SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF SEVENTH FLEET COMMANDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000821

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SEVENTH FLEET FOR VADM GREENERT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016
TAGS: OVIP PREL PGOV MARR TH
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF SEVENTH FLEET COMMANDER
VADM GREENERT

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (a and d)


1. (C) Jonathan, all of us in Bangkok look forward to your
return visit and the big top reception aboard the USS Blue
Ridge. Our military-to-military relationship is strong.
Nonetheless, our relationship with the Royal Thai Navy could
be improved. We hope during your stay that you will be able
to promote several issues such as our desire for better
cooperation with Thailand in maritime security as well as
flag key benefits of U.S.-Thai cooperation such as the
growing professionalism within Thai Naval Special Forces.

THE OVERALL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP


2. (C) The U.S.-Thai security relationship is based on over
50 years of close cooperation. Thai soldiers, sailors and
airmen participated in the Korean and Vietnamese Conflicts
and Thai peacekeepers served in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Thailand is the fourth largest participant in the U.S.
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.
Thailand's willingness to allow the United States to use
Utapao Naval Air Station as the hub for our regional tsunami
assistance program was key to making Operation Unified
Assistance a success. In your meetings with Thai officials,
you will want to note the overall strength of the
relationship -- highlighting our history and underscoring the
importance of our tsunami cooperation, exercise program,
increased tempo of USN ship visits, and cooperation in the
War on Terrorism.

THE NAVAL RELATIONSHIP


3. (C) While our overall relationship with the Thai
military is good, our links with the Royal Thai Navy (RTN)
are not as strong as those with the Royal Thai Army or Air
Force. The RTN is smaller than the other services and tends
to be less willing to be open with U.S. counterparts. This
has not been the case historically, and we need to work to
reverse the trend. Recently, the Chinese have improved their
ties to the RTN as evidenced by the first PLA Navy ship visit
to Phuket, a joint SAR exercise in the Andaman Sea, and sales
to Thailand of Chinese equipment. Likewise, the RTN has been
developing a closer relationship with the Indian Navy and has
conducted some exercises with the Indians.


4. (C) In addition to supporting our annual Cooperation
Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise with Thailand,
JUSMAGTHAI has worked closely with RTN Special Warfare units
to increase their capacity. USN SEALS have helped to provide
their Thai counterparts with some impressive capabilities.
For instance, Thai SEALS regularly conduct exercises aimed at
protecting oil and gas platforms in the Gulf of Thailand.
This NSW relationship was graphically demonstrated during the
tsunami response when USN and RTN SEALS rapidly deployed to

SIPDIS
Phuket to assist in the recovery efforts. The Prime Minister
was photographed in a recovery boat manned by the SEALS.
Despite their improved professionalism, the Thai SEALS are
not well-supported by senior RTN officials. In your meetings
with your counterparts, you may wish to discuss the
importance of the SEALS and make mention of their
capabilities.

REGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY


5. (C) A key U.S. objective in the region is to improve
Maritime Security. We are working closely with PACOM to
encourage Thailand and others to support the Regional
Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI). In November, during the
U.S.-Thailand Strategic Dialogue, LTG Kemarat Kanchanawat,
the Royal Thai Supreme Command (RTSC) Joint Operations
Director, discussed a "Combined Maritime Patrol" architecture
for the Strait of Malacca that would involve Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. In a January 24 meeting
with the Ambassador, RTN CINC ADM Satirapan Keyanon indicated
that the RTN was leery of this Combined Maritime Patrol
architecture, suggesting that Kemarat was trying to commit
the RTN budget to the proposal without proper authority.
During your meetings with RTN officers, you may wish to probe
for a clearer understanding of how the Thai Navy views its
responsibilities to safeguard waters in the region. On a
related topic, RTN officials are skeptical of the Malaysian
sponsored "Eyes in the Sky" program. Thailand does not plan
to actively participate for at least a year due to not having
enough aircraft to sustain long-term patrolling.

UTAPAO UPGRADES


6. (C) Utapao NAS has been designated by PACOM as the most
important Cooperative Security Location (CSL) in the Asia
Pacific Region. While we avoid using the term "CSL" with the
Thai due to their sensitivities about bases, Utapao remains
vital to our interests in the region. Thai and U.S.
officials in-country concur that Utapao is due for
significant safety upgrades in order to continue to meet our
needs. Although Utapao is a RTN facility, PACAF is the
executive agent exploring whether the United States can
assist in providing safety upgrades there. Thai military
officials still await the results of a PACAF assessment of
Utapao which took place in September. Royal Thai Navy
officials recently indicated to the Ambassador that they seek
radar upgrades at Utapao in addition to fire safety and other
improvements.

