Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANGKOK6269
2006-10-12 10:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:
AMBASSADOR MAKES JOINT CALL ON INTERIM PM SURAYUD
VZCZCXRO6853 OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM DE RUEHBK #6269/01 2851006 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 121006Z OCT 06 FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2274 INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 6171 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 7351 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 2222 RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1542 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI RHFJSCC/COMMARFORPAC RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 006269
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON KDEM TH
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MAKES JOINT CALL ON INTERIM PM SURAYUD
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).
SUMMARY
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 006269
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON KDEM TH
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MAKES JOINT CALL ON INTERIM PM SURAYUD
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) The Ambassador used an October 12 joint call on
interim PM Surayud Chulanont to press for the lifting of
martial law, restoration of full civil liberties, early
completion of Thailand's new constitution, and democratic
elections as soon as possible. Surayud, accompanied by
Foreign Minister Nitya (Nit) Pibulsonggram, expressed a
strong desire to achieve all those goals as soon as
circumstances permitted. He said the one-year timeframe for
elections represented a deadline, not a target. The
Ambassadors of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand made points
similar to our own. Speaking in general terms, Surayud
welcomed foreign assistance as the Thais considered how to
fix their system of governance. He said addressing militant
activity in southern Thailand would also be a top priority
for his administration, and he pledged continuity in Thai
foreign and economic policy. End Summary.
PM EXPLAINS HIS AGENDA
--------------
2. (C) Interim PM Surayud began on October 12 a series of
meetings with groups of Ambassadors. The Ambassador joined
his counterparts from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and a
few others from Latin America for a joint call on Surayud and
FM Nit at Government House. Surayud opened the meeting by
saying he was fully aware of his status as an appointed Prime
Minister (i.e., he recognized he lacked the mandate of an
elected PM). He had spent the past week seeking suitable
people for his cabinet. With both the cabinet and the new
interim legislature (septel) in place, Surayud planned to use
his second week to establish policies for his new
administration. "This is a very difficult period for me and
my cabinet to work against time, to do our best for the
Kingdom of Thailand," he said.
3. (C) Surayud described his first priority as healing the
rifts that had arisen among the Thai people over the past
year. His second, equally important task was addressing the
situation in southern Thailand. He did not know if he could
achieve any or all of his objectives during his time in
office, but he noted his military training had taught him to
take responsibility and accomplish whatever he could in the
time available. Unsure of success, he sought the support of
friendly countries. He added, "I didn't plan to be Prime
Minister. It came out of the blue."
4. (C) Thailand was a small country, Surayud observed, and
would try to continue its existing foreign policy, based on a
cooperative theme. He foresaw no changes in this area. He
noted that his administration would apply four criteria in
deciding whether to continue with other policies or projects
from the Thaksin administration: transparency; justice;
economy of resources; and efficiency. Turning to economic
policy, Surayud noted he had spoken publicly of the need for
a "sufficiency economy." These remarks reflected the King's
philosophy. His intended audience had been Thais, who needed
to keep in mind the King's approach. Over the past five
years, Thais had shown a tendency to forget the lessons
learned from the 1997 financial crisis. However, Surayud
said he was committed to maintaining policies based on market
economics and trade.
AMBASSADORS REPLY
--------------
5. (C) Surayud then opened the meeting for questions and
comments. The Canadian Ambassador called for the early
lifting of martial law, the reinstatement of civil liberties,
completion of a new constitution as soon as possible, and the
setting of a date for the next national election. Surayud
replied that he had raised the status of martial law on the
agenda for the first cabinet meeting. He said he personally
agreed with the Canadian Ambassador -- he would like to see
martial law lifted. He said the cabinet would bring this
matter to the Council for National Security (CNS) for
discussion, as the recision of martial law would depend on
BANGKOK 00006269 002 OF 003
security conditions. He hoped that his discussions with the
CNS would provide at a minimum a sense of the timeframe for
lifting martial law. However, he noted that, even with
martial law, there were no restrictions on the media; the
Ambassadors themselves were surely aware the media had
presented a wide range of opinions on the coup.
6. (C) Surayud asked FM Nit to make further comments. Nit
said he hoped that the Ambassadors had a feel for the
developments of the past month; Thailand was firmly on course
to restore parliamentary democracy. The government was
taking concrete steps in that direction, and there had been
no curtailment of liberties. No political figures were being
held in custody, and anyone questioned by the authorities
would be provided with due process. Thailand would operate
under the rule of law. "Please allow us to work our way out
of this crucial juncture in our country's history, and convey
to your capitals the situation on the ground," Nit said.
7. (C) Turning to constitutional issues, Surayud noted his
government had had little to do with the drafting of the
interim constitution issued soon after the coup. Although
the CNS had the role of appointing the body to draft the new
constitution, Surayud and his administration would work
closely with the CNS on that task. Surayud said that the one
year timeframe for elections marked a deadline, not a target.
