CONCERNS OVER DRAFT INTERIM CONSTITUTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 006003

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM MOPS KDEM TH
SUBJECT: CONCERNS OVER DRAFT INTERIM CONSTITUTION

REF: A. BANGKOK 5973 (SURAYUD TO BE PRIME MINISTER)


B. BANGKOK 5929 (THAI OFFICIALS PLEA FOR
UNDERSTANDING)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) (d)

SUMMARY
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1. (C) The Council for Democratic Reform (CDR) has circulated
a draft interim constitution with provisions that would allow
the military officials in the CDR to retain excessive
influence over the civilian administration. The draft
constitution has likely evolved since this early draft was
circulated, and we are unsure which provisions might appear
in the final document. The Ambassador has expressed USG
concern to likely interim Prime Minister Surayud
Chulanont(ref A) as well as to CDR SecGen Winai Phattiyakul
(septel); the NGO community has also voiced its wariness as
the CDR's honeymoon period appears to be ending. END SUMMARY.

PROVISIONS OF CONCERN
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2. (C) On September 27, Embassy contacts provided us with a
text that appears to outline certain general principles for
the interim constitution. The text was provided to us by a
close embassy contact who received it after the CDR shared
the draft with four university rectors. We believe it
accurately represented the thinking of the interim
constitution drafters in recent days. If the
soon-to-be-promulgated interim constitution were to mirror
the text, certain provisions would enable the CDR's successor
organization -- the Council on National Security (CNS) -- to
retain considerable influence over the civilian
administration:

- As already reported, the CNS will appoint the Prime
Minister and the members of the National Legislative Council
(NLC -- the interim parliament) (Article 7). The CNS will
designate the NLC's President and Vice President. (Note:
Technically, the King would make the appointment, but the CNS
would "countersign" the King's Royal Decree. CNS has already
briefed us that they will select the interim legislature (ref
b). End Note.)

- The CNS Chairman (General Sonthi) has the authority to
dismiss the Prime Minister (article 14). Article 34 would
allow the CNS to join cabinet meetings, although it is
unclear in what capacity.

- Articles 36 and 37 would provide that the CDR's orders and
announcements (which have been issued piecemeal since the
night of the coup) remain in effect and are considered
constitutional. As written, this appears to include those
that restricted civil liberties. However, since Article 3 of
the draft would provide protections for civil liberties, it
is unclear exactly how these two articles would be
reconciled.

- Several civil society advocates who have reviewed the draft
text have expressed to us their concern that the draft is
unclear with regard to guarantees on fundamental civil
liberties and human rights.

- The CNS will have a very strong role in choosing the
drafters of the new constitution. They will appoint a 2000
member National Assembly "from all walks of life" that will
choose 200 of its members for a short list. The CNS,
however, will choose 100 of those to draft the constitution,
and will appoint the President and Vice President of this
Constitution Drafting Council (Articles 19, 22).


3. (C) In his September 28 meeting, the Ambassador raised
with Privy Councilor Surayud Chulanont -- the most likely
figure to be appointed as Prime Minister -- our concerns
about the provisions above (reftel). In our conversations
with members of the academic and NGO community, it is clear
that many of them share our concerns.

COMMENT
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4. (C) The provisions of the final version of the interim

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constitution that has gone forward for the king's approval
remain unclear. We hope that the CDR will respond to private
and public expressions of concern and ensure that the interim
civilian administration due to be appointed next week will
have authority to run the government, including authority
over the military. Thai interlocutors often complained that
Thaksin manipulated their institutions so effectively that he
became a de facto dictator; we doubt whether those who felt
this situation warranted a coup would be happier with a de
jure concentration of power in the hands of a small group of
military officers. So, we await promulgation of the interim
constitution to judge whether initial reaction to the draft
has led to improvements in the final version.
BOYCE