THE GAMBIA: FURTHER JUSTIFICATION FOR ESF PROJECT

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANJUL 000245

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2016
TAGS: PGOV EAID ECON PHUM KDEM PREL GA
SUBJECT: THE GAMBIA: FURTHER JUSTIFICATION FOR ESF PROJECT


REF: A. BANJUL 231

B. STATE 59002

C. BANJUL 187

D. BANJUL 233

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH STAFFORD, REASON 1.4 (B AND D)

SUMMARY
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1. (C) We view our proposed ESF project with IFES as of
vital importance for The Gambia's electoral process. The
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC),charged with
conducting The Gambia's 2006-7 Presidential and National
Assembly elections, is an imperfect institution, but
nonetheless has run elections deemed credible by the
international community. We are encouraged by opposition
parties' professed determination to participate in the
upcoming contests as well as other foreign donors' aid plans.
Despite President Jammeh's erratic behavior and clear
distaste for the opposition, sources rule out his massively
rigging the elections or so harassing the opposition that it
cannot campaign effectively -- but the "Jammeh factor"
requires careful monitoring of the electoral process and
maintaining pressure for credible contests. END SUMMARY


OUR ESF PROJECT PROPOSAL
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2. (SBU) Ref a contains post's proposed $300,000 ESF project
with IFES in support of The Gambia's preparations for its
Presidential and National Assembly elections scheduled for
October 2006 and January 2007, respectively. As the deadline
for submission of ESF proposals approaches (ref b),we wish
to reiterate our view that USG assistance for The Gambia's
electoral process here is of vital importance. As we have
previously argued (ref c),the coup plot thwarted here March
21 only highlights the fragility of the country's democratic
process and the consequent need for assistance, in
particular, to bolster the capacity of the Independent
Electoral Commission (IEC),charged with conducting the
2006-7 contests.

THE IEC
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3. (C) The IEC itself is an imperfect institution, with
limited staff and expertise. It is headed by a Board of
Commissioners composed of nominally non-partisan figures,
among them, retired government bureaucrats. Our sense is
that chairman Ndondi Njie, a former educator, and his fellow
commissioners recognize the need to address election-related
concerns of the opposition parties as well as those of the
GOTG/ruling APRC party -- but if there is a slant in a given
IEC decision, it is likely to be in the latter's favor. At
the same time, we also believe that the IEC commissioners
recognize the importance of conducting elections that, at the
end of the day, are seen as credible at home and abroad. In
this respect, it is worth noting that the IEC-supervised
Presidential and National Assembly elections of 2001-2 were
deemed credible by the international community (including the
U.S.) as were the National Assembly by-elections of September

2005.

OPPOSITION'S DETERMINATION TO PARTICIPATE
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4. (C) We are encouraged by opposition parties'
determination to participate in both the Presidential and
National Assembly contests, unlike the previous round in
2001-2, when the country's largest opposition party, the
United Democratic Party (UDP),boycotted the National
Assembly elections. In April 14 conversation with
pol/econoff, UDP head Oussainou Darboe reaffirmed his party's
commitment to participating in both upcoming contests and
asserted that all other opposition parties would do so as
well. Echoing other opposition politicians, Darboe
acknowledged the IEC's imperfections, but judged that the
opposition parties and their candidates would have sufficient
opportunity to compete for office to warrant their
participation. He also opined that President Jammeh, in the
aftermath of the failed coup plot, would refrain from a
crackdown on the opposition parties that would rule out their
being able to campaign effectively in the run-up to the
2006-7 elections. Darboe stressed the importance of
international support, i.e., IFES, to the IEC.

DECISION OF OTHER DONORS TO ASSIST
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5. (C) We are also encouraged by the professed commitment by
other donors to provide election-related assistance. Ref c
reports assistance plans by the UK's aid agency, Department
for International Development (DFID),EU, and UN; we have
also gotten indications that other donors may also step
forward, e.g., the Japanese and the Commonwealth
organization. Most recently, in April 19 conversation with
Ambassador, UNDP Resident Representative said the
establishment of a donors "basket fund" for election-related
assistance was on track.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATION -- THE JAMMEH FACTOR
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6. (C) President Jammeh's penchant for erratic behavior and
his distaste for the opposition parties -- as reflected in
his harsh criticisms at an April 15 rally (ref d) -- raise
the possibility of an abrupt move by him either to massively
rig the elections or so harass the opposition that they
cannot campaign effectively. At this point, we are inclined
to rule out either scenario -- and we note that the
opposition does so as well, judging from UDP head Darboe's
remarks. At this point, we note the assessment of various
sources, none of them Jammeh supporters, that the President
is confident that he will win in the 2006 election and that
his party will win a majority of seats in the subsequent
National Assembly ballotting -- but also recognizes that
contests seen as rigged or devoid of significant opposition
will deprive him and his party of the legitimacy he prizes.
At this point, we have no basis for challenging the foregoing
assessment, but the "Jammeh factor" only heightens the need
for careful monitoring of the electoral process and
maintaining pressure for credible contests.




STAFFORD