THE NEW PUSH FOR THAI POLICE REFORM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 007501 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, INL/AAE DOJ FOR ICITAP E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINS PINR KHUM KDEM ASEC TH SUBJECT: THE NEW PUSH FOR THAI POLICE REFORM REF: A. BANGKOK 07388 (LUNCH WITH PM SURAYUD) ¶B. BANGKOK 07331 (THE AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALL ON NEW INTERIOR ¶C. MINISTER ARI WONG-ARAYA) Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton. Reason 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (C) Summary. Plans to reform Thailand's notoriously venal and abusive police may be gaining steam, in part due to strong interest from the Prime Minister's office. While many people agree on the need for change--and the legislature is already drawing up plans--the exact prescription for reform remains murky. Two legislators involved in the debate recently outlined separate, dramatic blueprints for reform, including breaking up the national police into 76 different local units, or subsuming the entire law enforcement community under the military. Both of our contacts agree that it will take most of a year to debate and produce any legislative change to the police force. Police reform is always a difficult subject to tackle, with few easy fixes, but the military background of the current government will make the debate over such plans even more heated. End Summary. TO SERVE AND PROTECT? -------------- ¶2. (C) While the Thai military (specifically the Army) remains widely respected and publicly perceived as a (relatively) honorable organization focused on defending King and country (if not always democracy),the Royal Thai Police (RTP) are almost the exact opposite. In a culture that maintains a broad tolerance for some activities that in Western eyes would reek of corruption, most Thai would agree that the police go too far. The police are generally seen as venal, corrupt and eager to abuse their power, even earning the nickname "land sharks." The type of sensational racketeering, murder, gambling and prostitution stories that dominate the most popular tabloid newspapers frequently include a corrupt police angle. While this sentiment may not be completely accurate--internal efforts to "clean up" the most egregious ethical lapses of the police appear to have had an impact, and military leaders have had their share of "special business deals"--the frequency of contact between most citizens and the petty, rent-seeking behavior of the police has cemented this image in the national consciousness. Even the most rudimentary conversation with a taxi driver in Thailand will eventually touch on frustration with the police. ¶3. (SBU) Critics also charge that the national police system remains a throwback to an older era of centralized rule. In the late 19th century, King Rama V began a process of placing the far-flung territory of Thailand under more direct control through the Ministry of Interior. The police were a key part of that effort. Today, over 210,000 police officers are divided into a number of Bangkok-based specialized units (Central Investigation, Forensics, Anti-Narcotics, Special Branch) and nine provincial regions, but all are beholden to central police headquarters in Bangkok. In the past, the RTP operated under the Ministry of Interior (MOI)--which still appoints career officials to serve as Governors of 75 of Thailand's 76 provinces--but in the 1990's, the Chuan administration made the RTP an independent agency operating under a supervisory committee chaired by the Prime Minister. ¶4. (C) To make matters more interesting, the police and military have been traditional rivals: for budgets, authority and even royal affection. Thaksin, a former cop himself, was widely seen as favoring the police, putting them in charge of southern policy and moving to expand their influence and funding. Following the coup, some police officials are beginning to worry that their uniformed cousins will make a power-grab at their expense. In 1991, after the last coup, word leaked that the Army-dominated junta was considering a plan to place the police directly under the military, which prompted shrill cries of opposition from the law enforcement community. The plan was eventually dropped. ¶5. (C) Over the last six weeks or so, the Surayud government has revived the debate over police reform and the PM has established several commissions in the National Legislative BANGKOK 00007501 002 OF 004 Assembly (NLA) to consider the issue. The tenor of the press coverage of this issue has been evenly split between academics and activists calling for dramatic restructuring efforts and senior police officials hysterically denying the need for such comprehensive change. LEGISLATURE LOOKING AT POLICE REFORM -------------- ¶6. (C) In a meeting with poloff on December 6, NLA member Dr. Sungsidh Piriyarangsan outlined his plan for police reform. Dr. Sungsidh, an academic who serves on the NLA commission charged with pursuing police reform and heads a separate independent 28-member committee studying the same issues, explained that Prime Minister Surayud is the driver