CONCERNS OVER DRAFT INTERIM CONSTITUTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 006003 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM MOPS KDEM TH SUBJECT: CONCERNS OVER DRAFT INTERIM CONSTITUTION REF: A. BANGKOK 5973 (SURAYUD TO BE PRIME MINISTER) ¶B. BANGKOK 5929 (THAI OFFICIALS PLEA FOR UNDERSTANDING) Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The Council for Democratic Reform (CDR) has circulated a draft interim constitution with provisions that would allow the military officials in the CDR to retain excessive influence over the civilian administration. The draft constitution has likely evolved since this early draft was circulated, and we are unsure which provisions might appear in the final document. The Ambassador has expressed USG concern to likely interim Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont(ref A) as well as to CDR SecGen Winai Phattiyakul (septel); the NGO community has also voiced its wariness as the CDR's honeymoon period appears to be ending. END SUMMARY. PROVISIONS OF CONCERN -------------- ¶2. (C) On September 27, Embassy contacts provided us with a text that appears to outline certain general principles for the interim constitution. The text was provided to us by a close embassy contact who received it after the CDR shared the draft with four university rectors. We believe it accurately represented the thinking of the interim constitution drafters in recent days. If the soon-to-be-promulgated interim constitution were to mirror the text, certain provisions would enable the CDR's successor organization -- the Council on National Security (CNS) -- to retain considerable influence over the civilian administration: - As already reported, the CNS will appoint the Prime Minister and the members of the National Legislative Council (NLC -- the interim parliament) (Article 7). The CNS will designate the NLC's President and Vice President. (Note: Technically, the King would make the appointment, but the CNS would "countersign" the King's Royal Decree. CNS has already briefed us that they will select the interim legislature (ref b). End Note.) - The CNS Chairman (General Sonthi) has the authority to dismiss the Prime Minister (article 14). Article 34 would allow the CNS to join cabinet meetings, although it is unclear in what capacity. - Articles 36 and 37 would provide that the CDR's orders and announcements (which have been issued piecemeal since the night of the coup) remain in effect and are considered constitutional. As written, this appears to include those that restricted civil liberties. However, since Article 3 of the draft would provide protections for civil liberties, it is unclear exactly how these two articles would be reconciled. - Several civil society advocates who have reviewed the draft text have expressed to us their concern that the draft is unclear with regard to guarantees on fundamental civil liberties and human rights. - The CNS will have a very strong role in choosing the drafters of the new constitution. They will appoint a 2000 member National Assembly "from all walks of life" that will choose 200 of its members for a short list. The CNS, however, will choose 100 of those to draft the constitution, and will appoint the President and Vice President of this Constitution Drafting Council (Articles 19, 22). ¶3. (C) In his September 28 meeting, the Ambassador raised with Privy Councilor Surayud Chulanont -- the most likely figure to be appointed as Prime Minister -- our concerns about the provisions above (reftel). In our conversations with members of the academic and NGO community, it is clear that many of them share our concerns. COMMENT -------------- ¶4. (C) The provisions of the final version of the interim BANGKOK 00006003 002 OF 002 constitution that has gone forward for the king's approval remain unclear. We hope that the CDR will respond to private and public expressions of concern and ensure that the interim civilian administration due to be appointed next week will have authority to run the government, including authority over the military. Thai interlocutors often complained that Thaksin manipulated their institutions so effectively that he became a de facto dictator; we doubt whether those who felt this situation warranted a coup would be happier with a de jure concentration of power in the hands of a small group of military officers. So, we await promulgation of the interim constitution to judge whether initial reaction to the draft has led to improvements in the final version. BOYCE