Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANGKOK6324
2006-10-16 10:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

THAILAND: AMBASSADOR URGES GEN SONTHI TO LIFT

Tags:  PGOV PREL MASS MARR TH 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 006324 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS
NSC FOR WILDER, MORROW
PACOM FOR FPA HUSO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MASS MARR TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: AMBASSADOR URGES GEN SONTHI TO LIFT
MARTIAL LAW, RESTRICTIONS ON CIVIL LIBERTIES

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (a and d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 006324 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS NSC FOR WILDER, MORROW PACOM FOR FPA HUSO E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL MASS MARR TH SUBJECT: THAILAND: AMBASSADOR URGES GEN SONTHI TO LIFT MARTIAL LAW, RESTRICTIONS ON CIVIL LIBERTIES Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (a and d) ¶1. (C) Summary. I met with Council for National Security (CNS) chief GEN Sonthi Boonyaratglin on October 16 to express our continued concern over the coup and the suspension of civil liberties. Reminding him that we have already suspended almost 24 million dollars in assistance, I informed Sonthi that we may be forced to consider additional measures if we do not see more progress towards democracy. I underscored the importance of lifting martial law quickly, describing for Sonthi the difficulty the President might have in meeting interim Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont at APEC next month if martial law remains in place. Sonthi said he believes that martial law remains necessary for the time being to prevent "influential and moneyed interests" from using undue influence on rural voters and fomenting unrest. I intend to use upcoming meetings with key civilian figures in an around the government in the coming days to impress upon them the importance of restoring civil liberties, first and foremost of which is lifting martial law, at the earliest possible date. End Summary. ¶2. (C) I met privately with General Sonthi at Royal Thai Army (RTA) Headquarters on October 16. Reminding him of the strong bonds and years of friendship between our two people, I underscored the importance of the CNS and interim government showing sustained, concrete progress on returning democracy to Thailand. I told Sonthi that, while we took note of the rapid naming of an interim Prime Minister, Cabinet, Constitution, and National Assembly, we remain extremely disappointed by the coup and urge Thailand to quickly end martial law and restore all civil liberties. After reminding him of the 24 million dollars of assistance we suspended under section 508, I told Sonthi that we might reevaluate other military programs and representational events not covered by 508 in the near future if we do not see more progress towards a return to democracy. I explained to Sonthi that interim Prime Minister Surayud and President Bush are both scheduled to attend APEC in Hanoi next month. I described the difficulty President Bush might have in meeting Surayud together with other ASEAN leaders if Thailand remains under martial law. ¶3. (C) Sonthi did not give me a firm date for lifting martial law. He told me that he believes martial law is necessary for the time being to prevent "influential and moneyed interests" from using undue influence over rural voters and fomenting dissent. He believes that the people are "comfortable" under martial law and generally support the need to keep it in place for a short while longer. I told him that martial law would not be necessary to prevent political violence and that we were unaware of any nascent opposition in the countryside that would warrant the continuation of martial law. I urged him to share with us any intelligence he might have indicating a counter-coup or violence was being planned. COMMENT ¶4. (C) Sonthi appears to view martial law in strictly security terms -- a useful tool to maintain order and prevent potential unrest. He seems not fully cognizant of how martial law is damaging Thailand's reputation abroad. For BANGKOK 00006324 002 OF 002 instance, in our meeting Sonthi did not seem to understand the impact a state of martial law would have on Surayud's participation at APEC. In the coming days, I intend to meet with very senior civilian leaders in the interim government or with connections to it, to continue our ongoing efforts to impress upon them that the government needs to lift martial law soon to overcome growing doubt abroad -- and to an extent, within Thailand as well -- about the sincerity of its commitment to democratic restoration. END COMMENT. BOYCE

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