If it was possible to have elections sooner, the government
would do its best to do so. Surayud observed that he had
told his wife this morning, "If this can be done in less than
one year, we can live in peace again."
8. (C) Surayud then invited the U.S. Ambassador to speak.
The Ambassador noted that the USG, while deeply disappointed
with the coup, had taken note of various subsequent actions,
such as Surayud's appointment as interim Prime Minister, the
promulgation of the interim constitution, the formation of
the cabinet, and the announcement mid-day on October 12 of
the new interim legislature. Nevertheless, some extremely
important steps remained to assure the international
community that the RTG was moving toward the speediest
possible return to democratically elected governance. These
included: lifting martial law, restoring full civil
liberties, accelerating the timetable for drafting a new
constitution and holding elections. These tremendously
important steps should be taken as soon as possible. The
Ambassador closed his remarks by saying that, in the process
of drafting a new constitution and preparing for elections,
the U.S. stood ready, if and where appropriate, to provide
assistance.
9. (C) The Australian Ambassador noted his country's deep
disappointment with the coup. He reiterated that lifting
martial law would send an important signal to the
international community. He stood ready to work with the
Prime Minister and his government, but sustained support from
Australia would require quick evidence of steps back toward
democratically elected governance. He echoed the U.S.
Ambassador's offer to assist in areas of good governance,
where Australia had been active in the past.
10. (C) The New Zealand Ambassador characterized the coup as
highly regrettable. He called for the restoration of civil
rights and an accelerated timetable for free and fair
elections. He welcomed the Prime Minister's intention to
promote reconciliation among Thais and to focus on problems
in southern Thailand. He offered in general terms to provide
aid for the situation in the South.
11. (C) Surayud concluded the meeting by stressing his
understanding of the urgency of free and fair elections.
This was a key moment for Thailand. Thais had learned from
the past, which included too many unfree and unfair
elections, because politicians had tried to distort the path
to democracy. Surayud said he did not yet know how to fix
the system, but he pledged to do his best to organize
elections as soon as possible, and he welcomed the help of
the international community.
COMMENT
--------------
BANGKOK 00006269 003 OF 003
12. (C) The Ambassador is seeking a separate, private meeting
with the Surayud to deliver detailed demarche points
forthcoming from Washington. Surayud's explanation of his
remarks on the King's concept of a sufficiency economy
appeared designed to assuage concerns that he aimed for a
more protectionist economic policy. We note that Surayud is
correct that the media has presented a wide range of opinions
on the propriety of the September 19 coup, but we believe
many members of Thai civil society feel more constrained by
martial law and associated restrictions than Surayud and Nit
implied.
BOYCE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON KDEM TH
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MAKES JOINT CALL ON INTERIM PM SURAYUD
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) The Ambassador used an October 12 joint call on
interim PM Surayud Chulanont to press for the lifting of
martial law, restoration of full civil liberties, early
completion of Thailand's new constitution, and democratic
elections as soon as possible. Surayud, accompanied by
Foreign Minister Nitya (Nit) Pibulsonggram, expressed a
strong desire to achieve all those goals as soon as
circumstances permitted. He said the one-year timeframe for
elections represented a deadline, not a target. The
Ambassadors of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand made points
similar to our own. Speaking in general terms, Surayud
welcomed foreign assistance as the Thais considered how to
fix their system of governance. He said addressing militant
activity in southern Thailand would also be a top priority
for his administration, and he pledged continuity in Thai
foreign and economic policy. End Summary.
PM EXPLAINS HIS AGENDA
--------------
2. (C) Interim PM Surayud began on October 12 a series of
meetings with groups of Ambassadors. The Ambassador joined
his counterparts from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and a
few others from Latin America for a joint call on Surayud and
FM Nit at Government House. Surayud opened the meeting by
saying he was fully aware of his status as an appointed Prime
Minister (i.e., he recognized he lacked the mandate of an
elected PM). He had spent the past week seeking suitable
people for his cabinet. With both the cabinet and the new
interim legislature (septel) in place, Surayud planned to use
his second week to establish policies for his new
administration. "This is a very difficult period for me and
my cabinet to work against time, to do our best for the
Kingdom of Thailand," he said.
3. (C) Surayud described his first priority as healing the
rifts that had arisen among the Thai people over the past
year. His second, equally important task was addressing the
situation in southern Thailand. He did not know if he could
achieve any or all of his objectives during his time in
office, but he noted his military training had taught him to
take responsibility and accomplish whatever he could in the
time available. Unsure of success, he sought the support of
friendly countries. He added, "I didn't plan to be Prime
Minister. It came out of the blue."
