THE NEW PUSH FOR THAI POLICE REFORM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 007501

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, INL/AAE
DOJ FOR ICITAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINS PINR KHUM KDEM ASEC TH
SUBJECT: THE NEW PUSH FOR THAI POLICE REFORM

REF: A. BANGKOK 07388 (LUNCH WITH PM SURAYUD)

B. BANGKOK 07331 (THE AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY
CALL ON NEW INTERIOR

C. MINISTER ARI WONG-ARAYA)

Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton. Reason 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary. Plans to reform Thailand's notoriously venal
and abusive police may be gaining steam, in part due to
strong interest from the Prime Minister's office. While many
people agree on the need for change--and the legislature is
already drawing up plans--the exact prescription for reform
remains murky. Two legislators involved in the debate
recently outlined separate, dramatic blueprints for reform,
including breaking up the national police into 76 different
local units, or subsuming the entire law enforcement
community under the military. Both of our contacts agree
that it will take most of a year to debate and produce any
legislative change to the police force. Police reform is
always a difficult subject to tackle, with few easy fixes,
but the military background of the current government will
make the debate over such plans even more heated. End
Summary.


TO SERVE AND PROTECT?
--------------


2. (C) While the Thai military (specifically the Army)
remains widely respected and publicly perceived as a
(relatively) honorable organization focused on defending King
and country (if not always democracy),the Royal Thai Police
(RTP) are almost the exact opposite. In a culture that
maintains a broad tolerance for some activities that in
Western eyes would reek of corruption, most Thai would agree
that the police go too far. The police are generally seen as
venal, corrupt and eager to abuse their power, even earning
the nickname "land sharks." The type of sensational
racketeering, murder, gambling and prostitution stories that
dominate the most popular tabloid newspapers frequently
include a corrupt police angle. While this sentiment may not
be completely accurate--internal efforts to "clean up" the
most egregious ethical lapses of the police appear to have
had an impact, and military leaders have had their share of
"special business deals"--the frequency of contact between
most citizens and the petty, rent-seeking behavior of the
police has cemented this image in the national consciousness.
Even the most rudimentary conversation with a taxi driver in
Thailand will eventually touch on frustration with the police.


3. (SBU) Critics also charge that the national police system
remains a throwback to an older era of centralized rule. In
the late 19th century, King Rama V began a process of placing
the far-flung territory of Thailand under more direct control
through the Ministry of Interior. The police were a key part
of that effort. Today, over 210,000 police officers are
divided into a number of Bangkok-based specialized units
(Central Investigation, Forensics, Anti-Narcotics, Special
Branch) and nine provincial regions, but all are beholden to
central police headquarters in Bangkok. In the past, the RTP
operated under the Ministry of Interior (MOI)--which still
appoints career officials to serve as Governors of 75 of
Thailand's 76 provinces--but in the 1990's, the Chuan
administration made the RTP an independent agency operating
under a supervisory committee chaired by the Prime Minister.


4. (C) To make matters more interesting, the police and
military have been traditional rivals: for budgets, authority
and even royal affection. Thaksin, a former cop himself, was
widely seen as favoring the police, putting them in charge of
southern policy and moving to expand their influence and
funding. Following the coup, some police officials are
beginning to worry that their uniformed cousins will make a
power-grab at their expense. In 1991, after the last coup,
word leaked that the Army-dominated junta was considering a
plan to place the police directly under the military, which
prompted shrill cries of opposition from the law enforcement
community. The plan was eventually dropped.


5. (C) Over the last six weeks or so, the Surayud government
has revived the debate over police reform and the PM has
established several commissions in the National Legislative

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Assembly (NLA) to consider the issue. The tenor of the press
coverage of this issue has been evenly split between
academics and activists calling for dramatic restructuring
efforts and senior police officials hysterically denying the
need for such comprehensive change.


