Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANGKOK5929
2006-09-26 11:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

THAI OFFICIALS PLEA FOR UNDERSTANDING

Tags:  PGOV PHUM TH 
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Debra P Tous 09/27/2006 10:12:46 AM From DB/Inbox: Debra P Tous

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 05929

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DISSEMINATION: POL1
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:BOYCERL
DRAFTED: POL:SUTTONSM
CLEARED: DCM: ARVIZUAA

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RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 6089
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 2140
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RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
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RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 005929 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

TREASURY PASS TO FRB SAN FRANCISCO/TERESA CURRAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM TH
SUBJECT: THAI OFFICIALS PLEA FOR UNDERSTANDING

REF: BANGKOK 05894 (NEW CONSTITUTION DRAFTER BRIEFS
AMBASSADOR)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 005929 SIPDIS SIPDIS TREASURY PASS TO FRB SAN FRANCISCO/TERESA CURRAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM TH SUBJECT: THAI OFFICIALS PLEA FOR UNDERSTANDING REF: BANGKOK 05894 (NEW CONSTITUTION DRAFTER BRIEFS AMBASSADOR) Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The MFA permanent secretary and the ruling military council's Secretary General reassured the diplomatic corps that Thailand would return to democratic rule as soon as possible. The Secretary General personally assured the Ambassador during a pull-aside that a civilian prime minister would be named by Sunday. The Thai side asked for understanding from Thailand's "friends" for the special circumstances here. They laid our a timetable for the return to elected government: -- an interim constitution by Friday -- an interim PM within the promised two week window -- quick establishment of a constitution drafting committee -- "eight months and 15 days" for the drafting and review of the constitution, and its submission in a referendum to the public -- "free and fair elections" within a year from now. ¶2. (C) Summary continued: The ruling military council will transform itself into a Council on National Security once it has transfered power to the interim prime minister and will retain only limited powers, largely in response to continued concerns about the possibility of a counter-coup. The interim civilian government will have an uphill battle to keep to the timetable for the constitution and elections that has been promised. End summary. ¶3. (C) MFA PermSec Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn and NSC Secretary General Winai Phattiyakul (also SecGen of the Council for Democratic Reform under the Constitutional Monarchy - CDRM) called the diplomatic corps for a meeting on 9/25. Krit admitted that the "coups are wrong and undesirable" and recognized that many might see the situation as "black and white." But he hoped that diplomats would recognize that there were gray areas. He pointed out that the "people as a whole seem to have welcomed the military intervention." He also emphasized that the CDRM did not want to hold on to power itself, but would turn over power to an interim civilian government as soon as possible, hopefully within two weeks. Many other governments had already passed judgment on the military intervention; Krit asked that "friends" continue to keep their judgments under review and reconsider them in
the light of new information. Because the transition was peaceful, Thailand hopes to "win back the trust of the international community in our economy and in our deep commitment to democracy." ¶4. (C) Krit pointed out that the CDRM was already restoring some on the mechanisms of normal government. The Election Commission would continue to function, and was "already making progress toward free and fair elections." The National Counter-Corruption Commission was empowered to investigate government corruption issues, along with the Auditor-General. The CDRM had affirmed that the office of the Ombudsman still functioned, and could receive complaints from citizens. The National Human Rights Commission would continue to carry out its mandate. A ROSE IS A ROSE IS... -------------- ¶5. (C) Krit said that the CDRM had learned that the initial rendering of its title (The Council for Democratic Reform under the Constitutional Monarchy) had caused misunderstandings and "wrongly suggested some role for His Majesty in the September 19 intervention." Therefore, the official title would now be simply the Council for Democratic Reform CDR) (reftel) During the Q's and A's, Krit returned to the question of the King's role. He emphasized that the CDR had their audience with the King "after the process of the takeover" to report what had happened. "The King had no foreknowledge" of the coup. "He is above politics. Remember the past year; he has been cautious not to intervene. He turned down requests to appoint a prime minister under Article 7 of the Constitution. That was a clear indication of how the King applies his role as constitutional monarch." He added, "We don't want any misunderstanding about this -- hence, the name change." TIMELINE FOR RETURN TO ELECTED GOVERNMENT -------------- ¶6. (C) General Winai then laid out the timeline for return to democratic government. (Note: his presentation closely mirrored the account we had already received from legal expert Borwornsak Uwanno - reftel). He also emphasized that the CDR did not want to hold on to power. They had a legal advisory group working day and night, and it had completed the draft interim Constitution. That draft was under consideration now; deans of the preeminent law faculties of the country were assisting in the review. The CDR expected to announce an interim Constitution on September 