behind this initiative. According to Sungsidh, shortly after taking office Surayud contacted Sungsidh--a longtime critic of the police--to discuss his desire for dramatic reform. Echoing comments he made to the Ambassador (ref A) Surayud reportedly told Sungsidh that this was his second priority as PM (after the restive South),and he had been thinking seriously about police reform even before the coup. Sungsidh says that he and Surayud agreed that any reform effort had to be handled carefully and transparently, given the sensitivities involved. Sungsidh says that it was his idea to put together a separate, independent commission made up of legal experts, activists and retired police to study the issue. ¶7. (C) Sungsidh says that his independent committee has only met twice so far. In his estimation, the various bodies considering police reform will take two to three months to study the issue and develop proposals. These proposals will be discussed in public NLA hearings and may even be the basis for some public polling. At that point, the NLA will draft an appropriate law representing these deliberations. Sungsidh hopes to have the entire legislative process accomplished in a year. Sungsidh says that only two plans are in circulation right now: a paper crafted by the Ministry of Justice PermSec that calls for breaking up the police into regional units and his own, more detailed plan. Sungsidh laughed when asked if he had heard of any plans for comparably dramatic military reform under the current government. "How can you (reform the military) when they are in charge? Besides, the Army has legitimacy that that the police lack." DECENTRALIZING THE POLICE -------------- ¶8. (C) In Sungsidh's view, the police are too centralized and disconnected from local communities. This is a throw-back to an earlier era of militarized rule and contributes to the police tendency to misuse their authority. Cops are only beholden to other, more senior cops. Even in the modern era under Thaksin, the police have been guilty of shocking abuses of power, such as the wave of extrajudicial killings during the "War on Drugs" and the disappearance of human rights lawyer Somchai Neelapaijit. Sungsidh believes that, when central government officials have the authority to use the police for their own ends, this has resulted in abuses of power. Overcentralization--and the limited oversight that comes with it--also exacerbates the problem of police involvement in underground and illicit economic activities. ¶9. (C) With this view in mind, Sungsidh's proposal for police reform would place all provincial police under the direct supervision of the MOI-appointed governor in each province (except for Bangkok, where the police would report to the only elected Governor in Thailand). Sungsidh also wants to boost civilian oversight of each provincial police force and improve cooperation with provincial courts, prosecutors and lawyers' associations. By making the police more accountable to the local people, Sungsidh hopes to improve their performance and focus on public service. Sungsidh says that alternative plans, which would place police under the MOI again would not go far enough. ¶10. (C) When asked if he is concerned that local criminal figures could end up exerting even more control over the cops, Sungsidh scoffed, saying "how do you say that the mafia will influence the cops when the cops are the mafia?" The BANGKOK 00007501 003 OF 004 key will be keeping local, elected political leaders and criminal bosses from exerting any influence over the local police through the use of oversight boards. Sungsidh also envisions a more aggressive internal affairs function based in each province, in Bangkok and also with the Ministry of Justice's Department of Special Investigation (DSI). (Note: Sungsidh believes that DSI needs its own reform plan, as well. According to him, it is far too heavily influenced by former RTP officers. End Note.) Even if not perfect in combating corruption "it has to be better than what we have now." According to Sungsidh, if a police officer is accused of corruption under the current system, he is often merely transferred to another province. In the new system, this would not be possible and would force the opening of an internal investigation. ¶11. (C) Sungsidh's plan would retain the several specialized units currently based in Bangkok, but they would be free to pursue trans-provincial criminal activities and provide expertise in difficult cases to local cops. Additionally, Sungsidh wants to cut the overall number of police in the country, boost their salaries and improve their educational level, all in an effort to cut police corruption. "We need to adjust the entire system of justice." Sungsidh is very interested in foreign views on police reform and will be meeting with UN officials to discuss their experiences soon. He underscored his desire for any available U.S. expertise or training available. ¶12. (C) Sungsidh understands that any police reform will be tough. "The Prime Minister says it may be the toughest problem in Thailand." Many cops do not like Sungsidh's ideas. Some police officials have strongly criticized him, even