4. (C) Thailand was a small country, Surayud observed, and
would try to continue its existing foreign policy, based on a
cooperative theme. He foresaw no changes in this area. He
noted that his administration would apply four criteria in
deciding whether to continue with other policies or projects
from the Thaksin administration: transparency; justice;
economy of resources; and efficiency. Turning to economic
policy, Surayud noted he had spoken publicly of the need for
a "sufficiency economy." These remarks reflected the King's
philosophy. His intended audience had been Thais, who needed
to keep in mind the King's approach. Over the past five
years, Thais had shown a tendency to forget the lessons
learned from the 1997 financial crisis. However, Surayud
said he was committed to maintaining policies based on market
economics and trade.
AMBASSADORS REPLY
--------------
5. (C) Surayud then opened the meeting for questions and
comments. The Canadian Ambassador called for the early
lifting of martial law, the reinstatement of civil liberties,
completion of a new constitution as soon as possible, and the
setting of a date for the next national election. Surayud
replied that he had raised the status of martial law on the
agenda for the first cabinet meeting. He said he personally
agreed with the Canadian Ambassador -- he would like to see
martial law lifted. He said the cabinet would bring this
matter to the Council for National Security (CNS) for
discussion, as the recision of martial law would depend on
BANGKOK 00006269 002 OF 003
security conditions. He hoped that his discussions with the
CNS would provide at a minimum a sense of the timeframe for
lifting martial law. However, he noted that, even with
martial law, there were no restrictions on the media; the
Ambassadors themselves were surely aware the media had
presented a wide range of opinions on the coup.
6. (C) Surayud asked FM Nit to make further comments. Nit
said he hoped that the Ambassadors had a feel for the
developments of the past month; Thailand was firmly on course
to restore parliamentary democracy. The government was
taking concrete steps in that direction, and there had been
no curtailment of liberties. No political figures were being
held in custody, and anyone questioned by the authorities
would be provided with due process. Thailand would operate
under the rule of law. "Please allow us to work our way out
of this crucial juncture in our country's history, and convey
to your capitals the situation on the ground," Nit said.
7. (C) Turning to constitutional issues, Surayud noted his
government had had little to do with the drafting of the
interim constitution issued soon after the coup. Although
the CNS had the role of appointing the body to draft the new
constitution, Surayud and his administration would work
closely with the CNS on that task. Surayud said that the one
year timeframe for elections marked a deadline, not a target.
If it was possible to have elections sooner, the government
would do its best to do so. Surayud observed that he had
told his wife this morning, "If this can be done in less than
one year, we can live in peace again."
8. (C) Surayud then invited the U.S. Ambassador to speak.
The Ambassador noted that the USG, while deeply disappointed
with the coup, had taken note of various subsequent actions,
such as Surayud's appointment as interim Prime Minister, the
promulgation of the interim constitution, the formation of
the cabinet, and the announcement mid-day on October 12 of
the new interim legislature. Nevertheless, some extremely
important steps remained to assure the international
community that the RTG was moving toward the speediest
possible return to democratically elected governance. These
included: lifting martial law, restoring full civil
liberties, accelerating the timetable for drafting a new
constitution and holding elections. These tremendously
important steps should be taken as soon as possible. The
Ambassador closed his remarks by saying that, in the process
of drafting a new constitution and preparing for elections,
the U.S. stood ready, if and where appropriate, to provide
assistance.
9. (C) The Australian Ambassador noted his country's deep
disappointment with the coup. He reiterated that lifting
martial law would send an important signal to the
international community. He stood ready to work with the
Prime Minister and his government, but sustained support from
Australia would require quick evidence of steps back toward
democratically elected governance. He echoed the U.S.
Ambassador's offer to assist in areas of good governance,
where Australia had been active in the past.
10. (C) The New Zealand Ambassador characterized the coup as
highly regrettable. He called for the restoration of civil
rights and an accelerated timetable for free and fair
elections. He welcomed the Prime Minister's intention to
promote reconciliation among Thais and to focus on problems
in southern Thailand. He offered in general terms to provide
aid for the situation in the South.
11. (C) Surayud concluded the meeting by stressing his
understanding of the urgency of free and fair elections.
This was a key moment for Thailand. Thais had learned from
the past, which included too many unfree and unfair
elections, because politicians had tried to distort the path
to democracy. Surayud said he did not yet know how to fix
the system, but he pledged to do his best to organize
elections as soon as possible, and he welcomed the help of
the international community.
COMMENT
--------------
BANGKOK 00006269 003 OF 003
12. (C) The Ambassador is seeking a separate, private meeting
with the Surayud to deliver detailed demarche points
forthcoming from Washington. Surayud's explanation of his
remarks on the King's concept of a sufficiency economy
appeared designed to assuage concerns that he aimed for a
more protectionist economic policy. We note that Surayud is
correct that the media has presented a wide range of opinions
on the propriety of the September 19 coup, but we believe
many members of Thai civil society feel more constrained by
martial law and associated restrictions than Surayud and Nit
implied.
BOYCE