EAP DAS JOHN'S MEETING WITH DEMOCRAT PARTY LEADER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 007397 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ECON ETRD KJUS KDEM TH SUBJECT: EAP DAS JOHN'S MEETING WITH DEMOCRAT PARTY LEADER Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Democrat Party (DP) Leader Abhisit Vejjajiva suggested to EAP DAS John that the USG should continue pressing the RTG for a return to democratic governance, without appearing to alienate Thailand. In a December 8 meeting with DAS John, Abhisit noted the RTG appeared to have made little use of martial law powers, but the constitution drafting process was proceeding slowly. He also stressed the importance of a favorable U.S. decision on Generalized System of Preferences benefits for Thailand, given the pain Thai exporters felt because of the strong Baht. Abhisit foresaw further conflict between deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the Council for National Security (CNS). He believed political factors might influence the ongoing legal case against the DP; after the case's resolution, the DP could begin to focus on competing against a limited field of opponents in the next elections. Abhisit supported the RTG's current approach toward insurgency in southern Thailand, and he expressed surprise that Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont had not taken a tougher approach toward Burma. End Summary. THE USG RESPONSE TO THE COUP -------------- ¶2. (C) Visiting EAP DAS Eric John opened his meeting with Abhisit by explaining the USG's response to the September 19 coup d'etat. After having issued critical public statements and suspended significant military assistance, the USG stood ready to work with the RTG to help ensure that the transition back to democratic governance would take place within the Committee for National Security's (CNS) announced one-year timeframe. The State Department was developing programs to bring constitutional experts to Thailand, as needed. The USG was disappointed that the cabinet had only approved a partial lifting of martial law, DAS John added, stressing that the CNS should return to at least the status quo ante as soon as possible. ¶3. (C) Abhisit said the Thais understood well that the USG would criticize the coup; Thais did not expect otherwise from a democratic ally. Noting the positive Thai response to Prime Minister Surayud's interactions with President Bush at the November APEC Summit, Abhisit advised that the USG continue steering a middle path, maintaining pressure on the administration to return to democratic governance, without giving the impression the USG wanted to alienate Thailand. Abhisit added that the government appeared to have made little use of emergency powers, as activists had been able to hold demonstrations, marches, and protests even before the announcement of the cabinet's decision to lift martial law. ¶4. (C) Abhisit asked if the USG planned to proceed with the annual Cobra Gold military exercise. The USG had not yet made a determination, DAS John replied. Abhisit said that the USG's upcoming decision to retain Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) benefits for Thailand would be even more important to Thais. Denying GSP benefits would be very harmful to Thai businesses, many of which were already suffering because of the recent strength in the Baht, which had wiped out the competitive margins of Thai exporters. DAS John replied that the decision for GSP would be made on the merits of the case, and without regard to the coup. DOMESTIC POLITICS -------------- ¶5. (C) The political environment remained of concern, Abhisit said. Deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was traveling to neighboring countries and retained an active network in Thailand; as the RTG was proceeding with criminal and other investigations of him and his family, Thaksin might move aggressively against the administration. While Thaksin might prefer to make a deal with the current administration, to protect his assets and family, the coup leaders would likely feel they had to take steps against Thaksin to show their coup was justified. While the Democrat Party (DP) did not agree with the coup, the DP also felt further political disruptions (instigated by Thaksin) would prove unhelpful. ¶6. (C) Abhisit also worried that the CNS might misjudge the mood of the public. Most people believed the constitution drafting process was proceeding too slowly, and the CNS was BANGKOK 00007397 002 OF 002 wasting time with its elaborate procedures to appoint its 100 designated persons to the Constitution Drafting Assembly. Only a minority of people believed Thailand's next constitution would be another "People's Constitution," like the 1997 version (which emerged from a highly participatory process),and attempts by the CNS to roll back progress enshrined in the 1997 constitution would generate substantial tension. ¶7. (C) The CNS appeared to be packing the boards of state enterprises with its loyalists, Abhisit observed. He worried that the 33 percent increase in the military's budget also represented an unjustified effort to reap spoils from the coup. Nevertheless, Abhisit said that Prime Minister Surayud and CNS Chairman Sonthi Boonyaratglin still enjoyed the goodwill of the Thai people, who trusted them to be men of integrity. OUTLOOK FOR THE DEMOCRAT PARTY -------------- ¶8. (C) DAS John asked Abhisit's view of the Democratic Party's future. Abhisit predicted the ongoing case before the Constitutional Tribunal -- in which the DP stood accused of committing undemocratic acts during the April 2006 election -- would conclude by March 2007 at the latest. While Abhisit considered the judiciary to be highly independent, he noted the Constitutional Tribunal differed from a regular court and might be subject to political influence. The cases coming to the Tribunal tended to be very political, and some people (NFI) were pressing the Tribunal to dissolve the DP if Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai were to be dissolved by the Tribunal as a result of a parallel case. ¶9. (C) Assuming the DP emerged intact from the Constitutional Tribunal process, the party would soon need to begin preparing for the campaign. Abhisit was optimistic about competing in the central and northern regions of Thailand, noting the party had good potential candidates to field, although he admitted the DP was "very weak" in the populous Northeast. (Note: Historically, the Democrats' strongest support has come from southern Thailand and the greater Bangkok metropolitan area. End Note.) However, Abhisit believed that the DP might be able to work cooperatively with another party more successful in the Northeast and form a coalition government. He foresaw relatively few parties playing significant roles: the DP, Chart Thai, and either TRT or a reincorporated version of TRT under a new name. Some other, newer parties -- specifically, Mahachon (led by former Democrat Sanan Kachornprasart) and Pracharat (led by Sanoh Thienthong) -- already were encountering difficulties. SOUTHERN THAILAND -------------- ¶10. (C) DAS John asked Abhisit's view of conditions in southern Thailand, where violence had worsened despite the Surayud administration's focus on reconciliation. Abhisit said he supported the Surayud's approach, but he recognized that officials might not quickly implement new policies at the grassroots level, and the people of the South would be slow to trust the government. Inevitably, a government taking a softer approach to militants would face criticism, but Abhisit hoped militants would not succeed in goading Surayud into reverting to a heavy-handed approach. BURMA -------------- ¶11. (C) Abhisit requested DAS John's view of Burma. DAS John noted that the USG hoped for passage of a UN Security Council Resolution on Burma in December and was working with other Asian nations toward that goal, including Thailand and other ASEAN members. Abhisit was surprised the Surayud administration had not taken a stronger line toward Burma -- maybe because this coup-installed administration felt it lacked the legitimacy to lecture the Burmese on democratization, he noted. DAS John said the USG would welcome steps by the RTG to press Burma for democratic change. ¶12. (U) DAS John has cleared this cable. HANSEN