threatened him, but he is working to build support among those officers who do see merit in his approach. For those who oppose him, Sungsidh says he exaggerates and tells them that it will take 20 years to implement his plan in an effort to lull them with a false sense of security. He also understands critics who point to efforts in the U.S. and other countries to centralize law enforcement efforts. That said, polls show strong public dissatisfaction with the police, and Sungsidh hopes that social pressure can be built to push aside any objections from the police. "It's all about meeting the needs of the people." Even if social pressure isn't enough, Sungsidh is confident that Surayud's personal commitment to reform--and the PM's strong control over the NLA--will result in success. That said, he has not briefed the PM on the specifics of his plan yet. PLAN B: PUT THE MILITARY IN CHARGE -------------- ¶13. (C) In a separate meeting with the International Law Enforcement Academy's (ILEA) U.S. Director on December 11, RTP General Watcharapol Prasamrajkit, himself an NLA member on the Police Reform Committee, outlined a distinctly different plan for reform that is circulating in police circles. Watcharapol was the first Thai Director at ILEA, is a former Commissioner of the RTP Narcotics Suppression Bureau and is considered a progressive leader in the RTP. He echoed Sungsidh's timeline of a year to develop, draft and pass a law reforming the RTP, but does not believe that this is sufficient time to produce an effective plan. Watcharapol agrees that the police need reform, but he had hoped former cop Thaksin would undertake these efforts himself. ¶14. (C) Under the plan outlined by Watcharapol--he did not specify who authored it--the RTP would be broken up into nine regional units (paralleling their current administrative regions),the Bangkok Metropolitan police and a separate Royal Thai Police Headquarters for administration. Each of these eleven new police units would have their own Commissioner General possessing independent control over their unit's region and budget. However, each of these RTP Commissioners would report directly to the Army Regional Commander. A variation of this plan would further undercut police authority, according to Watcharapol. The newly reinstated Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) would hire an additional 60,000 of its own personnel to provide a "homeland security" function, with the police reporting to the local ISOC commander (who would almost certainly be the local Army commander.) BANGKOK 00007501 004 OF 004 ¶15. (C) Watcharapol expressed strong unhappiness with this plan to militarize the police saying that, in his view, no Western nation would want to work with Thai police if such a system is installed. He added, however, that neither he, nor any of his RTP colleagues in the NLA would publicly broach this subject with Surayud and his cabinet. Watcharapol hopes that U.S., Australian and other Western nations can explain to the PM how bad it would look to the world if Surayud placed Thai law enforcement under direct military control. ¶16. (C) These concerns aside, Watcharapol admits that the RTP needs reform. In his view, the police need better education opportunities and increased civilian oversight. When asked if higher pay could improve police performance, Watcharapol responded that increasing pay for a 210,000 member police force is impossible due to budgetary constraints. Moreover, if police pay is increased, the military and the civilian bureaucracy would demand pay raises as well. Watcharapol is also a proponent of increased in-service educational opportunities--which enables officers to move up the ranks easier and develop better skills. He would also like to see a set term for the Commissioner General position, in order to avoid the politicization that inevitably occurs with the top cop position. In fact, Watcharapol would even support the installation of a civilian in the CG slot. In his view, (and with little elaboration) no matter how good a cop may be, if he steps into the CG position he immediately becomes ineffective. Finally, Watcharapol would like to pursue a community-based policing program like that used in Hong Kong. COMMENT -------------- ¶17. (C) Much like recent government efforts to reform the lottery or alcohol sales, these two proposals to fix the police seem to have been cooked up by very smart people in an insulated laboratory far, far away from the reality of Thai politics. While we don't doubt Surayud's personal interest or commitment to this issue, his ability to ramrod proposals as dramatic as these through the legislature--not to mention his ability to implement such ideas--is far from certain. We are concerned by the idea of institutionalizing military control over the police, but recognize that this is just one option under consideration. We would certainly use every opportunity to discourage this solution. Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this debate is that some much-needed, achievable reforms may be sidelined by the tug-of-war over much more dramatic, and in the end, overly-ambitious plans for change. ARVIZU