THE ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF THAILAND'S SOUTHERN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BANGKOK 007511 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2016 TAGS: ECON PTER PINS TH SUBJECT: THE ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF THAILAND'S SOUTHERN INSURGENCY Classified By: Embassy Charge Alex A. Arvizu; Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: While economic factors are not the root cause of Thailand's southern Islamist insurgency, there are important economic dimensions to the Southern crisis that, if effectively addressed, could make a contribution to the solution. Existing official statistics for the South present an incomplete and misleading picture of economic conditions there, obscuring wide gaps between ethnic Malays and ethnic Thais in income and employment. The high levels of violence make new investment out of the question; more seriously, the region's existing investments are slowly collapsing under the weight of the insurgency. The best that can be hoped for currently is a "stabilize the patient" approach which seeks to maintain the region's existing investment, buying time for the RTG to implement effective policies aimed at eventually reducing the level of violence and creating conditions for sustained economic development. The RTG's recent decision to designate the three Southern provinces as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) with tax breaks is a step in the right direction, but additional measures may be necessary. Also, there is an urgent need for better defining the problem by developing and disseminating statistics detailing the economic status of the various ethnic groups in the region. ¶2. (C) The U.S. could make a modest but useful and welcome contribution to solving Thailand's southern problem by looking for ways to share our extensive expertise on the design and implementation of SEZs (Empowerment Zones),as well as development of necessary statistical data, with Thai Government officials. End Summary. ¶3. (C) Since the beginning of the latest round of violence in July 2004 in the nation's three Southernmost provinces, over 1,800 people have lost their lives. Notwithstanding the new military-appointed Thai central government's adoption in September 2006 of a new, more conciliatory policy toward the Southern Muslim population, violence has intensified. Assassinations, bombings, burning of schools, and other acts of mayhem have continued on a daily basis. Based on our observations during a recent visit to the region, we can attest to a palpable climate of fear pervading the region. ¶4. (C) Most knowledgeable observers trace the roots of the conflict to the early 20th century border delineation negotiated between the British colonial rulers of Malaya and the Kingdom of Siam that placed the territory of the old Pattani Sultanate within Thailand. (NOTE: Some commentators date the conflict to the 17th century, when war broke out over the refusal of the Pattani queen to pay the annual tribute to the Thai king during the reign of the Thai Kingdom of Ayutthaya.) Populated overwhelmingly by ethnic Malay adherents to the Muslim faith, the three provinces of Pattani, Songkhla, and Narathiwat speak a different (non-Thai) language, are not ethnic Siamese/Thai, and had a history of independent rule. Even within the three provinces, there is a fairly rigid pattern of segregation. Ethnic Malays generally live in the rural and coastal areas, while a disproportionate number of ethnic Thais live in the cities. Rural villages are almost always either exclusively Buddhist or Muslim. ¶5. (C) This feeling of separateness from the Buddhist Thai nation, with the latter emphasizing the three principles of "Nation-Religion-King" (with religion meaning Buddhism),is viewed by most observers as the root cause of the insurgency. The recent (2004) upsurge in violence may also be related to the upsurge in militant Islamist beliefs in the world outside Thailand. In Southern Thailand, the most extreme Islamism militancy expresses itself in the drive for the expulsion of colonialist Siamese and the restoration of the Sultanate of Pattani. Economic Factors Not the Basic Problem, But Could Be Part of the Solution ¶6. (C) This conventional view marginalizes any economic dimension to the Southern insurgency. In support of this view, observers point out that the southern provinces are not the poorest in Thailand, and unemployment is relatively low. Tellingly, in their previous pronouncements the insurgents themselves do not give prominence to economic factors in their list of grievances against "Siam." During a recent visit to the Southern provinces by Embassy economic officers, BANGKOK 00007511 002 OF 006 we found no evidence that refutes the conventional view. By and large, the region's economic woes are an effect -- not a cause -- of the problem. However, we also believe that while economic factors are not the root cause of the problem, there are important economic dimensions to the Southern crisis that, if effectively addressed, could make a contribution to the solution. A World Apart ¶7. (C) Viewed from the available statistics, Thailand's Southern three provinces are a world apart from Thailand. The