THE ROLE OF CHINA AND INDIA IN THE REGION


7. (C) Southeast Asia continues to feel the rising influence
of China and India. While emphasizing the vital role of the
U.S. in the region -- and Thailand's desire to intensify U.S.
engagement -- Thai leaders also focus on developing stronger
relations with the two regional powers. The Thai view both
countries as sources of unlimited consumer demand and hope to
conclude Free Trade Agreements with both nations. Given your
close interest in those countries, it would be worthwhile for
you to exchange views on the future roles of India and China.


COUNTERTERRORISM AND SOUTHERN THAILAND


8. (C) Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's biggest domestic
challenge is the unsettled security situation in the far
southern part of the country. Southern Thailand, in
particular the southernmost Muslim majority provinces of
Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, has experienced episodic
violence since it was incorporated into the Siamese Kingdom
in 1902. However, since January 2004, we have witnessed a
dramatic increase in the level of violence. Press reports
indicate that over 1,000 persons have been killed either by
militants or by security forces during this period. Local
Muslim separatist militants have attacked symbols of Thai and
Buddhist authority, civilians, and local citizens suspected
of collaborating with the Government. There continue to be
daily incidents of violence. In March 2005, Thaksin appointed
a National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) headed by highly
respected former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun to look for
alternative solutions to the long-running insurgency. The NRC
is expected to present its findings in March 2006.


9. (C) The RTN does not play a role in addressing the
situation in the South. Nonetheless, Thai officials may ask
you for U.S. equipment and technology such as UAVs. We
suggest you be non-commital. There are widely circulated
rumors among ethnic Malay Muslims that the U.S. has fomented
the violence in the South in order to justify a U.S. security
presence there. This has made the RTG very sensitive about
any visible U.S. assistance aimed at the South. You should be
aware of these concerns when discussing offers of possible
U.S. assistance.

USN SHIP ACCESS


10. (C) Port access for USN ships in Thailand is a high
priority. Current exercise planning and ship visits,
particularly to Gulf Of Thailand ports, are affected because
USN ships are limited in their ability to enter Thai Navy
ports with confidence because the navigation charts provided
are outdated and inaccurate. We know the RTN has more
accurate and current data but they have been unwilling to
provide the information thus far. In his January meeting
with the Ambassador, ADM Satirapan promised to explore
sharing better charts with us. You may wish to follow up on
this matter during you meetings.

HARRIERS


11. (C) The RTN, like the other services, does not have a
long-range vision of what Thailand's maritime security needs
are, what threats Thailand might need to counter, or what
equipment it should procure. As a result, its inventory
includes a wide variety of equipment of questionable utility.
One example is its VSTOL Carrier, the Chakri Naruebet.
Thailand procured the carrier from Spain and, at the same
time, bought eight used AV-8 Harriers. These aircraft are no
longer airworthy. For several years, we have been urging the
Thai to use their carrier as a helicopter platform. A number
of RTN officers agree and have supported more training for
helo ops from the Chakri Naruebet. However, another faction
within the RTN continues to ask us for more Harriers. If you
are asked for AV-8's, you may wish to underscore that we have
no surplus Harriers due to their use elsewhere and urge the
Thai to continue to develop their carrier as a helicopter
platform.


NAVAL HAWK (MH-60S) HELICOPTER


12. (C) The RTN has expressed an interest in increasing the
size of its helicopter force. One option is to purchase four
of the new Sikorsky MH-60S Naval Hawk. With its design
emphasis on multi-mission capabilities, most particularly
logistics, SAR and light attack, coupled with the fact that
it is marinized for shipboard operations, make this aircraft
ideal for the roles and missions of the RTN. Although the
RTN wants the MH-60S, it has been experiencing sticker shock
and has had difficulty getting the funding required through
the budgetary process. You may wish to ask your
interlocutors whether the RTN is willing to push for the
funding required to purchase four aircraft as planned.

WE LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR VISIT


13. (U) Have a safe trip , and I look forward to your visit.
BOYCE