personnel. Reftel A outlines other attacks on the REO compound since July ¶16. ¶4. (C) As per reftel B, the EAC recognizes the limited capability of the bunkers to house all 419 REO personnel overnight. In response to the continuation of IDF, the EAC has decided to bring the numbers of personnel on the REO compound into line with the existing capacity of overnight hardened accommodations. All agencies on the compound will relocate all or some of their personnel to other locations temporarily until conditions at the REO become permissible to allow a return of personnel. ¶5. (C) All agencies agreed to bring their personnel numbers into line in order to reduce the total number of personnel on the REO compound from 419 to roughly 250. This would involve the UN, CPATT, ACE, DOJ, and JCCI to relocate all of their existing personnel to alternate locations. The UN requested to allow two people, their military advisor and a security officer, to remain on the compound, but would seek to arrange life support for there people on the British side of the compound. Triple Canopy will reduce the number of security contractors assigned to movement teams. DOS, KBR, and SCID will temporarily redeploy some of their personnel to alternate locations. ¶5. (C) SCID requested to allow all 19 of their personnel on the REO compound, but admitted that four of the 19 could be redeployed temporarily to another location. SCID justified their position by stating that 12 of their staff were personal security detail that were necessary to move their staff to meeting locations outside of the REO compound. Without the PSD team, SCID could reduce their numbers to seven but would be unable to conduct meetings outside the REO compound. ¶6. (C) KBR staff agreed to a limited redeployment of 34 out of 107 personnel based on the overall reduced numbers of REO personnel to support. Several construction projects slated to be started, including the expanded laundry facility, construction and the helicopter landing pad, would be temporarily halted. However, overhead construction on the ORA compound would continue. ¶7. (C) There is a coordinated effort in place between REO Basrah, Embassy Baghdad, U.S. military, and the Iraq Support Unit in Kuwait to move personnel designated for redeployment out of REO Basrah. ¶8. (C) The EAC will monitor events and reconvene as necessary. GROSS

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