population of the area totals about 1.6 million out of a total population of about 63 million. While Thailand as a whole is mainly populated by ethnic Thais, ethnic Malays account for 70-80 percent of the population in the South. The first language for the majority of Thais is Thai, whereas the local Malayu language is the principal spoken language in the south. Estimates vary, but a substantial minority of Southerners do not have a working knowledge of Thai. (NOTE: This statistic is testament to a lack of uniform effectiveness of the Thai educational system in the region: by law, all Thais must attend Thai schools through grade 6. That many southerners do not speak Thai suggests that this legal requirement has not been completely fulfilled throughout the southern provinces. The situation does, however, seem to be improving: most non-Thai speakers are thought to be older.) Consistent with trends seen in other developing economies, Thailand's birthrate has steadily declined throughout the 1980's and 1990's to slightly under two children per child-bearing age female, i.e., slightly below the replacement rate. This trend has not been seen in the South, however, where birth rates remain very high, currently about three times higher than the national average. (NOTE: Part of this wide difference is due to the fact that, in line with Islamic custom, polygamy is a common practice among ethnic Malays in the Southern provinces.) Official Statistics Paint an Overly Positive Picture ¶8. (C) Inadequate statistical information obscures the pronounced economic fault lines within southern society, fault lines which closely correlate with ethnicity. According to available RTG statistics, household income for the Southern regions is modestly lower -- about 15 percent -- than the whole of Thailand. Gross Regional Product per capita for the South is about 25 percent lower than Thailand's GDP per capita. However, the "poverty incidence" (an RTG indicator that measures the percentage of the population living below a set "poverty line" income figure) is appreciably lower for the South than for Thailand as a whole (about 11 percent versus 15 percent). Unemployment in the South, while somewhat higher than Thailand as a whole, is a seemingly low 3 percent. Judging from the official statistics, then, the situation in the South is not particularly bad, comparing favorably with, for example, northeast Thailand. ¶9. (C) However, these statistics provides a generally misleading picture. They do not capture the very negative economic dynamics that have been at work in the South since ¶1960. If we look at household income in 1960, if all of Thailand is indexed at 100, the Southern region was 120.7, that is, had a household income 20.7 percent higher than Thailand as a whole. In 2000, the index number for the South had fallen to 91.8. A similar picture can be seen for GDP per capita: in 1960, the South's index number was 126.2 (compared to all-of-Thailand's 100); by 2000, the South had fallen to 68.7. Starting in 1960 from a position of relative prosperity, the South has fallen behind. There is every reason to believe that since 2000 the South has continued to fall farther and farther behind the national average. This negative trend has occurred even as the South's absolute income levels have increased; it is the region's relative performance vis--vis Thailand as a whole that is falling behind. ¶10. (C) While the Southern provinces are a world apart from Thailand, within the far South there is an equally severe separation between ethnic Malays and ethnic Thais. The RTG generally does not break down unemployment rates for age, ethnicity, or gender. For the South at least, this lack of statistical disaggregation severely limits the usefulness of the available data. By all accounts, the Southern provinces BANGKOK 00007511 003 OF 006 are highly segregated, living on opposite sides of a wall composed of differing cultures, history, language, and religion. Buddhist Thais and Thai-Chinese are mostly concentrated in urban areas, engaged as government workers and merchants. Ethnic Malays are mostly engaged in rural agricultural work (rubber production, small-scale farming, fishing, and canneries). Female Muslims are extensively employed in the region's canneries. For male Muslims, however, knowledgeable local observers estimate the unemployment or severe underemployment rate at 40 percent, increasing to as much as 60 percent for youth. (NOTE: The severity of these reported unemployment figures is apparent when definitions are considered: the RTG defines a person as employed if he/she works for pay as little as three hours per week.). Reasons cited for the high unemployment rate among ethnic Malay youth include a lack of tradition of employment outside the home; a weak family structure that, among other things, fails to instill a strong work ethic in youth; lack of work qualifications, mostly due to inadequate education; and discrimination by mostly Buddhist Thai employers. Whatever the reason(s),everyone agrees that there exists severe unemployment among male ethnic Malay youth. The significance of this lies in the fact that most of the violence is being perpetrated by male ethnic Malay youth. Slow Motion Economic Collapse ¶11. (C) The