U.S.-THAI MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000926 SIPDIS DOD FOR USD(P) EDELMAN AND ASD RODMAN FROM AMBASSADOR BOYCE STATE FOR S/CT CRUMPTON AND EAP A/S HILL E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL TH POL MIL SUBJECT: U.S.-THAI MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF SOUTHERN VIOLENCE Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (a and d) ¶1. (S) Eric and Peter: My country team continues to explore ways to improve our military cooperation with Thailand in order to address the violence in the South here. I know these are issues that are important to you. I'd like to share my views with you and suggest ways we can help the Thai. I recently met with Hank Crumpton and believe we should seek his input too. I see three basic ways to focus our military cooperation strategy: --1) Improve the professional and operational skills of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, especially the Thai Army; --2) Help the Thai break down stovepipes between the Thai military, police forces, and civilian agencies; --3) Do everything we can to ensure the Thai respect international human rights norms as they counter the violence. However, in order to successfully implement such a strategy, it is important to clearly understand the roots of the violence in southern Thailand which make this situation very different from the southern Philippines and Indonesia. THIS IS ETHNIC, NOT RELIGIOUS ¶2. (S) At its core, the violence in southern Thailand arises primarily from ethnic rather than religious tension. Unlike in other parts of Thailand where Muslims speak Thai and are linguistically and culturally linked to their Buddhist neighbors, Muslims in southern Thailand speak a different language, have different customs, and resent being treated as second class citizens. They are proud of their distinct -- fundamentally Malay -- heritage. The unrest can be traced back to 1902 when Britain and Siam drew a border between the once-independent sultanate of Pattani and British Malaya -- thereby separating ethnic Malays in what is now southern Thailand from their kinsmen in what is now northern Malaysia. This is not a new issue for the Thai. ¶3. (S) Unrest in the South has smoldered on and off for over a hundred years. It will likely continue to simmer for years to come. However, unlike the Philippines and Indonesia, where the security forces cannot operate in large areas of those countries, the RTG controls all of southern Thailand. There are roughly 45,000 security forces (police and military) deployed in an area smaller than Connecticut. Most importantly, unlike the Philippines -- which seeks U.S. direct involvement in and around Mindanao -- the RTG does not want U.S. troops or trainers working in the South. I can't underscore this point too much -- Prime Minister Thaksin and his Government do not want us to operate in the South. DO NO HARM ¶4. (S) Right now, southern separatists direct their anger at the government in Bangkok, not at the United States. A U.S. presence or perception of U.S. involvement in the South could redirect that anger towards us and link it to the international jihadist movement -- a link that is currently absent. Likewise, we are working hard to avoid feeding rampant, outlandish speculation that we are somehow fomenting the violence in the South in order to justify building permanent bases -- a very sensitive issue in Thailand. We do not want to jeopardize our access to key military facilities in Thailand like Utapao Naval Air Station. Utapao was invaluable during Operation Unified Assistance and allows us to quickly ferry materiel from the Pacific to the Persian Gulf. ¶5. (S) We must ensure that any offers of assistance or training pass the "location and label" test. Put simply, we should ensure that U.S. personnel are kept away from the far South and we need to make sure that we do not label any assistance or training as directly linked to the southern situation. WHAT THAI POLICY IS AND WHAT THEY HAVE DONE ¶6. (S) The RTG's CT effort in the South has been plagued by Thaksin repeatedly changing his policies and lead agencies. Shortly after taking power, Thaksin decided to dissolve the joint civilian-police-military Task Force which since the 1980s had successfully contained the separatist-related violence. The loss of that coordinating body increased the natural propensity of the Thai bureaucracy to stovepipe information and not cooperate operationally. The problems caused by this lack of coordination have been compounded by the constant shifting of both the civilian and military leadership responsible for the South. In addition, Thaksin has often set unrealistic deadlines for his deputies to "solve" the southern problem and has been inconsistent in his policy statements, creating a situation where the operational leadership has a weak mandate and lack of strategic focus. Now, he finally appears settled on Army CINC GEN Sonthi Boonyaratklin (who is a Muslim with a Special Forces Background) as his chief military representative. Sonthi recently assured me that the Army had rebuilt its intelligence and political network in the South, which is a good sign. Nonetheless, Thaksin himself retains a tight hold on policy decisions in the South and there is little guarantee that he couldn't switch course again in response to an actual or perceived setback. But irrespective of which agency has the titular lead in the South, implementation of the CT effort will remain a joint effort among the Army, Police, and civilian officials and thus will require improved coordination and elimination of crippling stovepipes among agencies. WHAT ARE THE GAPS? A) MILITARY SKILLS ¶7. (S) As mentioned above, I see three areas