THE GAMBIA: CALM, BUT JITTERY ENVIRONMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANJUL 000194 SIPDIS SIPDIS DAKAR PASS RAO, DAO,AND ODC E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS CASC ASEC PHUM GA SUBJECT: THE GAMBIA: CALM, BUT JITTERY ENVIRONMENT REF: A. BANJUL 190 ET AL ¶B. BANJUL 188 ¶C. BANJUL 193 BANJUL 00000194 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH STAFFORD, REASON 1.4 (B AND D) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Amidst a calm, but jittery atmosphere, there have been additional televised statements by persons suspected of involvement in the March 21 coup attempt. A senior police official noted the release of two military officers cleared of involvement and estimated the remaining number of detainees at around 28. He expressed certainty that elements in the Senegalese military and security services had been aware and supportive of the coup plot, but expressed doubt that Senegalese President Wade had been aware or that he would endorse Jammeh's overthrow. Authorities' closure of the journal,"The Independent," and detention of its general manager and editor-in-chief contribute to the jittery atmosphere. Another daily, "Daily Observer," gave lead coverage to Ambassador's March 29 statement of USG opposition to extra-constitutional attempts to change governments. Despite the jitters here, we have no sense at this point that Jammeh's hold on power is slipping or that the country's stability is in jeopardy. END SUMMARY JITTERS IN AFTERMATH OF COUP ATTEMPT -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The failed coup attempt March 21 continues to overshadow events in the Gambian capital (see ref a for background). Amidst the prevailing calm and general normality, there is a sense of jitteriness in the air. The current shortage of fuel in the Banjul area is contributing to the nervousness, as are the televised confessions of those suspected of involvement in the failed overthrow attempt. While we believe that the GOTG is having these confessions aired in order to convince any doubters that the plot was real, sources indicate that the broadcasts are also instilling in some Gambians a sense of unease as to the country's stability and security. (NOTE: Since the failed coup attempt, we have detected no sign of threat to stability; e.g. the incident has generated no significant public gatherings, except for the show of mass support -- doubtlessly organized by the GOTG -- for President Jammeh when he appeared in public March 24 (ref B). TELEVISED CONFESSIONS -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Ref a reported televised confessions by suspected plotters March 27; one suspect, Capt Bunja Darboe, read the statement that the plotters had planned to issue on toppling the Jammeh government. In their statement, the plotters cited the country's "social and economic degradation" as justification for their move and spoke of establishing an interim government within ten days. There were further televised confessions on March 29, when statements by two "marabouts" (traditional Muslim religious guides) were broadcast. The pair acknowledged having prior awareness of the overthrow scheme through contact with plotters, but denied any actual involvement and proclaimed their loyalty to Jammeh (text being sent to AF/W). The March 29 footage also featured a statement by a senior civilian official, General Accountant of the Treasury, Alieu Jobe, who had also appeared in the March 27 airing. Jobe, who has emerged as a major figure in the plot, recounted his belief that the ringleader, former Chief of Defense Staff Lt Col Ndure Cham, would select him to head a post-coup government. UPDATE ON DETENTIONS AND RELEASES -------------- ¶4. (C) A senior police officer familiar with the GOTG's ongoing investigation into the aborted plot told Ambassador March 30 that that coup ringleader Cham remained at large and was probably in the Casamance. This source denied rumors that Senegalese authorities had located Cham and taken him into custody. This source estimated the current number of detainees at around 28 and noted the release earlier this week of two military officers cleared of involvement in the plot, Maj Ebrima Bah, commander of the First Infantry Battalion, and Captain Famara Jammeh, Deputy Commander of the State Guards (NOTE: Jammeh's release was particularly noteworthy, as he had been among suspects giving televised statements March 27; investigators evidently accepted his assertion that he learned of the plot only on the day it was BANJUL 00000194 002.2 OF 002 to occur, March 21, and played no part in it. END NOTE) Our police contact asserted that various civilians -- e.g., former Gambian Ports Authority head Adama Deen and former National Assembly member Ramzia Diab -- had been picked up on suspicion of supporting the coup, in some cases financially. Ambassador stressed the importance of authorities' respecting detainees' rights and avoiding abuses; the police officer responded that he was not aware of any detainees' being tortured or otherwise abused. SENEGALESE ANGLE -------------- ¶5. (C) Asked about a possible Senegalese hand in the failed overthrow attempt, the police contact expressed certainty that elements in the Senegalese military and security forces were aware of it, although he doubted that Senegalese President Wade was aware or that he would have approved of supporting a coup attempt. Noting plotters' televised statements about ringleader Cham's assertions of Senegalese forces' readiness to assist coup plotters in securing Gambian military sites (ref A),our contact said he believed that Cham had indeed lined up such contingency support from Senegalese forces. Asked why Senegalese forces would support Jammeh's overthrow, the source explained that the former were concerned that Jammeh, given his common Jolla ethnic background with the majority of Casamance residents, had supported Casamance rebels in the past and would continue to do so. (NOTE: According to local press reports March 29, the Senegalese Embassy here declined to comment on allegations of Senegalese involvement. END NOTE) ¶6. (C) According to an Amcit businessman who met March 30 with Jammeh's senior adviser, Secretary General Mambury Njie, Jammeh was dissuaded, for the time being, from issuing an anti-GOS statement, but was convinced of Senegalese involvement in the plot. Njie reportedly said that Jammeh had sent his Interior Minister to Dakar to discuss the allegations of Senegalese involvement. CLOSURE OF DAILY NEWSPAPER -------------- ¶7. (C) Authorities' March 28 closure of the offices of the newspaper "The Independent" and ongoing detention of its General Manager and Editor-in-Chief contribute to the jittery atmosphere (ref C). The precise reasons for the GOTG's action remain unclear, but the paper's March 27 articles replaying opposition concerns about Jammeh's wealth and containing critical references to his own 1994 coup may well have prompted authorities to act. As in his March 29 conversation with the Interior Minister, Ambassador registered concern over this crackdown on "The Independent" in March 30 call to the Information Minister and has requested a meeting with her March 31. AMBASSADOR' STATEMENT CONDEMNING COUPS -------------- ¶8. (U) Ambassador's March 29 interview with the journal,"Daily Observer," in which he stated the USG's firm opposition to any effort to change governments by extra-constitutional means such as coups, received lead coverage in the paper. In a March 30 editorial, the paper applauded the U.S. statement of opposition to coups and contrasted it with the Senegalese Embassy's failure to comment, as reported above. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Despite the jittery atmosphere as the GOTG's investigation of the failed coup continues, we have no sense that Jammeh risks losing his hold on power or that the country's stability is becoming shaky. However, authorities' move against "The Independent," doubtless with Jammeh's knowledge if not at his instruction, suggests that, in the recent aftermath of the ovethrow attempt, his sensitivity to personal criticism is even greater than usual. END COMMENT. STAFFORD