29. Shortly thereafter, it would name an interim civilian Prime Minister and cabinet. (Note: In a pull-aside after the meeting, the Ambassador emphasized to General Winai how important it was for the CDR to hold to its announced timetable and transfer power to a civilian government as soon as possible. Winai assured the Ambassador that the CDR fully intended to do this, and predicted that they would be able to name the new PM by Sunday. end note.) Once the CDR had transfered authority to the civilian PM, it would become the Council on National Security, and it would have limited authority primarily in matters of national security. During the Q's and A's, they were questioned again about the role of this Council. Winai emphasized that the new Council would have a "minimal" mandate to look after national security issues and ensure that there is a free and fair election. Krit added that the Council on National Security was necessary to prevent "counter-coup efforts." ¶7. (U) The CDR would also name two other bodies. First would be a legislative body. This would serve as a Parliament to handle required legislation while the interim government was in power. The CDR would also name approximately 2000 people from all walks of life and all parts of the country, and they would in turn choose 100-200 legal experts who would then draft the new constitution. ¶8. (U) The drafting process would take six months. The government would then take one month to example the draft and consult. It would give the drafting commission 15 days to make corrections to the draft, and would then prepare to hold a referendum. They anticipated this would take one month. According to this timetable, the new constitution would be ready in "eight months and 15 days." After that, "free and fair elections" would be organized, within one year from now. ECONOMIC ISSUES -------------- ¶9. (U) Winai said that there would be minimal economic impact. The new airport would open on schedule this week, and the country's international trade policy would remain unchanged, including regarding free-trade agreements. CIVIL LIBERTIES ISSUES -------------- ¶10. (U) Winai referred to the many questions about the restrictions on civil liberties, especially freedom of assembly. "Thai hold these freedoms dear," he said. He promised that political activities could be resumed when the situation returns to normal, and that press freedom would be restored soon. (During the Q's and A's, Winai also underscored that the CDR had not dissolved any political parties; the parties would be able to participate in the elections next year.) Winai concluded saying that the "trust and confidence of our international partners is necessary for us to return to normalcy." ¶11. (U) During the Q's and A's, Winai took the opportunity to highlight the coup's role in forestalling possible further violence. He refered to a "concrete intelligence report" that some pro-Thaksin forces planned to bring supporters to Bangkok to confront the opposition rally scheduled for September 20. Winai claimed that "violence was imminent" and the decision for military intervention had to be made "to prevent loss of life." It was better to act before a clash than after, he said. ¶12. (U) Most questions focused on civil liberties and the transition to democracy. The Ambassador expressed concern about the four former officials reportedly detained; he asked whether they would charged with any offense, or released. Winai said that the CDR had invited them under its protection. They would not be charged with any offense, and they would be allowed to go free "at an appropriate time." He said that they were not being mistreated, and that their families were allowed to visit. "We need to take measures to keep the situation stable," he said. The Australian ambassador pointed out that the members of the interim legislature and the 2000-member "electoral college" that will chose the constitution drafting committee were all appointed by the CDR, through a process that was inherently not democratic. The UK representative also asked whether these bodies would have representatives from upcountry, or would they have largely Bangkok-based participants? Krit responded that "everything is under discussion" and that the CDR planned to have the widest possible involvement. Another democratic element would be introduced when the draft constitution was submitted to a referendum. "The points you make are at the forefront of the minds of those deciding," Krit said. COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) The CDR appears to on track for keeping its first big commitment, setting up the interim constitution and transferring power to the interim PM. We will continue to emphasize the importance of keeping to this timetable. We were struck by a couple of points in the presentation. One is that some of the CDR decisions are clearly driven by concerns of a possible counter-coup. This will make the transition back to full respect for civil liberties more difficult. Second is the angst over how to portray the King's role. On the one hand, the CDR wants the legitimacy that comes from the perception that the King has accepted, if not approved, the coupmakers' actions. At the same time, they do not want to be accused of causing damage to the King's reputation by having exposed him to international criticism. (The reference to the King as "an idiot" by a reporter asking questions at the State Department briefing has already excited great concern at the MFA. there is also lingering concern about the book "The King Never Smiles" which, though banned in Thailand, is on the minds of some.) We were also struck by the military precision of the timetable Gen. Winai laid out: precisely eight months and 15 days until the new constitution. The CDR is handing the interim government a very tough timetable. Getting Thailand's fractious civil society to go along with the CDR's precise timetable, while allowing a return to normal civil liberties, will be a difficult trick. BOYCE

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