economy of the South centers on rubber cultivation, coconuts, fishing/aquaculture and processing, tourism, wood, and small scale farming. In the cities and along the border, merchants (many of them ethnic Chinese) traditionally have done a brisk business selling various consumer products at discount rates made possible by a thriving smuggling trade with Malaysia. Due in part to the smuggling trade, the South has always had a reputation among Thais as a lawless, swashbuckling place with more than its fair share of gangster types (operating in collusion with corrupt officials appointed by Bangkok). By and large, however, the gangsters didn't present a threat to the region's basic industries. ¶12. (C) With the ongoing -- and intensifying -- insurgency, everything has changed. Virtually all components of the region's economy have been severely affected. The almost daily bombings have caused the once thriving tourism industry to collapse. In Pattani, once a major tourism destination for visitors from Malaysia, hotel owners report that there are no longer any traditional tourists; business nowadays consists mostly of Thai Government officials and security services personnel. A similar situation can be seen in Hat Yai, which is Thailand's largest Southern city. Although not within the three Southern provinces, it is close by and is used as a gateway to the far South. Hat Yai used to enjoy a booming tourist industry. Malaysians would arrive in charter buses. The city also was a popular destination for Singaporeans. Many Thais from the north also visited, usually on shopping expeditions motivated by the availability of cheap electronics and other goods. Hat Yai suffered a number of fatal bomb attacks starting in 2004. In 2003, Hay Yai hotels enjoyed occupancy rates of about 80 percent. In 2005, after a fatal bombing at the city's airport, this fell to 40 percent. For 2006, after further bomb attacks, including the coordinated attacks of September 11 that killed an AmCit tourist, occupancy rates have been around 20 percent. ¶13. (C) A casual examination of RTG statistics suggests that the region's rubber industry is doing fairly well: for 2006, overall production volume is about the same as it was in 2004 (although it has declined by about 10 percent in the southernmost province of Narathiwat). However, rubber prices have more than doubled over the past two years. Historically, such price surges have provoked greatly increased rubber production in the South. That this has not occurred in the current commodity price cycle is due to the ongoing violence. Rubber cultivation has been affected by a lack of workers, and intimidation of the dwindling number of workers still available. There is also a lack of investment necessary to improve the infrastructure that supports the rubber industry. The region used to attract workers from the north of Thailand, but these have departed for two reasons. First, employment opportunities for rubber workers now exist in northern Thailand (many rubber trees have been planted there in recent years),plus the violence in the South serves as a deterrent. The nature of rubber harvesting makes it an BANGKOK 00007511 004 OF 006 especially dangerous occupation under the current conditions in the South: normally, rubber trees are tapped at around 1:00 am, with the worker returning in the morning to collect the latex. Given the level of violence, the prospect of walking around in the woods in the middle of the night in the South is viewed as daunting if not suicidal; several rubber tappers have been killed in the early morning hours. ¶14. (C) Fish and wood processing plants have also been affected. Many of the fish processing plants, or canneries, serve overseas markets. This usually entails expatriate quality control inspectors on-site. The escalating violence has made this problematic. Most Japanese importers have declared Thailand's Southern provinces off limits to their quality control personnel. This means that these plants cannot export to Japan. Due to these kinds of problems, several canneries have either been forced to lay off many workers, or close completely. Sometimes a work-around solution can be found. A para wood furniture maker selling to the U.S.'s Wal-Mart told us that Wal-Mart would no longer allow their employees to visit the furniture plant for necessary quality control and other certification. In this case, however, the Thai firm arranged to ship the furniture to its sister firm in northern Thailand, where it could be inspected by Wal-Mart personnel. But even in this "happy ending" case, there are additional costs that reduce the commercial viability of the Southern Thailand factory. A Declining Population ¶15. (C) The ongoing violence and declining economy have led to an out-migration from the affected provinces and neighboring areas. Again, statistics are scarce since most people who leave do not formally change their residence registration, but simply take up residence farther north. We have also heard anecdotal evidence that the RTG is deliberately not registering Buddhists who move from the South in order to conceal the large number leaving the region. Ethnic Thai Buddhists and university students comprise the majority of out-migrants (although there