CHASING "UNDERCURRENTS" IN NORTHEASTERN THAILAND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 007286

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PACOM FOR FPA HUSO
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM PREL TH
SUBJECT: CHASING "UNDERCURRENTS" IN NORTHEASTERN THAILAND

REF: A. CHIANG MAI 00211 (UNDERCURRENTS CONFIDENCE BOTH

WEAK IN NORTH)

B. BANGKOK 07150 (EXPLAINING THE DECISION TO LIFT
MARTIAL LAW)

C. BANGKOK 07132 (THAI CABINET APPROVES PARTIAL
LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW)

D. BANGKOK 006085 (COUP REACTION IN THAKSIN-COUNTRY)

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR SUSAN M. SUTTON. REASON 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary. Despite the interim government's decision
to extend martial law in some provinces (refs A-C),our
contacts in three Northeaster provinces--the heart of Thaksin
country--are nearly unanimous in their denial that any
political "undercurrents" are active in that region. During
a visit by Poloff in late November, over a dozen politicians,
local officials, NGO representatives and academics painted a
nearly uniform picture of a crushingly poor rural population
focused on day-to-day survival rather than the political
navel-gazing in Bangkok. Thaksin's former subordinates,
moreover, are either overseas, or already focused on
party-switching ahead of the next election. More
surprising, our contacts cited widespread uncertainty over
the interim government's effectiveness and attention to
issues that matter to local voters. As one aged farmer and
NGO leader told us, "there are no undercurrents (stirred up
by outsiders),but if the government doesn't pay attention
(to agricultural issues),in another two to three months you
could have an uprising." End Summary.

THAKSIN'S HEART OF DARKNESS
--------------


2. (C) Poloff and Polfsn traveled to the rural northeastern
(aka Isaan) provinces of Si Sa Ket, Surin and Buriram
November 29 to December 1. These three provinces bordering
Cambodia are among the very poorest in Thailand, with at
least seventy percent of the population living in poverty.
Most people depend on agriculture--almost always rice
cultivation--to earn a living. The people of these provinces
also overwhelmingly voted for Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai (TRT)
party in all three of its election victories since 2001,
giving rise to the interim government's fear that this region
remains a potential hotbed of political opposition. One of
Thaksin's more notorious lieutenants, Newin Chidchob, is from
Buriram, and has heavy influence in neighboring Surin, adding
to these security concerns.


3. (SBU) In their decision to extend martial law in these
provinces last week, interim government officials continued
to cite reports of political "undercurrents"--alleged efforts
by Thaksin supporters to organize rural opposition to the
junta--as justification. Local media have reported the
discovery of flyers attacking the interim government--and
coup leaders--in this region as further evidence of an
anti-government mindset.

LIKE CRICKETS (THOSE UNEATEN) CHIRPING
--------------


4. (C) During the often lengthy driving journey within and
between these provinces, Poloff witnessed no army or police
checkpoints, and rarely even saw any police conducting
"normal" activities. In contrast to a separate visit by
Poloffs to relatively developed Khon Kaen in October (ref D),
no security officials monitored our meetings or travels.


5. (C) Our local contacts--including central government
officials, academics, local lawyers, politicians and NGO
leaders--were nearly uniform in their denial of any
"undercurrents" in any of the three provinces. All described
the situation in their provinces as "quiet." Only one
Commerce Ministry official in Surin believed that
"undercurrents" existed in his area, but cited no proof, just
rumors. Most were surprised that martial law had been
extended in the area. Almost all cited the same reasons for
the lack of political opposition to the government: local
people are focused on putting food on the table, not

BANGKOK 00007286 002 OF 004


politics. According to Amnart Somsri, Chairman of the Law
Society of Thailand, Si Sa Ket branch, martial law has no
impact on the local people, only on the politicians. "No one
is interested in going to Bangkok and stirring up trouble."
Lots of people don't even understand what is going on
politically. The politicians in Bangkok "are just playing
their games."


6. (C) According to Prayong Siriprasertsilp, Chief of the
Provincial Administration Office in Surin, many people
appreciated the Thaksin government's agricultural programs,
but very few people feel strongly about the coup. Arunsak
Ocharos, Secretary General of the Si Sa Ket People's
Organization Council and a longtime schoolteacher in the
area, pointed to rural people's lack of both political
education and access to mass media. The farmers "close their
ears and eyes" when politics comes up, even on television.
Dr. Chaiya Chotikawanit, Vice Rector of Rajabhat Buriram
University, agreed with the low level of political
sophistication among local people. According to Dr. Chaiya,
Buriram remains very quiet, and former Thaksin ally (and
local political boss) Newin Chidchob remains in India. Dr.
Chaiya believes that the interim government kept martial law
in place because they are scared that pro-Thaksin figures
could instigate the people into protesting, but this is not
happening. Such rural organization requires money and
leadership, both of which are non-existent. Ministry of
Interior officials in both Si Sa Ket and Surin denied having
been consulted by Bangkok officials on the martial law
decision. As one put it, "that's the Army's responsibility."


7. (C) Some of our contacts pointed to the respected standing
of Interim PM Surayud and the King's official acquiescence to
the coup as key factors in the rural public's acceptance.
Poolsombat Namlar, Director of the Isaan Community NGO, said
that rural people are sad that Thaksin is gone, but believe
that the government has more moral authority now, based on
former Army Commander and Privy Councilor Surayud's "status"
in Thai society. Dr. Chaiya simply said, "the people stand
with and depend on the King. That's all that matters." In a
separate meeting, Sarai Kiewthaisong an academic who is the
Chairwoman of the Village Fund and Loan Networks of Ron Tong
District, Amphoe Satuk, Buriram, repeated this almost
verbatim, saying, "people are sad about the coup
but...everyone here still stands with the King."


