Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANGKOK5832
2006-09-21 11:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:
FORMER PREMIER ANAND: COUP FORESTALLED VIOLENCE
VZCZCXRO5725 OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM DE RUEHBK #5832/01 2641104 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 211104Z SEP 06 FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1804 INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS IMMEDIATE RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 6075 RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 1518 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 005832
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM MOPS ASEC TH
SUBJECT: FORMER PREMIER ANAND: COUP FORESTALLED VIOLENCE
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (d).
SUMMARY
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 005832
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM MOPS ASEC TH
SUBJECT: FORMER PREMIER ANAND: COUP FORESTALLED VIOLENCE
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (d).
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) The September 19 coup d'etat forestalled an imminent
violent confrontation between enemies and loyalists of former
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, according to former Prime
Minister Anand Panyarachun. In a September 21 meeting with
the Ambassador, Anand related that Thaksin had already
steered Thailand away from democratic governance and deprived
the people of mechanisms to remove him from office
peacefully. Anand regretted the manner in which the Council
for Democratic Reform under the Monarchy (CDRM) abolished the
1997 Constitution, but he observed that Thailand could
benefit from constitutional reforms, especially the creation
of a new type of Senate. He recommended the USG press for
the dissolution of the CDRM after the installation of a
civilian Prime Minister. Anand also expressed cautious
optimism that conditions in southern Thailand might improve.
End Summmary.
FACTORS LEADING UP TO THE COUP
--------------
2. (C) In a September 21 meeting with the Ambassador, Anand
Panyarachun, who twice served as appointed Prime Minister in
the early 1990's, claimed the September 19 coup d'etat
forestalled imminent political violence between Thaksin's
enemies and loyalists. (Note: The People's Alliance for
Democracy, which earlier this year organized large
anti-Thaksin demonstrations, had called for a major rally on
September 20 to persuade Thaksin to resign. Thaksin's allies
publicly condemned the plan and rumors arose of an impending
crackdown on protesters by security forces. End Note.)
3. (C) Anand said he could not have advocated a coup, but it
was important to recognize that Thaksin's administration had
already become undemocratic. Thaksin had controlled the
media, suppressed the free flow of information, and
manipulated an uninformed electorate. He had corrupted the
judiciary, to the point that court cases against him could
not proceed. He had sabotaged the Constitution, manipulating
political institutions that were supposed to be independent,
destroying the system of checks and balances set up by the
1997 Constitution. Thaksin's administration lacked
accountability and transparency. In this environment,
elections by themselves hardly ensured democracy. Thaksin
blocked off all avenues for political change, leaving his
opponents no option other than a coup.
4. (C) Thaksin further aggravated the Thai people by
appearing to put himself on the same level as the King.
Anand stopped short of characterizing Thaksin as disloyal to
the King, but he said Thaksin failed to understand how many
people came to perceive him as hostile to the monarchy.
Thaksin had brought trouble upon himself by picking fights
with Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda, Anand noted.
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
--------------
5. (C) The Ambassador asked Anand's views on constitutional
reform. (Note: Anand chaired the drafting committee for the
1997 Constitution. End Note.) Anand expressed regret that
the CDRM had abolished the Constitution rather than simply
suspending it, but he hoped the CDRM or its successor
civilian government would still use the 1997 document as a
starting point. Anand acknowledged problems in the 1997
Constitution, and he advocated abolishing the Senate as a
non-partisan elected body. (The current Senate, although
elected by the people, became highly partisan, contrary to
the intention embodied in the Constitution.) A better
alternative would be a House of Lords model, with the Senate
consisting perhaps at least in part of former high-ranking
officials, appointed in a transparent, systematic process.
Anand also noted one could not hope to abolish money politics
completely, but it would be important to ensure checks and
balances more effective than those provided by the 1997
Constitution.
6. (C) Citing his own experience as a Prime Minister
appointed by the National Peace Keeping Council (NPKC -- the
junta which overthrew Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan in
1991),Anand lamented that the NPKC had continued to exercise
power behind the scenes during his first administration.
Now, he took note of CDRM leader General Sonthi
BANGKOK 00005832 002 OF 002
Boonyaratglin's pledge to appoint a civilian government
within two weeks. Anand urged the USG to press Sonthi to
follow through on this commitment.
CONDITIONS IN THE SOUTH
--------------
7. (C) The Ambassador asked whether Anand felt conditions in
southern Thailand might improve now that Thaksin was out of
the scene. (Note: Many contacts considered restoring order
to southern Thailand difficult if not impossible so long as
Thaksin remained as Prime Minister. End Note.) Anand, who
served as Chairman of the National Reconciliation Commission,
expressed cautious optimism, saying he liked how Sonthi
viewed situation in the South. A good first step would be
the release of some 59 people still detained in connection
with a clash between security forces and Muslim protesters at
Tak Bai in October 2004, Anand suggested.
COMMENT
--------------
8. (C) As one of Thailand's most distinguished elder
statesmen, Anand made waves in August when he publicly
denounced Thailand's course under Thaksin. Anand presented
himself as lacking foreknowledge of the September 19 coup but
feeling generally sympathetic to the CDRM and understanding
of its motives. Given Anand's experience as a Prime Minister
who was appointed by a coup-instigating junta and then worked
to restore democracy to Thailand, the ease with which he
accepts the CDRM's claim of noble intentions is noteworthy.