have been reports of relatively small numbers of ethnic Malays seeking refuge in Malaysia in response to alleged Thai military/police harassment). Based on interviews with municipal officials, we estimate that tens of thousands of people have fled the South and have taken up more or less permanent residence elsewhere. Various measures support this: the mayors of the municipalities of Yala and Pattani told us that the volume of garbage collected by the municipal services in those cities has declined by 50 percent over the past two years. Real estate values have plummeted in the three provinces, reflecting a lack of buyers and a surplus of sellers, while they have increased in neighboring Songkhla Province which is seen as safer. Much of the massive drop in population that could be inferred from garbage collection statistics is probably more accurately attributable to the near total collapse of the tourism industries in those cities. But it is obvious from our numerous interviews that the resident populations of the urban centers have been measurably reduced in recent years; fearing for their safety, many ethnic Thais have chosen to live outside the region, making day trips to the area to attend to their businesses. Ordinary people receive daily reminders of the seemingly omnipresent dangers: during our meeting with the Mayor of Yala and prominent business leaders and academics, eight separate bombs went off in downtown car dealerships (including one located next to the meeting venue),critically injuring several people. Our interview with the head of the Pattani Chamber of Commerce had to be hastily rescheduled because he was leaving the city: Muslim friends had tipped him off that he was targeted for assassination the following week. Naturally, in this climate of intimidation investor confidence is very low. The flight of so many people, the majority of whom are higher income ethnic Thais, is both a cause and effect of the slow motion collapse of the region's economy. ¶16. (C) While no one thinks that economic factors are the root cause of the Southern insurgency, the gradual collapse of the region's economy is serving to exacerbate an already bad situation. Given that greater economic opportunity for the region's ethnic Malay population figures in the RTG's plans for pacifying the South, the fact that economic trends are headed in the opposite direction has the potential to derail the RTG's overall strategy. BANGKOK 00007511 005 OF 006 Stabilizing the Patient ¶17. (C) With the current level of violence, the idea advocated by some -- massive economic development in the South -- is unrealistic, in our view. The level of security for both life and property that currently can be provided is completely inadequate for any investor using conventional risk assessment methodologies. The South has significant economic potential (particularly, we believe, in tourism), but development awaits an improved security situation. ¶18. (C) What is going on currently in the South is much worse than lack of "new" economic development -- the existing economy is collapsing under the weight of daily assassinations and attacks on property. What is needed -- and, we think, could be possible with the right policies -- is to take effective steps to preserve the existing investment in the region. This "stabilizing the patient" approach would aim to prevent the economic situation from worsening, buying time for the RTG to implement effective policies aimed at eventually reducing the level of violence and creating conditions for sustained economic development. The Southern Special Economic Zone (SEZ): A Step in the Right Direction ¶19. (C) A proposal made over a year ago and recently approved by the interim government is the creation of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) encompassing the three Southern provinces, as well as some neighboring areas affected by the violence. Existing and new investors within the SEZ are qualified to receive very low tax rates on their investments. That should increase profit margins, keeping some otherwise failing businesses afloat. Another potentially useful step taken by the RTG is the extension for an additional year of an existing Bank of Thailand-financed soft loan program. In our tour of the region, we met several business owners who credit this program with enabling them to stave off bankruptcy. ¶20. (C) Thai efforts to integrate the three Southern provinces into Thailand's dominant culture probably has blinded policymakers to potential economic development opportunities unique to the region. Examples include the development of a halal food export industry (an idea which has been promoted by some thoughtful RTG officials),and the development of Islamic medical tourism. Also, the area is possessed of considerable natural beauty, including spectacular beaches. The region could be developed for tourism, perhaps with marketing that targets Islamic countries. ¶21. (C) It remains to be seen how much of a stabilizing impact the RTG's cheap credit measures will have. The RTG is aiming at a moving target: these incentives are designed to countervail the enormous disincentives to investment that currently exist. However, there is a general perception that the disincentives