8. (C) The only group that offered strong opinions on the
coup were, as expected, the three former TRT Members of
Parliament (MPs) we separately spoke with. All
three--Wiwatchai Hotaraweisaya (Si Sa Ket),Manit Sangphum
(Surin) and Sophon Phetsawang (Buriram)--decried the Army's
ouster of an elected government and pointed to the interim
government's failure to prove their allegations of widespread
graft in the Thaksin government. Wiwatchai believes that the
coup will "backfire" and result in further delays to a new
election, as the public becomes more openly opposed to the
junta. "Before, the privy councilors served as the referees
in Thai politics and kept the game relatively fair, but now,
they have put on uniforms and are playing on the field. Who
will ensure the game is fair now?" Sophon, a former deputy
house speaker who has represented his district in parliament
seven times (for several different political parties),
compared the current government to the military juntas of the
1970s, and predicted even odds that the junta will launch a
coup against itself (as has happened before) to delay the
next election.


9. (C) All three former MPs denied the existence of any
undercurrents in their provinces, and explained that they
were keeping a low profile so as not to arouse the scrutiny
of the security forces. Wiwatchai explained that,
immediately after the coup, he had been directed by TRT
leaders in Bangkok to keep quiet and refrain from political
activities. He added that this was the last communication he
received from his party leadership, several months ago. Both
Manit and Sophon, however, have resigned from TRT and are
actively maneuvering for spots in a different (or new)
political party for the next election (septel will elaborate

BANGKOK 00007286 003 OF 004


on these efforts.)

LOCALS QUESTION INTERIM GOV'S INTENTIONS
--------------


10. (C) Critics of the Thaksin government often pointed to
the raft of populist programs--the 30 baht health care
scheme, the Village Fund, etc--as naked attempts to buy rural
votes. Indeed, we expected to hear a much stronger current
of disappointment among locals that these policies may be in
jeopardy (septel will report further on the status of these
programs). Instead, our contacts focused on questioning the
effectiveness of the new, interim government. Whether merely
perception or reality, several contacts pointed at the slow
central government response to recent flooding and a lack of
attention to agricultural issues as evidence of the interim
government's failure to meet the expectations (heightened
under Thaksin) of rural voters. (Note: in referring to the
interim government, our contacts almost invariably used the
initials for the Council on National Security (CNS) rather
than refer to the civilian government, an interesting symbol
of a wide-spread perception that the military is still really
in charge. End Note.)


11. (C) Sorasath Kietsuranond, a member of the Si Sa Ket
Chamber of Commerce, was blunt in expressing little
confidence in the central government. "We don't know what
they intend to do. Even after several months it is still not
clear what their policies are; people liked Thaksin's
policies." According to Sorasath, politics are not as
important as economics. "If the government can't get this
right, they can't get anything right."


12. (C) When asked if the government was getting its "message
out," Dr. Chaiya replied in the negative. According to him,
the interim government has little political influence at the
local level and is doing a poor job of communicating with the
rural people. NGO leader Poolsombat echoed this comments,
saying that the government is still trying to explain their
actions and policies, which are not clear at all.


13. (C) Academic and Village Fund Chairwoman Sarai let loose
with one of the more passionate diatribes against the current
government. Sarai, who grew up in a relatively impoverished
village in Buriram, where her father Somsri Thonglor is a
widely respected farmer and anti-poverty leader, said, "life
here for most people is very difficult, but this new
government is even more difficult!" According to Sarai, the
people are very confused. They do not understand the coup,
the new government and the King's "sufficiency economy"
theory. The people don't know anything about national level
politics--they don't read newspapers. Most damning of all,
the government has not contacted local level leaders--who are
the bedrock of Isaan politics. In Sarai's view, the
government doesn't appear to have a clear agricultural plan
or strategy. Without rural representation in Bangkok, the
government is losing legitimacy day by day.


14. (C) Sarai's wrinkled and soft-spoken father Somsri echoed
these concerns. While professing no special support for the
Thaksin government, Somsri--who represents nearly 14,000
farmers in rural Buriram--expressed disappointment with the
Surayud administration's lackluster efforts to reach out to
the rural people. During Surayud's much publicized visit to
Buriram after the coup, the interim PM failed to meet with
local, elected political leaders from the district and
village level. Even worse, the PM didn't even venture beyond
the Buriram airport on his visit. While not denying that
certain Thaksin-era policies were very popular in Buriram,
Somsri said that it was a perception of inattention, more
than anything, that was eroding local faith in the interim
government. According to Somsri, "there are no undercurrents
(stirred up by outsiders),but if the government doesn't pay
attention (to agricultural issues),in another two to three
months you could have an uprising."

COMMENT
--------------

BANGKOK 00007286 004 OF 004




15. (C) The lack of active undercurrents in this part of
Isaan was not surprising, but we expected a stronger sense of
lingering support for Thaksin and his policies (Note: our
contacts did agree that, if he ran again, the former PM would
win in a landslide. End Note.) The breadth and depth of rural
dissatisfaction with the current government was much stronger
than we anticipated and based less on unhappiness with the
coup rather than dissatisfaction with current performance.
Somsri's warning of a possible "uprising" based on government
inattention to agricultural and poverty issues is probably
hyperbole--as another contact put it, the elite in Bangkok
have been ignoring the rural poor since the dawn of
constitutional politics in the 1930s. However, for all the
interim government's talk of working for the good of the
people, the divide between the political reality in Bangkok
and the real life of average Thai voters in the countryside
remains as wide as ever.
BOYCE