LUNCH WITH PM SURAYUD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 007388 SIPDIS SIPDIS PACOM FOR FPA HUSO NSC FOR MORROW E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM TH SUBJECT: LUNCH WITH PM SURAYUD Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Prime Minister Surayud assessed his government's progress on key issues during a discussion with me over lunch on December 8. He said that the government was improving the security force organization in the South, although violence there was continuing. He said that police reform was his "second biggest challenge," and that he favored a less "Bangkok centered" police force. He also reported on plans to revitalize the old Internal Security Command (ISOC),as a way to overcome the chronic problem of stovepiping in the security forces. He said Thailand would no longer defend Burma from outside criticism, but did not respond to the suggestion that they support the UNSC Burma resolution. Surayud denied rumors that one of the coup leaders was trying to form a political party as a vehicle for a future political role. Surayud has correctly identified some of the biggest problems facing Thailand, but the new government does not yet have a clear and convincing plan to fix them. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister does not get much help from ministries that are expending too much political capital on much less important issues, like the lottery and alcohol advertising. End summary. ¶2. (C) Prime Minister Surayud joined me for lunch on December 8. He gave a fairly frank account of the main problems on his mind, starting with the Thai media. He commented ruefully that he had "never expected dealing with the press to be such a problem," referring to the decidedly mixed coverage some of the government's initiatives are getting from local journalists. THE SOUTH -- GOOD NEWS AND BAD NEWS -------------- ¶3. (C) He then immediately turned to the South, clearly one of the chief issues for him. I said that I believed the visits by the PM and Army Chief Sonthi, as well as the PM's apology to the southerners for the previous government's mistakes, had been well-received by the people in the South. The violence was still increasing, however - perhaps because the insurgents wanted to disrupt any progress the government was making toward reestablishing trust with the people. I asked whether it was hard to negotiate with shadows. Surayud responded, "Catching shadows is hard." He acknowledged that he would not be able to fix the problems in the south during his brief tenure in office. He compared the situation to an aircraft carrier -- getting it turned around takes some time, but, once turned, it can go on the right course. His administration would try to get the ship turned back on course. He also noted that his problem was not just with the insurgents in the South, but with the attitudes of many Thai people about the southern problem. He recalled something that former PM Anand had said while he was working on the unrest in the south -- the problem is not with the five percent of Malay-Muslims, it's with the other 95 percent of the population. ¶4. (C) There were some bright spots in this rather gloomy current situation. Surayud was very pleased with the attitude of Malaysian PM Abdullah Badawi. Malaysia clearly has no territorial aspirations on the three provinces. Badawi had offered Surayud some helpful insights into Malay culture. Surayud said that, although he was not a Malay or a Muslim, he thought that he had some credibility in the South, and would use it. ¶5. (C) I asked about the progress of reestablishing the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC), dissolved by PM Thaksin in 2002 -- a decision which many believe exacerbated the tensions in the region. Surayud said that the Center start-up was proceeding well, and he thought that it would be an improvement over its predecessor. He reminded me that, at one of our last meetings, I had raised concerns over the structure of the SBPAC that I had heard from a former ranking official in the south who worried that the Center would be an empty shell, without sufficient resources. Surayud said that he had reassured this critic BANGKOK 00007388 002 OF 004 that the Center would in fact include representatives from the relevant agencies, and it would engage in outreach to community leaders as well. SECURITY FORCES REFORM -------------- ¶6. (C) I raised the more general issue of lack of coordination among national security agencies. Surayud explained that his government planned to resurrect the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) to address the intractable problem of stovepiping. ISOC would be headed by Army chief Sonthi and would oversee the security agencies dealing with trafficking in persons, narcotics smuggling, counter-terrorism and immigration. The model would be the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (Comment: When Thailand was combatting the communist insurgency in the 1970s and 1980s, ISOC was a powerful security agency which spearheaded the fight. ISOC in recent years was a relatively weak agency with a special mandate to work on issues related to border security, especially narcotics trafficking. The Prime Minister was the head of ISOC, with a general appointed as his deputy to oversee the day-to-day operations. Surayud's plan appears to give ISOC a shot of steroids, and it is not at all clear that this is a good thing. As with police reform (below),Surayud has correctly identified systemic problems with the security forces, but may not have thought through all the ramifications of his proposed solutions. In both cases, however, the reform plans are still at an early stage. End comment.) ¶7. (C) Surayud turned to police reform. He identified this as the "second biggest challenge" for him, after dealing with the South. I pointed out the police have not actively opposed the September 19 coup, but they were also clearly not enthusiastic supporters. (Note: The