ripe for improving our work with the armed forces. First, making the Thai military more capable. Our current military assistance program, using Joint/Combined Exercise Training (JCET) funds, is good but could be expanded. If funds and trainers were available, we could augment our JCET program and improve Thai facilities for training. Existing efforts include: --JCETs programs focused on enhancing general CT capabilities, counter-insurgency operations, civil affairs and psychological operations, and information warfare. Since FY04 over 2500 Thai soldiers from 50 different units have been trained in counter-insurgency by U.S. Special Forces. --Building a National Training Facility (NTF). We have worked with the Thai for over a year to develop an NTF that can serve as a world-class training facility. Such a site could not only help hone CT skills and provide human rights training, but is a key tool to improve peace keeping skills for soldiers in the region under the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). We have been cobbling funds together to make the NTF a center of excellence and could use more. --PSYOPS. We presently support a U.S. Military Information Support Team (MIST) unit from Ft. Bragg attached to the Thai Army. This team will likely be augmented by an experienced Civil Affairs planner within the next month or so who will assist with campaign planning and product support to counter ideological support to terrorism. I think it is worth exploring doing more in this area -- including creating training material aimed at soldiers rotating to the South to make them more sensitive to local customs and religious beliefs. That being said, it is critical that the Thai military be in control. Under the current arrangement, the MIST Unit works out of Thai Army Special Warfare HQ in Lopburi north of Bangkok, nowhere near the South, under the explicit direction of GEN Sonthi, the Thai Army Commander. B) POOR COORDINATION WITH THE POLICE FORCES ¶8. (S) The area most ripe for exploration is improving coordination between the Thai military and the Thai Police. There is a glaring lack of public confidence in the justice system here -- creating an atmosphere ripe for human rights abuses. Thai police are generally not as professional as the military and there is little coordination between the two institutions. Recently, we began to explore what steps we can take to break down these barriers. One obvious example is to invite a few key Thai police to U.S.-sponsored military training courses and to invite key Thai military officers to U.S.-sponsored police training courses. Other possibilities worth exploring include: --Expanding DOJ's International Criminal Investigative Assistance Training Program (ICITAP). ICITAP has years of experience in Indonesia, Colombia and elsewhere in providing fundamental skills to police and prosecutors that allow them to conduct investigations and prosecute cases under the rule of law. Helping train police in crime scene preservation and forensic techniques and instilling in them an understanding of the prosecutorial process could reduce the risk of extra-judicial killings. Expanding key courses to include military participation could enhance cooperation between the military and police. --Doing more work on IEDs. DOD, DOJ and Intelligence agencies have all recently sponsored training courses for the Thai aimed at detecting and mitigating the risk posed by IEDs. In the future, we should explore mixing the student make up for these courses to break down the walls between the military and the police. --Working more closely with ILEA Bangkok. Although ILEA has its limitations, I'd like to see the Thai military included in more ILEA courses. We've initiated discussions with DOJ and INL about this. C) A LACK OF HUMAN RIGHTS AWARENESS ¶9. (S) I urge all senior U.S. officials visiting Thailand to ask the Thai to conform with international norms while working in the South and warn them what might happen to important programs like IMET should they resort to extra-judicial means. You and I know this is not an idle threat. If funding could be found, we could expand our human rights training for the Thai military. Existing efforts include: -- Regular human rights courses as part of JCET. Since 2004, JCET programs have included more comprehensive human rights training before the trained unit deploys to the South. This training has been conducted jointly by U.S. and Thai Special Forces. --Advanced courses. In response to the October 2004 Tak Bai incident in which 80 Southern Muslims died after a demonstration while in police custody, we worked with the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) to set up a more thorough human rights training program for Thai enlisted troops as well as mid-level and senior officers. We could expand this program should funding be available. --Improving military police skills. We are planning to use State Department GWOT funds to be administered by U.S. Marines to pay for non-lethal weapons for Thai troops in the hope of avoiding major human rights violations. IN CLOSING ¶10. (S) The Thai are looking for more intelligence cooperation. We share as much intel as we can with them and are doing myriad things to make them more capable. I think they have some unrealistic hopes that there is a technical silver bullet that will solve their problems (e.g., UAVs). ¶11. (S) There is no clear endgame to this 100-year-old insurgency. Given our recent experience in nearby countries, I think we need to craft a strategy that is realistic, effective, and sustainable -- and limits our direct involvement. I look forward to hearing your reaction and stand ready to assist as you move forward. Sincerely, Skip BOYCE