THE MONARCHY'S ROLE IN THAILAND'S SEPTEMBER 19 COUP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 005836 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM MOPS ASEC TH SUBJECT: THE MONARCHY'S ROLE IN THAILAND'S SEPTEMBER 19 COUP REF: BANGKOK 5812 (WHO'S IN CHARGE?) Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) It remains unclear whether Thailand's King encouraged or provided approval in advance for the September 19 coup d'etat by the Council for Democratic Reform Under the Monarchy (CDRM). However, the CDRM is publicly linked to the monarchy to a greater extent than previous coup plotters, and the CDRM's September 19 royal audience sent a clear public signal of Palace endorsement. Palace endorsement likely contributed to public support for the coup, although polls by two prominent institutions provide divergent accounts of the coup's popularity. The ill health of the King might have influenced the timing of the coup. End Summary. ROYAL AUDIENCE KEY TO COUP SUCCESS, ACCEPTABILITY -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) On the night of September 19, soon after the CDRM seized control of the media, word spread that CDRM leaders would have an audience with King Bhumibol Adulyadej. The audience took place at Chittralada Villa from 12:19 a.m. until 1:24 a.m. the same night, according to an Embassy contact at the Palace. The willingness of the King to receive the CDRM representatives so quickly sent a clear public signal of royal endorsement of the coup. And by including Supreme Commander Ruangroj, previously thought to be firmly in Thaksin's camp, the audience displayed the military's unity and loyalty to the King -- to the point of deflating Thaksin's hopes that he could prevail against the rebellious soldiers (reftel). ¶3. (C) The CDRM's public claims that it acted to maintain peace and order, and to protect the King against acts of lese majeste, were not unexpected or atypical. The CDRM's inclusion of reference to the monarchy in the coup-plotters' group name, however, appears unprecedented in Thai history. (A literal translation of the Thai version is: "Council for Reforming Governance in the Democratic System having His Majesty the King as Head of State.") Also unprecedented is an alleged Royal Command, published online by the Prime Minister's Office, in which the King "appoints General Sonthi as leader of the (CDRM),and demands... all government officials follow the orders of General Sonthi." (Full text of the alleged Royal Command provided septel.) Embassy contacts at the Palace tell us they have not seen a copy of the signed Royal Command, however. ¶4. (C) Given the widespread public understanding, especially in Bangkok, that Thaksin was increasingly engaged in confrontation with members of the Privy Council (if not with the King himself),most Thais view the CDRM as acting on behalf of the King's interests. Almost universal Thai reverence for the King has likely contributed significantly to popular acceptance of the coup. ¶5. (C) The King is in ill health and has not been seen in public since his August 4 departure from a Bangkok hospital. However, we hear that the CDRM has requested the release of photographs and video footage of the royal audience with the CDRM. Our contacts told us that the King's Secretary will likely release the photographs, but is unlikely to release the video footage. Release of images from the audience would convey further signals of royal endorsement. KING'S HEALTH INFLUENCING COUP TIMING? -------------- ¶6. (C) Given the King's ill health, we do not dismiss the possibility that the coup's timing was determined in part not only by Thaksin's travel abroad, but also by a desire by CDRM figures to make their move while they could still obtain the support of the King. (Not only does the King's imprimatur carry much more weight than the Crown Prince's would, but a coup mounted during any period of mourning would be seen as a deep affront to Thai sensibilities, no matter how unpopular the government. Similarly, whatever constitutional reform efforts begin under the CDRM will likely be suspended for a lengthy period in the event of the King's demise.) COMMENT -------------- BANGKOK 00005836 002 OF 002 ¶7. (C) The now-terminated 1997 Constitution provided no basis for military intervention in politics. The monarchy appears to be the sole institution capable of legitimizing the September 19 coup in the eyes of the Thai people. By its actions to date, the Palace seems to be playing that role. The King's imprimatur -- combined with widespread hatred of Thaksin in elite circles -- appears to have provided a certain amount of breathing room for the CDRM. BOYCE