police are also viewed as linked to Thaksin, a former police official.) The police will likely view any attempts to interfere with them as "punishment" rather than "reform." Surayud insisted that he was consulting with respected police officials as part of the process of planning the reforms. He personally favored decentralization of the police. He believed that Thailand's police force was too "capital centered;" decentralization would make the police more accountable to the population. I pointed out the US has a law enforcement training program here (ILEA),and we might be able to provide useful assistance to the team working on the reform proposals. "UNDERCURRENTS" -------------- ¶8. (C) I asked the PM about the "undercurrents" (alleged pockets of Thaksin supporters prepared to use or provoke violence to return him to power). I said that, in our travels and meetings, we had not found evidence of significant pockets of this kind of resistance. I pointed out that the citizenry in the areas of Thaksin's greatest popularity in the North, and especially the Northeast, did not historically participate in political demonstrations, or challenge authority. They were more likely to hunker down, and perhaps show some passive resistance. Surayud replied that the "undercurrents" that the government and CNS had so feared did not appear now to be a strong force. He speculated that the former Thai Rak Thai (TRT) leadership in some regions had put up "trial balloons" (pamphlets, calls for demonstrations) to see how people would respond. In the end, there had not been as much response as the government/CNS had feared. I conceded that some of the rural population might participate in anti-government demonstrations or actions if they were paid to do so. Surayud answered, "This is our concern." ¶9. (C) Surayud commented also that it may be very difficult for the government to come up with any concrete corruption charges that would stick to Thaksin, as he had been very clever in all his business dealings. Surayud said that Thaksin "really shouldn't come back" to Thailand until the reform process was over. (Note: In a previous meeting, BANGKOK 00007388 003 OF 004 Surayud had implied that Thaksin might run in the election next year. This time, however, he appeared to mean that Thaksin should sit out this round entirely, returning only after the 2007 vote. End note.) DEPORTATION OF LAO-HMONG -------------- ¶10. (C) I asked Surayud about the apparent move to deport some 150 Lao-Hmong, many of whom are recognized by the UNHCR. I remarked that we appreciated Surayud's earlier intervention to block a proposed deportation of the same group. Surayud did not respond directly, but asked whether the USG could help with resettling any of the Hmong, including those at Petchaboon. I replied that this was an issue that would have to be considered, and asked whether this would increase the pull factor and draw more Hmong to Petchaboon. The Petchaboon group would have to be carefully screened to determine if they had valid refugee claims. Surayud made no commitment on what would happen to the Lao-Hmong group at Nong Khai. (Note: We continue to be in touch with MFA and UNHCR about this issue. End note.) GENERAL WITH POLITICAL AMBITIONS? -------------- ¶11. (C) I asked the Prime Minister about the widespread rumors that General Winai Phattiyakul, one of the members of the Council for National Security (CNS),had aspirations for a political career after the elections next year. (Note: Winai, one of the key leaders of the coup, met with leading former Thai Rak Thai MPs last month. This was followed by a flurry of allegations that Winai was trying to set up a political party to be a vehicle for the military, and Winai himself, to remain active in politics after the elections next year. End note.) Surayud denied unequivocally the suggestion that Winai had any political ambitions. Surayud said that Winai, currently Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defense, only wanted to "retire in uniform." BURMA -------------- ¶12. (C) Surayud looked rueful when I asked him about his trip to Burma. He said that he had told the Burmese they needed to do something "dramatic" to show the international community that they understood its concerns. But if Burma was not prepared to take such a step, then Bangkok would not argue against the UNSC resolution. I underscored the importance the U.S. places on the resolution, and urged him to support it. At a minimum, we hoped that Thailand, and ASEAN, would at least not oppose the resolution. I raised some recent statements by the foreign minister, who was still advocating constructive engagement and who was, reportedly, considering reviving the "Bangkok process," a failed Thaksin-era policy to engage Rangoon. Surayud categorically rejected the idea of reviving a special role for Thailand as an intermediary between Burma and the rest of the world. He said that he only had a year in office, and he didn't have time to try to "fix" Burma. He had his hands full with Thailand. I concluded by asking him point blank to keep an eye on Foreign Minister Nitya. COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) Surayud showed himself, once again, to be a thoughtful and reasonable man grappling with an overwhelming array of problems. On a number of issues -- Burma, police reform, the South -- he is trying to change course from the failed policies of his predecessor, but exactly how the government can successfully address these issues is still unclear. Surayud is aware that he has a very short time to try to make these changes. Unfortunately, while he is focused on the insurgency in the South and long-standing problems with the security forces, his ministers somewhat inexplicably have chosen to focus on less important issues like alcohol advertising and the lottery, or suggesting BANGKOK 00007388 004 OF 004 unhelpful initiatives on Burma. Unless this changes, Surayud's problems with the press are unlikely to ease any time soon. BOYCE