THAILAND: CHINESE REACTION TO THE COUP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 006095

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS, EAP/CM
PACOM FOR FPA HUSO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR MASS TH CH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: CHINESE REACTION TO THE COUP


Classified By: Charge Alexander A. Arvizu. Reason 1.4 (a and d)


1. (C) Summary. Although surprised by the coup, Chinese
Embassy officials in Bangkok are confident that Sino-Thai
relations will continue to thrive under the new Thai
government and see opportunities for expanding influence
while the United States imposes sanctions. Likely Chinese
responses to the coup will include stronger military training
programs and public signals of support from Politburo
members. The Thai media has given wide coverage to Wen
Jiabao's letter to the MFA which states that the "traditional
friendship between China and Thailand dates back to ancient
times" and the two people "are like each other's relatives
with friendly feelings." They are contrasting this response
to our condemnation of the coup. End Summary.

CAUGHT OFF GUARD BUT CONFIDENT OF CONTINUING INFLUENCE


2. (C) Officials at the PRC Embassy in Bangkok were
surprised by the coup. Political Counselor Jiang Yili and
Political Officers Wang Shuai and Zhang Ying confessed that
their reporting to Beijing in the weeks before September 19
had predicted a coup was unlikely. Working through the night
of September 19, Jiang and Wang said that their initial
focus, after reporting on breaking events, was to provide
analysis to Beijing on whether China's close relationship
with deposed PM Thaksin Shinawatra would hurt bilateral
relations. They advised Beijing that China's influence in
Thailand remains strong for a variety of reasons: growing
commercial links, cultural ties, collegial diplomatic
relations, and growing military cooperation programs and
urged Beijing to focus on protecting its interests. Jiang
maintained that the large number of Sino-Thai in business,
the media and the Thai government who want to cultivate good
relations with Beijing would continue to ensure strong
relations. Zhang made special mention of the PRC's
relationship with Princess Sirindhorn, a Mandarin speaker who
frequently visits China, calling her "our special Ambassador
in Thailand."

DAMAGED REPUTATION AND DAMAGE CONTROL


3. (C) The Chinese Embassy's failure to predict the coup
may have damaged the reputation of Ambassador Zhang Jiuhuan,
however. The Guangming Daily reporter in Bangkok, Li Teng
(aka Terry Lee),told PolOff that he had been summoned back
to Beijing on October 7 to brief officials on the coup. When
asked why he, and not the Chinese Ambassador, was briefing
officials, Li explained that Ambassador Zhang and DCM Pan
Guangxue had lost credibility with the Chinese leadership for
failing to predict the coup. Our Thai MFA colleagues tell us
that Zhang is working hard to remedy the situation. They
report that Chinese Embassy sources were chagrined to find
out that the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand had met Prime
Minister Surayud on his first day in office and immediately
asked Government House for an audience. A Thai MFA official
also told us that Surayud initially did not want to meet with
any Ambassadors except ours until he had a Cabinet in place
but was persuaded by key aides to see Ambassador Zhang in the
coming days. If the meeting goes off as planned, Zhang would
be the second Ambassador to meet with Prime Minister Surayud.
We have also heard that a joint meeting of ASEAN envoys
based in Bangkok with Surayud may bin the works soon.

MILITARY OPPORTUNITIES


4. (C) Several times in recent months, PRC Defense Attache
Major General An Zuoshan has told us that the PLA wants to
develop a more open relationship with the Thai armed forces
to include more regular high level military talks, more Thai
students at the PLA Command and General Staff College, a
better international military education and training program,
and subject matter expert exchanges. After the coup, PRC
Army Attache Senior Colonel Li Mingliang told our DATT that
his office looks at U.S. military sanctions as an opportunity
to expand influence. Li confidently expressed hope that his
approach of telling the Thai that "China is your neighbor, we
will be here long-term, we will not interfere in your
internal affairs," will give him a leg up on his American
counterparts.

BANGKOK 00006095 002 OF 002



COMMENT: DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY


5. (C) It appears the PRC diplomatic strategy will take a
similar approach. On September 26, Political Officer Wang
Shuai told PolOff that, although no firm decision had been
made at that time whether China would support the new
Government, his Embassy had urged Beijing to make a quick
show of support if the new Government appeared legitimate.
Wen Jiabao's letter appears to indicate Beijing agreed with
the suggestion. The headline on the front page of the
October 5 Nation newspaper reads "US, CHINA DIFFER ON COUP"
and contrasts our concerns about martial law and respect for
democratic norms with PRC Premier Wen Jiabao's paean of
support.
ARVIZU