LEGISLATURE LOOKING AT POLICE REFORM
--------------


6. (C) In a meeting with poloff on December 6, NLA member Dr.
Sungsidh Piriyarangsan outlined his plan for police reform.
Dr. Sungsidh, an academic who serves on the NLA commission
charged with pursuing police reform and heads a separate
independent 28-member committee studying the same issues,
explained that Prime Minister Surayud is the driver behind
this initiative. According to Sungsidh, shortly after taking
office Surayud contacted Sungsidh--a longtime critic of the
police--to discuss his desire for dramatic reform. Echoing
comments he made to the Ambassador (ref A) Surayud reportedly
told Sungsidh that this was his second priority as PM (after
the restive South),and he had been thinking seriously about
police reform even before the coup. Sungsidh says that he
and Surayud agreed that any reform effort had to be handled
carefully and transparently, given the sensitivities
involved. Sungsidh says that it was his idea to put together
a separate, independent commission made up of legal experts,
activists and retired police to study the issue.


7. (C) Sungsidh says that his independent committee has only
met twice so far. In his estimation, the various bodies
considering police reform will take two to three months to
study the issue and develop proposals. These proposals will
be discussed in public NLA hearings and may even be the basis
for some public polling. At that point, the NLA will draft
an appropriate law representing these deliberations.
Sungsidh hopes to have the entire legislative process
accomplished in a year. Sungsidh says that only two plans
are in circulation right now: a paper crafted by the Ministry
of Justice PermSec that calls for breaking up the police into
regional units and his own, more detailed plan. Sungsidh
laughed when asked if he had heard of any plans for
comparably dramatic military reform under the current
government. "How can you (reform the military) when they are
in charge? Besides, the Army has legitimacy that that the
police lack."

DECENTRALIZING THE POLICE
--------------


8. (C) In Sungsidh's view, the police are too centralized and
disconnected from local communities. This is a throw-back to
an earlier era of militarized rule and contributes to the
police tendency to misuse their authority. Cops are only
beholden to other, more senior cops. Even in the modern era
under Thaksin, the police have been guilty of shocking abuses
of power, such as the wave of extrajudicial killings during
the "War on Drugs" and the disappearance of human rights
lawyer Somchai Neelapaijit. Sungsidh believes that, when
central government officials have the authority to use the
police for their own ends, this has resulted in abuses of
power. Overcentralization--and the limited oversight that
comes with it--also exacerbates the problem of police
involvement in underground and illicit economic activities.


9. (C) With this view in mind, Sungsidh's proposal for police
reform would place all provincial police under the direct
supervision of the MOI-appointed governor in each province
(except for Bangkok, where the police would report to the
only elected Governor in Thailand). Sungsidh also wants to
boost civilian oversight of each provincial police force and
improve cooperation with provincial courts, prosecutors and
lawyers' associations. By making the police more accountable
to the local people, Sungsidh hopes to improve their
performance and focus on public service. Sungsidh says that
alternative plans, which would place police under the MOI
again would not go far enough.


10. (C) When asked if he is concerned that local criminal
figures could end up exerting even more control over the
cops, Sungsidh scoffed, saying "how do you say that the mafia
will influence the cops when the cops are the mafia?" The

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key will be keeping local, elected political leaders and
criminal bosses from exerting any influence over the local
police through the use of oversight boards. Sungsidh also
envisions a more aggressive internal affairs function based
in each province, in Bangkok and also with the Ministry of
Justice's Department of Special Investigation (DSI). (Note:
Sungsidh believes that DSI needs its own reform plan, as
well. According to him, it is far too heavily influenced by
former RTP officers. End Note.) Even if not perfect in
combating corruption "it has to be better than what we have
now." According to Sungsidh, if a police officer is accused
of corruption under the current system, he is often merely
transferred to another province. In the new system, this
would not be possible and would force the opening of an
internal investigation.


11. (C) Sungsidh's plan would retain the several specialized
units currently based in Bangkok, but they would be free to
pursue trans-provincial criminal activities and provide
expertise in difficult cases to local cops. Additionally,
Sungsidh wants to cut the overall number of police in the
country, boost their salaries and improve their educational
level, all in an effort to cut police corruption. "We need
to adjust the entire system of justice." Sungsidh is very
interested in foreign views on police reform and will be
meeting with UN officials to discuss their experiences soon.
He underscored his desire for any available U.S. expertise or
training available.


