SECURITY SITUATION IN MAYSAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000114

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/5/2016
TAGS: PGOV MCAP PREL IZ
SUBJECT: SECURITY SITUATION IN MAYSAN

REF: BASRAH 47

BASRAH 00000114 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)


1. Summary: On June 28 the Regional Coordinator (RC) and
Poloff met with the Commander of the 4th Brigade of the Iraqi
Army (IA),Commander of the Department of Border Enforcement
(DBE) and Chief of Police in Maysan province. All three men
grumbled about the lack of heavy weaponry their forces possess
vis-`-vis militia forces and tribes. And they all agreed that
without better weapons and equipment, they could not maintain
adequate security in the province against the threats posed by
militia units and tribal in-fighting. The chief of police said
that he could not support the transfer of security control from
British military forces to Iraqi security forces until the
militias were disarmed. End summary.


2. (C) On June 28, the RC and Poloff traveled to Maysan
province and met with Brigadier Abdul Hussain, Commander of the
Iraqi Army's 4th Brigade, Brigadier Mokhaled Aysa Kadem, DBE
Commander in Maysan, and Ismail Arrar al-Majidi (Abu Maythem),
the Chief of Police. Discussions centered on the current
security environment in Maysan as well as readiness for transfer
of security responsibilities to Provincial Iraqi Control.

THE TROUBLEMAKERS: TRIBES AND MILITIAS


3. (C) Brigadier Hussain said that the largest concern for the
IA is trying to keep the militias in check and fighting among
the tribes. He lamented that the both the tribes and the
militia "outgun" the IA and requested that heavy weapons, more
training and additional troops be provided to the IA to allow it
to provide proper security to the province. He complained that
the militias and tribes have much heavier weaponry than the IA,
and the IA cannot therefore intervene effectively when tribes
clash or the militias carry out operations. (Note: An
illustrative example occurred during the meeting when a report
came in that two quarreling tribes had gathered in Al Amarrah
The Brigadier immediately dispatched two companies to the site,
but voiced concerns that the IA's lack of firepower might keep
it on the sideline as the tribes fought it out on the streets.
A later report, however, said that the dispute had been diffused
for the moment. End Note.)

MAYSAN PROVINCE COULD BE LIKE SWITZERLAND?


4. (C) On the prospect of the UK military withdrawing from
Maysan, Brigadier Hussain pointed out that security problems
would remain once the British forces left. Most of the
problems, he said, must be resolved by force. He said that the
IA needs heavier firepower, more troops and better training
before he could give a "green light" to Iraqi forces taking over
security responsibilities. The militias, particularly JAM, are
the main security threat in Maysan, but Brigadier Hussain said
that if this thorny problem could be solved, Maysan would be a
very stable province, "like Switzerland." To eliminate militias
and their influence, he said that the Ministry of Defense should
be put in charge of the campaign and should receive solid
support from everyone in Baghdad.

VIEW OF THE POLICE


5. (C) Police Chief Abu Maythem cited the role of militias in
Maysan as his most challenging problem. (Note: Abu Maythem was
a Badr Corps commander famous in Maysan for liberating the
province from Saddam before Coalition Forces arrived. See
Reftel for more on him. End Note.) Like his colleagues in the
IA and the DBE, the absence of heavy weapons and equipment are
the major internal problems he faces, though he also said that
almost half of his 10,000-man police force has no weapons.
(Note: the British officer commanding in Maysan said that the
police do not have weapons for the additional officers since the
authorized number of police is just over 5,000. End Note.) The
police chief said that he is confident that his force is under
his control.


6. (C) Abu Maythem said that the UK military should remain in
the province as long as there are heavily armed militia units.
He averred that he would arrest any armed militia in Maysan, but
JAM is the major problem. Abu Maythem said that he has tried to
solve the militia problem politically, but has been unsuccessful
because of Governor Adil Mahudir Rahdi al-Maliki's interference.
Battles between the police and JAM occur frequently, and Abu
Maythem placed the blame for this squarely on the support JAM
receives from the governor and members of the Provincial
Council. Tribal disputes are also a problem for the police, and
Abu Maythem said that the police need heavier weapons to better
control them. He uses his influence to sort out disputes among
tribes with the leaders themselves, and, for the most part,
believes he is successful.

BASRAH 00000114 002.2 OF 002



BORDER CONTROL


7. (C) Brigadier Kadem commands the DBE in Maysan, a force of
1,705 men who patrol the 275-kilometer border with Iran and man
28 forts spread out approximately 5-15 kilometers along the
border. He also complained about the lack of heavy weapons and
equipment and the influence of militias and tribes. In
particular, the DBE does not have communications equipment that
would allow communication among forts, a necessity for border
enforcement units to be effective. Brigadier Kadem said that
drugs and weapons are smuggled across the border, but not in
significant numbers. Appliances are most frequently brought in
to Iraq and to Iran by illegal methods, with liquor being a
popular smuggling item into Iran. The border area in the south
of Maysan, the marsh area, is the most difficult area to control
and monitor. According to Brigadier Kadem, there is no
relationship or contact between the DBE and Iranian border
enforcement elements.

COMMENT


8. (C) Comment: Maysan province is predominantly Shia (99
percent) and its population is strongly tribal in nature.
Tribal customs and laws frequently trump secular laws in the
province, and there is a great deal of tension between the
Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) and Badr organization entities.
OMS elements hold 15 of the 41 seats on the Maysan Provincial
Council, and the Governor is a strong OMS supporter. Abu
Maythem is a former member of Badr (his assertion),and much of
the police force is made up of Badr members. The heightened
sense of tension between the OMS and Badr has led to numerous
conflicts in the past few years. High unemployment in the
province makes recruitment easy for the militias. (Note: For
further background information on Maysan province, see reftel.
End note.)


9. (C) Comment continued: With well-organized and heavily
armed tribes and militia in Maysan, all three of the security
professionals cited the need for better weaponry as their main
concern before security control could be returned to the Iraqis.
The British Commander at Camp Abu Naji noted that this is a
constant refrain that he hears from them and said that the IA
will receive some of the items on its wish list. Tribal
fighting is historical and endemic to the area and will never
disappear, and all the security chiefs believe that the British
military forces serve as a lightening rod for JAM attacks. But
JAM wields significant power in Maysan and is able to outgun the
security forces if they have to go it alone without the British.
As Brigadier Kadem pointed out when the discussion turned to
Muthanna Province reverting to Iraqi security control, Muthanna
does not share a long border with Iran and "does not have
political parties supported by neighboring countries." End
Comment.
GROSS