AMBASSADOR MAKES JOINT CALL ON INTERIM PM SURAYUD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 006269 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON KDEM TH SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MAKES JOINT CALL ON INTERIM PM SURAYUD Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The Ambassador used an October 12 joint call on interim PM Surayud Chulanont to press for the lifting of martial law, restoration of full civil liberties, early completion of Thailand's new constitution, and democratic elections as soon as possible. Surayud, accompanied by Foreign Minister Nitya (Nit) Pibulsonggram, expressed a strong desire to achieve all those goals as soon as circumstances permitted. He said the one-year timeframe for elections represented a deadline, not a target. The Ambassadors of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand made points similar to our own. Speaking in general terms, Surayud welcomed foreign assistance as the Thais considered how to fix their system of governance. He said addressing militant activity in southern Thailand would also be a top priority for his administration, and he pledged continuity in Thai foreign and economic policy. End Summary. PM EXPLAINS HIS AGENDA -------------- ¶2. (C) Interim PM Surayud began on October 12 a series of meetings with groups of Ambassadors. The Ambassador joined his counterparts from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and a few others from Latin America for a joint call on Surayud and FM Nit at Government House. Surayud opened the meeting by saying he was fully aware of his status as an appointed Prime Minister (i.e., he recognized he lacked the mandate of an elected PM). He had spent the past week seeking suitable people for his cabinet. With both the cabinet and the new interim legislature (septel) in place, Surayud planned to use his second week to establish policies for his new administration. "This is a very difficult period for me and my cabinet to work against time, to do our best for the Kingdom of Thailand," he said. ¶3. (C) Surayud described his first priority as healing the rifts that had arisen among the Thai people over the past year. His second, equally important task was addressing the situation in southern Thailand. He did not know if he could achieve any or all of his objectives during his time in office, but he noted his military training had taught him to take responsibility and accomplish whatever he could in the time available. Unsure of success, he sought the support of friendly countries. He added, "I didn't plan to be Prime Minister. It came out of the blue." ¶4. (C) Thailand was a small country, Surayud observed, and would try to continue its existing foreign policy, based on a cooperative theme. He foresaw no changes in this area. He noted that his administration would apply four criteria in deciding whether to continue with other policies or projects from the Thaksin administration: transparency; justice; economy of resources; and efficiency. Turning to economic policy, Surayud noted he had spoken publicly of the need for a "sufficiency economy." These remarks reflected the King's philosophy. His intended audience had been Thais, who needed to keep in mind the King's approach. Over the past five years, Thais had shown a tendency to forget the lessons learned from the 1997 financial crisis. However, Surayud said he was committed to maintaining policies based on market economics and trade. AMBASSADORS REPLY -------------- ¶5. (C) Surayud then opened the meeting for questions and comments. The Canadian Ambassador called for the early lifting of martial law, the reinstatement of civil liberties, completion of a new constitution as soon as possible, and the setting of a date for the next national election. Surayud replied that he had raised the status of martial law on the agenda for the first cabinet meeting. He said he personally agreed with the Canadian Ambassador -- he would like to see martial law lifted. He said the cabinet would bring this matter to the Council for National Security (CNS) for discussion, as the recision of martial law would depend on BANGKOK 00006269 002 OF 003 security conditions. He hoped that his discussions with the CNS would provide at a minimum a sense of the timeframe for lifting martial law. However, he noted that, even with martial law, there were no restrictions on the media; the Ambassadors themselves were surely aware the media had presented a wide range of opinions on the coup. ¶6. (C) Surayud asked FM Nit to make further comments. Nit said he hoped that the Ambassadors had a feel for the developments of the past month; Thailand was firmly on course to restore parliamentary democracy. The government was taking concrete steps in that direction, and there had been no curtailment of liberties. No political figures were being held in custody, and anyone questioned by the authorities would be provided with due process. Thailand would operate under the rule of law. "Please allow us to work our way out of this crucial juncture in our country's history, and convey to your capitals the situation on the ground," Nit said. ¶7. (C) Turning to constitutional issues, Surayud noted his government had had little to do with the drafting of the interim constitution issued soon after the coup. Although the CNS had the role of appointing the body to draft the new constitution, Surayud and his administration would work closely with the CNS on that task. Surayud said that the one year timeframe for elections marked a deadline, not a target. If it was possible to have elections sooner, the government would do its best to do so. Surayud observed that he had told his wife this morning, "If this can be done in less than one year, we can live in peace again." ¶8. (C) Surayud then invited the U.S. Ambassador to speak. The Ambassador noted that the USG, while deeply disappointed with the coup, had taken note of various subsequent actions, such as Surayud's appointment as interim Prime Minister, the promulgation of the interim constitution, the formation of the cabinet, and the announcement mid-day on October 12 of the new interim legislature. Nevertheless, some extremely important steps remained to assure the international community that the RTG was moving toward the speediest possible return to democratically elected governance. These included: lifting martial law, restoring full civil liberties, accelerating the timetable for drafting a new constitution and holding elections. These tremendously important steps should be taken as soon as possible. The Ambassador closed his remarks by saying that, in the process of drafting a new constitution and preparing for elections, the U.S. stood ready, if and where appropriate, to provide assistance. ¶9. (C) The Australian Ambassador noted his country's deep disappointment with the coup. He reiterated that lifting martial law would send an important signal to the international community. He stood ready to work with the Prime Minister and his government, but sustained support from Australia would require quick evidence of steps back toward democratically elected governance. He echoed the U.S. Ambassador's offer to assist in areas of good governance, where Australia had been active in the past. ¶10. (C) The New Zealand Ambassador characterized the coup as highly regrettable. He called for the restoration of civil rights and an accelerated timetable for free and fair elections. He welcomed the Prime Minister's intention to promote reconciliation among Thais and to focus on problems in southern Thailand. He offered in general terms to provide aid for the situation in the South. ¶11. (C) Surayud concluded the meeting by stressing his understanding of the urgency of free and fair elections. This was a key moment for Thailand. Thais had learned from the past, which included too many unfree and unfair elections, because politicians had tried to distort the path to democracy. Surayud said he did not yet know how to fix the system, but he pledged to do his best to organize elections as soon as possible, and he welcomed the help of the international community. COMMENT -------------- BANGKOK 00006269 003 OF 003 ¶12. (C) The Ambassador is seeking a separate, private meeting with the Surayud to deliver detailed demarche points forthcoming from Washington. Surayud's explanation of his remarks on the King's concept of a sufficiency economy appeared designed to assuage concerns that he aimed for a more protectionist economic policy. We note that Surayud is correct that the media has presented a wide range of opinions on the propriety of the September 19 coup, but we believe many members of Thai civil society feel more constrained by martial law and associated restrictions than Surayud and Nit implied. BOYCE