12. (C) Sungsidh understands that any police reform will be
tough. "The Prime Minister says it may be the toughest
problem in Thailand." Many cops do not like Sungsidh's
ideas. Some police officials have strongly criticized him,
even threatened him, but he is working to build support among
those officers who do see merit in his approach. For those
who oppose him, Sungsidh says he exaggerates and tells them
that it will take 20 years to implement his plan in an effort
to lull them with a false sense of security. He also
understands critics who point to efforts in the U.S. and
other countries to centralize law enforcement efforts. That
said, polls show strong public dissatisfaction with the
police, and Sungsidh hopes that social pressure can be built
to push aside any objections from the police. "It's all
about meeting the needs of the people." Even if social
pressure isn't enough, Sungsidh is confident that Surayud's
personal commitment to reform--and the PM's strong control
over the NLA--will result in success. That said, he has not
briefed the PM on the specifics of his plan yet.

PLAN B: PUT THE MILITARY IN CHARGE
--------------


13. (C) In a separate meeting with the International Law
Enforcement Academy's (ILEA) U.S. Director on December 11,
RTP General Watcharapol Prasamrajkit, himself an NLA member
on the Police Reform Committee, outlined a distinctly
different plan for reform that is circulating in police
circles. Watcharapol was the first Thai Director at ILEA, is
a former Commissioner of the RTP Narcotics Suppression Bureau
and is considered a progressive leader in the RTP. He echoed
Sungsidh's timeline of a year to develop, draft and pass a
law reforming the RTP, but does not believe that this is
sufficient time to produce an effective plan. Watcharapol
agrees that the police need reform, but he had hoped former
cop Thaksin would undertake these efforts himself.


14. (C) Under the plan outlined by Watcharapol--he did not
specify who authored it--the RTP would be broken up into nine
regional units (paralleling their current administrative
regions),the Bangkok Metropolitan police and a separate
Royal Thai Police Headquarters for administration. Each of
these eleven new police units would have their own
Commissioner General possessing independent control over
their unit's region and budget. However, each of these RTP
Commissioners would report directly to the Army Regional
Commander. A variation of this plan would further undercut
police authority, according to Watcharapol. The newly
reinstated Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) would
hire an additional 60,000 of its own personnel to provide a
"homeland security" function, with the police reporting to
the local ISOC commander (who would almost certainly be the
local Army commander.)

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15. (C) Watcharapol expressed strong unhappiness with this
plan to militarize the police saying that, in his view, no
Western nation would want to work with Thai police if such a
system is installed. He added, however, that neither he, nor
any of his RTP colleagues in the NLA would publicly broach
this subject with Surayud and his cabinet. Watcharapol hopes
that U.S., Australian and other Western nations can explain
to the PM how bad it would look to the world if Surayud
placed Thai law enforcement under direct military control.


16. (C) These concerns aside, Watcharapol admits that the RTP
needs reform. In his view, the police need better education
opportunities and increased civilian oversight. When asked
if higher pay could improve police performance, Watcharapol
responded that increasing pay for a 210,000 member police
force is impossible due to budgetary constraints. Moreover,
if police pay is increased, the military and the civilian
bureaucracy would demand pay raises as well. Watcharapol is
also a proponent of increased in-service educational
opportunities--which enables officers to move up the ranks
easier and develop better skills. He would also like to see
a set term for the Commissioner General position, in order to
avoid the politicization that inevitably occurs with the top
cop position. In fact, Watcharapol would even support the
installation of a civilian in the CG slot. In his view, (and
with little elaboration) no matter how good a cop may be, if
he steps into the CG position he immediately becomes
ineffective. Finally, Watcharapol would like to pursue a
community-based policing program like that used in Hong Kong.

COMMENT
--------------


17. (C) Much like recent government efforts to reform the
lottery or alcohol sales, these two proposals to fix the
police seem to have been cooked up by very smart people in an
insulated laboratory far, far away from the reality of Thai
politics. While we don't doubt Surayud's personal interest
or commitment to this issue, his ability to ramrod proposals
as dramatic as these through the legislature--not to mention
his ability to implement such ideas--is far from certain. We
are concerned by the idea of institutionalizing military
control over the police, but recognize that this is just one
option under consideration. We would certainly use every
opportunity to discourage this solution. Perhaps the most
troubling aspect of this debate is that some much-needed,
achievable reforms may be sidelined by the tug-of-war over
much more dramatic, and in the end, overly-ambitious plans
for change.
ARVIZU