THAI MFA PERMSEC PROMISES TIMELY DEMOCRATIZATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 006561 SIPDIS SIPDIS PACOM FOR FPA HUSO NSC FOR MORROW E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM TH SUBJECT: THAI MFA PERMSEC PROMISES TIMELY DEMOCRATIZATION REF: BANGKOK 6478 (NEW LEGISLATURE PRESIDENT) Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Thai MFA Permanent Secretary Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn assured the Ambassador and visiting DAS John that Thailand would return to democratic governance in roughly one year. In an October 26 lunch, Krit said the interim constitution's deadlines ensured the timely promulgation of a new constitution; Krit spoke dismissively of an RTG official who publicly predicted a longer process. Krit said interim Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont favored lifting martial law, but it was Surayud's nature to build consensus rather than to force his views on others. DAS John emphasized the need for the recision of martial law in the near future, and he recommended that Surayud assure other leaders at the mid-November APEC summit that Thailand would send an elected Prime Minister for the 2007 APEC meeting. Krit's deputy discussed RTG talks with southern Thai separatist groups, noting the RTG was unsure that participants in Malaysian-brokered talks represented the principal perpetrators of violence, but these talks nevertheless could provide a psychological benefit. Krit expressed dismay about a recent raid by immigration police on a shelter for North Korean refugees, while reinforcing concern that publicizing the transit of North Korean refugees through Thailand could prove problematic. End Summary. TIMEFRAME FOR DEMOCRATIZATION -------------- ¶2. (C) In an October 26 lunch with DAS John and the Ambassador, MFA Permanent Secretary Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn assured DAS John that the soon-to-be-formed Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA) would complete its work in accordance with the timeline laid out in the interim consitution. Krit highlighted the interim constitution's "self destruct mechanisms" that provided for the CDA's dissolution if it failed to complete its task in the time provided. The interim constitution now represented "the law of the land," Krit said, and all concerned would respect its provisions. Krit added that, in Surayud's presence, he had criticized Thirapat Serirangsan, Minister Attached to the Prime Minister's Office, for having speculated publicly that the interim government might remain in office for at least 17 months. CONSTITUTION DRAFTING COMMISSION -------------- ¶3. (C) Responding to DAS John's inquiries about the procedures for drafting Thailand's new constitution, Krit explained that provincial governors met on October 25 to receive a briefing on how local administrative mechanisms would be used in a decentralized process to nominate representatives for the 2,000-person National People's Assembly, which would then work with the Council for National Security (CNS) to select the 200-person CDA and a smaller Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC). Krit said the CNS would use its constitutional prerogative to appoint 10 of the 35 members of the CDC in order to ensure the inclusion of experienced jurists (such as Borwornsak Uwanno and Wissanu Krea-ngam) with the background necessary to produce a charter of high quality. MARTIAL LAW AND BILATERAL RELATIONS -------------- ¶4. (C) Krit assured DAS John that civil liberties were already being restored. Although the legislature had not yet been able to take formal action, the ban on political gatherings had been implicitly lifted after the cabinet announced its intention to ease restrictions. Krit noted thousands of people had gathered for demonstrations critical of the government, without repercussions. DAS John expressed BANGKOK 00006561 002 OF 003 dismay that the RTG seemed reluctant to lift martial law formally; the Ambassador noted the pace of progress on this matter appeared "glacial." Krit replied that both Surayud and CNS Chairman GEN Sonthi Boonyaratglin genuinely wanted to lift martial law and saw it as unnecessary; however, they needed time to bring other RTG officials (NFI) on board. Surayud by nature strove for consensus, Krit observed. ¶5. (C) Citing the long history of U.S.-Thai friendship, Krit asked that the USG understand that the political crisis during Thaksin's final year in office had left Thailand dysfunctional. Prior to the coup, former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun had publicly warned Thailand could become a "failed state." The coup therefore generated relief and euphoria -- the end was so good that people were in no mood to denounce the means. With its repeated criticisms, the USG's condemnation appeared gratuitous and risked generating a perception of overall American antagonism toward Thailand. Krit asked that the USG not "punish us more just to get your message out," and consider instead how the U.S. and Thailand could continue their history of working together to enhance security and strategic interests in the region. ¶6. (C) DAS John noted the Thais could generate a positive climate by lifting martial law. This could enable a more normal atmosphere for the APEC summit in mid-November. DAS John recommended that Surayud assure other APEC leaders that Thailand would have an elected Prime Minister in office in time to attend the 2007 APEC summit. THE NEW LEGISLATURE -------------- ¶7. (C) Krit, who is also a member of the newly established National Legislative Assembly (NLA),mentioned that there was vibrant debate during the recent election for the NLA presidency (reftel). From observing the debate, one would not have guessed that the NLA consisted entirely of appointed members, Krit said. The NGO representatives in the NLA were particularly active. Krit acknowledged the NLA lacked representatives of Thailand's rural areas, remarking on the absence of the provincial godfathers whose local influence had enabled them to win seats in prior legislatures. SOUTHERN VIOLENCE -------------- ¶8. (C) Changing topics, Deputy PermSec Sihasak Phuangketkeow observed that continuing violence in southern Thailand might represent an effort of separatists to maintain a high profile. Sihasak noted there seemed to be no link between the southern Thai separatists and the al Qaeda-affiliated international terrorist network, but he expressed concern that the ideology promoted by international jihadists could inflame the situation in Thailand. Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir had gathered views from separatist organizations PULO, Bersatu, BRN, and Pattani Islamic Mujahideen Movement; these organization had devised an eight-point peace proposal, and none of their points appeared objectionable to the RTG. Although the RTG remained unsure whether those organizations were the principal instigators of violence -- intelligence pointed instead to the BRN-Coordinate, Sihasak said -- reaching an accommodation with them could provide psychological benefits. Thai intelligence chief LTG Waipot had the lead for the RTG in the Mahathir-brokered talks. NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES -------------- ¶9. (C) Noting a raid by Thai immigration police on a South Korean safehouse for North Korean refugees, Krit said the MFA opposed this action, which appeared to represent attempts at self-promotion by the immigration police. The RTG was concerned that media coverage of the movement of North Korean refugees through Thailand could generate a larger influx from the DPRK. The Ambassador said the USG was committed to accepting DPRK refugees for resettlement but also understood BANGKOK 00006561 003 OF 003 that publicity could undermine the prospects for continuing the flow of North Koreans through Thailand. ¶10. (U) DAS John did not have the opportunity to clear this cable. BOYCE