are growing (violence levels are on the rise),so the RTG may have to provide even more incentives to woo investors away from a cut-and-run strategy. We were told that conventional plant insurance rates for facilities located in the south have quadrupled since 2002. Southern officials have asked the RTG for some form of relief on this (perhaps in the form of a partial state-provided rebate on insurance premiums),so far to no avail. Our impression is that the RTG is just beginning to come to grips with the budgetary implications of a comprehensive strategy for the Southern problem. Effective measures are likely to be expensive and necessary for many years. ¶22. (C) Even if the Southern economy begins to create employment opportunities, it is an open question whether young ethnic Malays will be hired. If the status quo endures, any new jobs would likely be filled by ethnic Thais from the northeast; male ethnic Malay youth would be sidelined as they have always been, for all the reasons listed in para 10. Recognition of this reality is what motivated the RTG-funded National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) to abruptly shift its policy prescriptions for the south. In 2004, the NESDB advocated economic development as the cure for the South's ills. In 2006, the NESDB altered its policy prescription, placing greater emphasis on improving qualifications for the region's BANGKOK 00007511 006 OF 006 youth through improvements in the educational system. There is universal agreement that something will have to be done to improve ethnic Malays' job qualifications and/or create additional employer incentives for hiring. Better Metrics, Please ¶23. (C) We've noted that most knowledgeable observers identify the separateness (language, education, history, religion, economic status) of Thailand's Southern Muslim population as the root cause of the problem. Unfortunately, much of what we know about that separateness is anecdotal. While no one in the region doubts that Southern Muslims earn much less than Southern Buddhists, there are no statistics that document this. Everyone we spoke with in the South readily conceded that the unemployment rate among Muslims (especially males) is much higher than other ethnic groups, but statistical information on this point does not exist. Some have suggested that the lack of data reflects political sensitivities among Thai rulers about anything documenting a lack of unity among the Thai people. In any case, since policymakers don't have a measure of the problem, it is hardly surprising that a solution has eluded them. The situation is somewhat analogous to the U.S.'s long struggle to address racial inequality in American society: imagine how much more difficult the task would be if the U.S. Government did not develop comparative data on white versus black incomes, employment, etc. It is axiomatic that a prerequisite of an effective policy solution is a reasonably complete understanding of the problem. We regard the development and dissemination of a comprehensive statistical database that measures the current situation in the South as an urgent priority. What We Can Do ¶24. (C) What can the U.S. do to help our friend and ally? The honest answer is, not much. Any overt, direct U.S. involvement would be viewed with suspicion and could easily make things worse. (Even now, conspiracy theories abound: during our recent visit to the region, we had to cancel one planned meeting with community leaders in Narathiwat due to concerns by some of the participants that our presence in the area would be maliciously interpreted by some.) This is a Thai problem that requires a Thai solution. ¶25. (C) We may, however, have expertise that we could share with Thais. The RTG is on the right track in throwing a lifeline to existing investment in the south through the SEZ concept. SEZs are an American invention (currently we call them Empowerment Zones in the U.S.). While the U.S. is not facing separatist violence, U.S. SEZs face the same basic challenge as the southern SEZ in Thailand: how to attract investment and jobs to an area that has significant disincentives to both. U.S. Federal and local governments have almost 40 years of experience in designing and implementing SEZs in both urban and rural areas in the U.S. While they have their critics ("they don't create wealth, they just shift it around"),SEZs in the U.S. have a fairly good record in fostering economic development in targeted areas. Most of the urban SEZs are administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, while most of the rural SEZs are administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. We can use the State Department's IV program and other agencies' similar exchange programs to share the expertise of these U.S agencies with Thai officials in designing and implementing SEZs. We should look for opportunities to have appropriate Thai officials visit U.S. SEZs to learn from their experiences on the effectiveness of various measures. Also, we may be able to assist the RTG in creating more useful economic data for the South. Such actions on our part would be non-controversial and welcome by Thais, and could play a modest but useful role in easing the crisis in southern Thailand. ARVIZU