Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANGKOK5500
2006-09-07 09:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

THAKSIN DEPUTY REVEALS LITTLE OF TRT PLANS

Tags:  PGOV PHUM TH 
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O 070959Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1462
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHFJSCC/COMMARFORPAC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 005500 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM TH
SUBJECT: THAKSIN DEPUTY REVEALS LITTLE OF TRT PLANS

REF: A. BANGKOK 5463 [EX-CABINET SECRETARY ASSESSES
THAKSIN'S POSITION]

B. BANGKOK 5335 [ALLEGED BOMB PLOT]

C. BANGKOK 4610 [MORE ON MILITARY RESHUFFLE]

D. BANGKOK 1091 [CHALLENGE TO THAKSIN]

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 005500 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM TH SUBJECT: THAKSIN DEPUTY REVEALS LITTLE OF TRT PLANS REF: A. BANGKOK 5463 [EX-CABINET SECRETARY ASSESSES THAKSIN'S POSITION] ¶B. BANGKOK 5335 [ALLEGED BOMB PLOT] ¶C. BANGKOK 4610 [MORE ON MILITARY RESHUFFLE] ¶D. BANGKOK 1091 [CHALLENGE TO THAKSIN] Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a September 5 meeting with the Ambassador, Thai Rak Thai's Pongthep Thepkanchana gave a fairly standard version of the TRT view of the political situation. He insisted that the car bomb was real, that PM's conflict was with the Privy Council, and not with the King, and that Thaksin would decide whether to step aside based on the good of the country. Pongthep was unimpressive, but he is, according to many contacts, one of Thaksin's leading choices for PM if Thaksin has to step down. The PM reportedly doesn't want anyone too good, who might eclipse him. Pongthep should fit the bill. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Ambassador met September 5 with Pongthep Thepkanchana, Deputy Thai Rak Thai (TRT) leader and potential replacement Prime Minister if Thaksin steps aside. The Ambassador sought Pongthep's views on the origins and possible cures of the Thai political crisis, which has dragged on for the better part of a year. Pongthep predicted that things would settle down and get back to normal after the election. He did not foresee any problems with putting in place the new election commission soon, and setting a new election date. probably in November. STANDARD TRT SPIEL -------------- ¶3. (C) Turning to the origins of the conflict, Pongthep gave a fairly standard TRT-style review of the issues. He pointed to TRT's landslide victory in February 2005 as a problem. People looked at the PM and saw someone who "had it all:" money, education, connections and political power. He is a visionary and, especially after the landslide, extremely self-confident. "Higher echelons" of Thai society did not like this type of elected leader. Academics turned against him. There followed a series of accusations against the PM. Some, perhaps, had some foundation, but others were baseless. Pongthep singled out opposition firebrand Sondhi Limthongkul, motivated by a personal grudge against Thaksin, as a key opponent. He said that Sondhi used his "illegal community radio station" and his "illegal, illegitimate cable TV station" to s
pread untrue accusations. (Note: Sondhi's small cable station, ASTV, is repeatedly cited by contacts of all persuasions as one of the most important tools the opposition has. They claim that ASTV makes a huge impact as it moves into new markets, even though it is not available in most homes. Like most independent media, its legal status is somewhat unclear due to the government's failure to establish clear procedures for the licensing of independent outlets. End note.) ¶4. (C) Ponthep gave a similarly familiar explanation of the April 2006 election and the opposition party boycott, although with a twist. He dismissed all other considerations, saying that the opposition parties only boycotted because they knew they'd lose. He then launched into a cryptic and, in the end, incomprehensible response to the Ambassador's question about why Thaksin decided to dissolve the Parliament in February. He agreed with the Ambassador that it was a strange move for the PM to give up his 375 seat dominance of the House and plunge into new elections. Pressed to give a reason, he alluded to some unspecified pressure that forced the PM to that action. Pongthep said that even he had not known beforehand that the PM would dissolve the House. The Ambassador noted that Thaksin had talked to him about it several days before he announced his decision (ref C),indicating that he was ready to dissolve Parliament. Pongthep expressed surprise, but still would not clarify what dark force he thought has forced Thaksin's hand. Pongthep admitted that the decisions Thaksin made at that time -- such as the way the Shin Corp sale was handled, and the dissolution -- could have been better. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador asked about the ever-more-public conflict between Thaksin and the Privy Council, particularly Prem Tinsulanond. Pongthep emphasized that "there is no misunderstanding" between the royal family and Thaksin. The issues are with the Privy Council, which is used to having a lot of authority. In the past, for example, Prem could have influence over the military promotions of his proteges. He BANGKOK 00005500 002 OF 002 doesn't want to lose that. Similarly, the Army Commander in Chief wants to promote his own aides (ref C). However, Pongthep added that he did not anticipate military intervention. Even if the military launched a coup, they would not be able to form a military government -- those days were past. So, they would be taking a significant risk for no real benefit. Pongthep said he did not fear "big violence" as there were no large groups facing each other in this conflict. He was concerned about smaller incidents of violence, as tensions remained high. IT WAS BOMB. REALLY. -------------- ¶6. (C) Pongthep stood by the government story that the August 24 car bomb was for real (ref B). He said that the plotters were in the military, but it was not a plot by the military. (Comment: we take this to mean that he is exculpating the military leadership. end comment.) His version of the events surrounding the bomb differs from other accounts in one respect: he claims that the assassin had sent the signal for the bomb to explode, but he was standing behind a pillar, which blocked the signal, so the bomb didn't go off. (Comment: this story gets more dramatic with each retelling. End comment.) The Ambassador noted his concern, as a friend of Thailand, over the political tensions. He asked what the Prime Minister's plans were about remaining prime minister. Pongthep said that Thaksin would decide what to do based on the "best interests of the country." COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) Pongthep did not impress. He replayed familiar themes of persecution by the old guard, jealous of the PM's success. He was disingenuous about a number of issues, including the relationship between Thaksin and the King. His mysterious allusions regarding the decision to dissolve Parliament were just plain annoying. Contacts point out how TRT is being weakened, as more respected figures are pushed to the margins and the "hawks" keep Thaksin's ear. Pongthep took over as the leading legal advisor to the PM after the resignation of the widely respected jurist Bowornsak Uwanno (ref A),and many sources say he is the leading contender for next Prime Minister if Thaksin decides to take a break and is able to chose his own successor. Part of the PM's calculation appears to be that he doesn't want anyone too good, who might eclipse him; Pongthep should fit the bill. BOYCE

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