Interesting and not surprising was Anand's disparaging
reference to Thaksin's manipulation of the "uninformed"
electorate. This elitist point of view -- shared by many
wealthy and educated Thais, especially in Bangkok -- gets to
the heart of Thaksin's claim about revolutionizing Thai
politics, precisely by taking on these entrenched elites.
BOYCE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM MOPS ASEC TH
SUBJECT: FORMER PREMIER ANAND: COUP FORESTALLED VIOLENCE
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (d).
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) The September 19 coup d'etat forestalled an imminent
violent confrontation between enemies and loyalists of former
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, according to former Prime
Minister Anand Panyarachun. In a September 21 meeting with
the Ambassador, Anand related that Thaksin had already
steered Thailand away from democratic governance and deprived
the people of mechanisms to remove him from office
peacefully. Anand regretted the manner in which the Council
for Democratic Reform under the Monarchy (CDRM) abolished the
1997 Constitution, but he observed that Thailand could
benefit from constitutional reforms, especially the creation
of a new type of Senate. He recommended the USG press for
the dissolution of the CDRM after the installation of a
civilian Prime Minister. Anand also expressed cautious
optimism that conditions in southern Thailand might improve.
End Summmary.
FACTORS LEADING UP TO THE COUP
--------------
2. (C) In a September 21 meeting with the Ambassador, Anand
Panyarachun, who twice served as appointed Prime Minister in
the early 1990's, claimed the September 19 coup d'etat
forestalled imminent political violence between Thaksin's
enemies and loyalists. (Note: The People's Alliance for
Democracy, which earlier this year organized large
anti-Thaksin demonstrations, had called for a major rally on
September 20 to persuade Thaksin to resign. Thaksin's allies
publicly condemned the plan and rumors arose of an impending
crackdown on protesters by security forces. End Note.)
3. (C) Anand said he could not have advocated a coup, but it
was important to recognize that Thaksin's administration had
already become undemocratic. Thaksin had controlled the
media, suppressed the free flow of information, and
manipulated an uninformed electorate. He had corrupted the
judiciary, to the point that court cases against him could
not proceed. He had sabotaged the Constitution, manipulating
political institutions that were supposed to be independent,
destroying the system of checks and balances set up by the
1997 Constitution. Thaksin's administration lacked
accountability and transparency. In this environment,
elections by themselves hardly ensured democracy. Thaksin
blocked off all avenues for political change, leaving his
opponents no option other than a coup.
4. (C) Thaksin further aggravated the Thai people by
appearing to put himself on the same level as the King.
Anand stopped short of characterizing Thaksin as disloyal to
the King, but he said Thaksin failed to understand how many
people came to perceive him as hostile to the monarchy.
Thaksin had brought trouble upon himself by picking fights
with Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda, Anand noted.
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
--------------
5. (C) The Ambassador asked Anand's views on constitutional
reform. (Note: Anand chaired the drafting committee for the
1997 Constitution. End Note.) Anand expressed regret that
the CDRM had abolished the Constitution rather than simply
suspending it, but he hoped the CDRM or its successor
civilian government would still use the 1997 document as a
starting point. Anand acknowledged problems in the 1997
Constitution, and he advocated abolishing the Senate as a
non-partisan elected body. (The current Senate, although
elected by the people, became highly partisan, contrary to
the intention embodied in the Constitution.) A better
alternative would be a House of Lords model, with the Senate
consisting perhaps at least in part of former high-ranking
officials, appointed in a transparent, systematic process.
Anand also noted one could not hope to abolish money politics
completely, but it would be important to ensure checks and
balances more effective than those provided by the 1997
Constitution.
6. (C) Citing his own experience as a Prime Minister
appointed by the National Peace Keeping Council (NPKC -- the
junta which overthrew Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan in
1991),Anand lamented that the NPKC had continued to exercise
power behind the scenes during his first administration.
Now, he took note of CDRM leader General Sonthi
BANGKOK 00005832 002 OF 002
Boonyaratglin's pledge to appoint a civilian government
within two weeks. Anand urged the USG to press Sonthi to
follow through on this commitment.
CONDITIONS IN THE SOUTH
--------------
7. (C) The Ambassador asked whether Anand felt conditions in
southern Thailand might improve now that Thaksin was out of
the scene. (Note: Many contacts considered restoring order
to southern Thailand difficult if not impossible so long as
Thaksin remained as Prime Minister. End Note.) Anand, who
served as Chairman of the National Reconciliation Commission,
expressed cautious optimism, saying he liked how Sonthi
viewed situation in the South. A good first step would be
the release of some 59 people still detained in connection
with a clash between security forces and Muslim protesters at
Tak Bai in October 2004, Anand suggested.
COMMENT
--------------
8. (C) As one of Thailand's most distinguished elder
statesmen, Anand made waves in August when he publicly
denounced Thailand's course under Thaksin. Anand presented
himself as lacking foreknowledge of the September 19 coup but
feeling generally sympathetic to the CDRM and understanding
of its motives. Given Anand's experience as a Prime Minister
who was appointed by a coup-instigating junta and then worked
to restore democracy to Thailand, the ease with which he
accepts the CDRM's claim of noble intentions is noteworthy.
Interesting and not surprising was Anand's disparaging
reference to Thaksin's manipulation of the "uninformed"
electorate. This elitist point of view -- shared by many
wealthy and educated Thais, especially in Bangkok -- gets to
the heart of Thaksin's claim about revolutionizing Thai
politics, precisely by taking on these entrenched elites.
BOYCE