Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANGKOK5567
2006-09-11 09:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

THAI DEPUTY PM OPTIMISTIC ABOUT UPCOMING ELECTION

Tags:  PGOV MOPS ASEC TH 
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INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 6054
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 1513
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 005567 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV MOPS ASEC TH
SUBJECT: THAI DEPUTY PM OPTIMISTIC ABOUT UPCOMING ELECTION

REF: A. BANGKOK 5466 (PANSAK ON POLITICS)


B. BANGKOK 5463 (BORWORNSAK ON POLITICS)

C. BANGKOK 5423 (SURAYUD ON POLITICS)

D. BANGKOK 5411 (CINC SONTHI ON POLITICS)

E. BANGKOK 5255 (SURANAND ON POLITICS)

F. BANGKOK 5204 (CAR BOMB)

Classified By: DCM Alex Arvizu, reason: 1.4 (d).

SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 005567 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2016 TAGS: PGOV MOPS ASEC TH SUBJECT: THAI DEPUTY PM OPTIMISTIC ABOUT UPCOMING ELECTION REF: A. BANGKOK 5466 (PANSAK ON POLITICS) ¶B. BANGKOK 5463 (BORWORNSAK ON POLITICS) ¶C. BANGKOK 5423 (SURAYUD ON POLITICS) ¶D. BANGKOK 5411 (CINC SONTHI ON POLITICS) ¶E. BANGKOK 5255 (SURANAND ON POLITICS) ¶F. BANGKOK 5204 (CAR BOMB) Classified By: DCM Alex Arvizu, reason: 1.4 (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Deputy Prime Minister Suwat Liptapanlop predicted PM Thaksin Shinawatra's Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party would win a majority of the vote in the upcoming legislative election, and participation of opposition parties would diminish the enthusiasm for street demonstrations. In a September 11 lunch with the Ambassador, Suwat said TRT would be better off if it fell short of its historic February 2005 377-seat total, so that the party would not appear totally dominant. Until the election, likely to take place in November, Thaksin would remain silent on whether he would withdraw from politics. Suwat downplayed the impact of factionalism in TRT. He also suggested several areas of focus for reforming Thai politics. End Summary. TRT TO TRIUMPH IN ELECTION -------------- ¶2. (C) Discussing the upcoming election over lunch with the Ambassador, Deputy Prime Minister Suwat Liptapanlop predicted with confidence that TRT would win a majority of the seats in the House of Representatives. However, TRT officials hoped not to do as well as in February 2005, when the party won 377 of the 500 seats in the House of Representatives; such a victory would raise criticism of TRT's dominance of the political landscape, and Thaksin's critics would again characterize his government as dictatorial. It would be better for TRT to win slightly more than 300 seats, Suwat said. ¶3. (C) Suwat claimed TRT's strength in the election reflected Thaksin's continuing popularity with the masses. Only around 10 percent of the population hated Thaksin, while around 40 percent of Thais loved him. The remaining 50 percent of the population comprised a relatively neutral portion of the electorate, although later in the conversation Suwat estimated that Thaksin currently had the support of a silent majority of around 70 percent. Stating with assurance that the recent alleged car bomb discovered near Thaksin's residence (ref F) represented a genuine assassination &
#x000A;attempt, Suwat noted this confirmed TRT's popularity, as the Prime Minister's opponents would not have to resort to such efforts if Thaksin was politically vulnerable. ¶4. (C) Based on the Senate's recent selection of five Election Commission members (septel),Suwat predicted the legislative election would take place in November. Because opposition parties would participate in the polling, Thailand's political energies would focus on the campaign and then on the ensuing political reform efforts and parliamentary wrangling -- not on street protests of the People's Alliance for Democracy, which Suwat believed was losing steam. ¶5. (C) Suwat noted the next House of Representatives would be short-lived, since there was a political consensus to undertake constitutional reforms, which would presumably be followed by dissolution of the House. Suwat briefly identified several priority areas: - Reviewing the Constitution's stipulated qualifications for legislative candidates (among the most controversial is the requirement that candidates hold no less than a bachelor's degree); - Revising the procedures for the conduct of a no-confidence debate on the Prime Minister; - Amending the restriction that requires legislative candidates to be members of their political parties 90 days prior to election day (this provision has been widely criticized for tying the hands of potential defectors); - Imposing term limits for the Prime Minister (limits currently exist for Senators and members of independent bodies, but not for cabinet members or members of the House BANGKOK 00005567 002 OF 002 of Representatives); and - Revising the nature of the Senate, currently an ostensibly non-partisan, fully elected body. THAKSIN TO DECIDE AFTER THE POLLS -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador pressed Suwat on whether Thaksin would withdraw from politics. Suwat remarked he found it difficult to address the matter; it would be better to go step by step, and the next step would be the election. TRT should focus on its performance at the polls, and after that, Thaksin would have a choice on how to proceed. However, Suwat hinted that Thaksin retained a strong interest in the premiership -- if he did not want it, why put up with all the current hassles, Suwat asked rhetorically. TRT FACTIONALISM OVERSTATED -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador asked Suwat's analysis of internal factionalism in TRT. Suwat dismissed the issue as relatively unimportant. Although TRT officials acknowledged factionalism, to some extent this represented delegation of responsibility; Suwat himself had to manage a group of around 20 key figures. Nevertheless, one should not believe the existence of power centers within the party imperiled Thaksin's leadership position. Thaksin knew well how to exercise power; he could command TRT to follow his bidding, and everyone would obey. No other TRT figure could rival Thaksin, who had charisma, power, and (especially) money. ¶8. (C) Comparing Thaksin to past Thai leaders, Suwat noted admiringly that Thaksin combined the statesmanship of Anand Panyarachun, the power of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, and the gangster-like scrappiness of General Chatichai Choonhavan. That being the case, the Ambassador asked, could Suwat explain how Thaksin wound up in his present predicament? Suwat noted it was difficult to figure out the answer; perhaps it was just a matter of fate. PRIVY COUNCIL RELATIONS WITH THE MILITARY -------------- ¶9. (C) The Ambassador asked Suwat to describe the role of the Privy Council in the current crisis. Suwat declined to discuss the activities of any specific Privy Councilors; he simply noted that the Council had a good relationship with the Army, and the Army would not dare to work against the interests of the Council. COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) Suwat's confidence in TRT's performance in the coming election was predictable but not necessarily misguided. Even Democrat Party contacts acknowledge that TRT will come out on top when voters go to the polls. The key question remains: what will Thaksin choose to do once he has his majority in the new parliament? Our high-level contacts vary in their predictions and preferences (refs A-E, and septel),but the consensus view as of today seems to be that Thaksin has a relatively free hand to make the decision himself; that he has not yet committed irrevocably -- and certainly not publicly -- to any course of action; and that the election results will likely have a significant impact on his ultimate decision. BOYCE

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