AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH PRIVY COUNCILLOR PREM

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 006395 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS PACOM FOR FPA HUSO NSC FOR MORROW E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PHUM TH SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH PRIVY COUNCILLOR PREM TINSULANONDA ¶1. (SBU) Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda hosted lunch for me today, and we had an in-depth conversation about the coup and its implications for US-Thai relations. While Prem is unapologetic about what happened September 19, he is also sensitive to the international implications and especially to the US angle. He is very close to the coup leadership as well as to Prime Minister Surayud. Both General Sonthi and Surayud are considered acolytes of Prem. (While it does not appear that Prem was part of the coup planning, it seems likely that his blessing was sought a few days before the event, and Prem no doubt gave the King at least some advance notice about what was coming.) ¶2. (SBU) I described for Prem US unhappiness over the fact of the coup and outlined the measures we had taken to date in response. Like most, he accepts that the US would be opposed to the military overthrow of an elected government, and understands the suspension of military assistance such as IMET, FMF, GPOI and section 1206. He assured me that Thailand was heading back toward democratically elected government and thus anticipated the restoration of the suspended programs at that time. ¶3. (SBU) I told him we had noted various actions in the month since the coup, such as Surayud's appointment, the interim constitution, the new cabinet and the selection of the interim assembly. In each case, there were just enough elements to leave the impression that perhaps the military's timeline for returning power might be lengthening rather than shortening. These included: -- the fact that the PM was a retired military officer; -- the many references in the interim constitution to the coup council and its various continuing responsibilities; -- the lack of "upcountry" representation in the cabinet; and -- the large percentage of military officers in the interim assembly. ¶4. (SBU) While disagreeing that the military had in mind a lengthy exercise of power, Prem conceded that the optics of these various elements, taken together, could create that impression. He asked what Washington's view was. I told him we were watching closely for signals that things were in fact moving in a more positive direction. Such signals would include lifting martial law and restoration of civil liberties, a shorter timeline to elections, indications of positive headway on the drafting of a new constitution and evidence that the new civilian interim government and assembly were indeed acting independently of the military. ¶5. (SBU) I said we would reassess in early November the degree to which progress was being made in these areas. Possible further actions we might take in the absence of progress or if things got worse could include canceling Cobra Gold, suspending ship visits, limiting senior military interaction and cessation of commercial sales of military equipment. There was also the issue of how to deal with Thailand at APEC in Hanoi, I added. ¶6. (SBU) Prem was very interested in the APEC angle. He understood instantly the equities at stake on the US side, with the President's strong commitment to our democracy agenda. (It is widely commented upon here that the Thai coup coincided with the President's speech on democracy at the UN.) He asked how I thought our deliberations would come out. I told him much of it depended on actions the interim government would take in the next couple of weeks -- lifting martial law would be a huge signal, for example. Prem did not push back with the line that other have used on this point (General Sonthi, for example) that martial law must be maintained to prevent "dark influences" associated with Thaksin from stirring up trouble. Indeed, he was responsive to my point that existing legal authorities should be sufficient to control and punish anyone breaking the law. BANGKOK 00006395 002 OF 002 ¶7. (SBU) Comment: We talked about various other issues, but Prem should take away from the meeting the need for an increased sense of urgency between now and early November if there is to be a successful encounter at APEC, and for that matter if the bilateral relationship is to avoid further friction. BOYCE