AMBASSADOR'S SEPTEMBER 1 MEETING WITH PRIVY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 005423 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM MOPS TH SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S SEPTEMBER 1 MEETING WITH PRIVY COUNCILOR SURAYUD CHULANONT REF: A. BANGKOK 5411 (ARMY CINC) ¶B. BANGKOK 5349 (BOMBS IN YALA) ¶C. BANGKOK 5335 (MILITARY ON DEFENSIVE) ¶D. BANGKOK 5204 (CAR BOMB DISCOVERED) ¶E. BANGKOK 4610 (MORE ON RESHUFFLE) Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Privy Council member Surayud Chulanont envisions Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra might be forced to withdraw from political life through a relatively poor performance by his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party in elections likely to take place in coming months. In a September 1 four-eyes meeting with the Ambassador, Surayud observed that TRT had serious factional problems and seemed to have less money available than in prior elections. Nevertheless, if TRT were to win a solid majority, Thaksin might intend to return as Prime Minister when forming the next government, Surayud said. Often named as a potential successor to Thaksin, Surayud said he was trying to maintain a low profile. Surayud dismissed the possibility of a coup; he did not mention the most recent bombings in southern Thailand. He expressed ambivalence about whether the recent car bomb incident presented as an attempt to kill Thaksin was genuine or a hoax. End Summary. A SCENARIO FOR THAKSIN'S EXIT FROM POLITICS -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador called on Privy Councilor Surayud Chulanont at his residence on September 1. Surayud appeared confident that the King would be able to appoint a new Election Commission (EC) in the coming weeks, upon conclusion of Senate processes, and the legislative election could take place in a few months -- if not in October then soon after the King's birthday, in December. Surayud indicated no serious concern about the EC's ability to run a credible and legitimate election. ¶3. (C) Surayud noted several indications that TRT might not perform as well in the coming election as previously: - TRT appeared to be "hollowing out"; in addition to the discontent on the part of dovish figures within the party, Surayud cited deteriorating support from Deputy Prime Minister Suwat Liptapanlop, whom Surayut claimed could influence ten million votes, principally in the northeast, which is seen as a TRT stronghold. - TRT appeared to have less money available to deploy for the coming election. While Thaksin remains extraordinarily wealthy, Surayud observed that Thaksin was "stingy" and preferred to spend others' money in elections -- but now, there were fewer eager donors for TRT. - Rival parties would do better than in previous elections. The Democrat Party, although facing a funding crunch, would perform well in Bangkok and southern Thailand, while the Chart Thai party of former Prime Minister Banharn Silapa-Archa would improve its showing in central Thailand, Surayud believed. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador noted that Thaksin might find his opponents' attacks against him would diminish if he were to withdraw from politics. Surayud agreed but characterized Thaksin as paranoid and unwilling to believe he would face less pressure and less of a threat to his assets. Surayud believed Thaksin's intention was to win as many votes as possible in the coming election, claim a mandate, and return as Prime Minister. However, Surayud believed TRT might underperform its prior showing (the party won around 60 percent of the vote in April's annulled election),raising doubt about Thaksin's ability to claim a mandate. PALACE DISCOURAGES COUP, CONSIDERS IT UNLIKELY -------------- - ¶5. (C) The Ambassador noted Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda's July 14 speech to cadets at the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy, in which Prem had made remarks widely interpreted as critical of Thaksin. Surayud said Prem intended to boost the morale of the military and send a signal to Thaksin; he added that Prem, despite rumors to the contrary, opposed the idea of a coup and had made this clear BANGKOK 00005423 002 OF 002 to Surayud and also to Army Commander General Sonthi Boonyaratglin. Surayud told the Ambassador he considered Sonthi as a solid professional and an unemotional person -- not the type to carry out a coup. When the Ambassador remarked that, given Thai history, it might be unwise to think a coup would be impossible, Surayud simply laughed in response. The Ambassador observed that conventional wisdom held that Prem, Surayud, and Privy Councilor Palakorn Suwanrath represented Thaksin's key foes, Surayud simply replied, "That's how he (Thaksin) sees it." ¶6. (C) The Ambassador raised the upcoming reshuffle of top military officers. Surayud believed that ongoing machinations within the military (ref C) reflected the efforts of Thaksin loyalists from the Prime Minister's class in the pre-cadet Academy (Class 10) to secure maximum advantage before Thaksin might be further weakened. These officers were eager to move into key positions, but Surayud believed they were not yet capable of holding them. He specifically cited the case of General Pornchai Kranlert, Thaksin's likely choice to replace Sonthi in 2007 -- Surayud described him as unintelligent. (Note: We hear Pornchai hoped for promotion to the position of Deputy Army Commander. End Note.) ¶7. (C) Recalling a prior conversation with Thaksin, the Ambassador asked Surayud's opinion of the Prime Minister's claim that he had sought to place Class 10 loyalists in key military positions not so that they could keep him in power through extra-constitutional efforts, but simply so they could block such efforts by others. Surayud noted this strategy would be consistent with Thaksin's style. CAR BOMB -------------- ¶8. (C) When the Ambassador raised the recent discovery of an alleged car bomb near Thaksin's residence (ref D),Surayud remarked that he was unsure whether this represented a genuine plot against Thaksin, rating the odds as "50-50" but noting that a majority of people seemed to consider it a hoax. KEEPING A LOW PROFILE -------------- ¶9. (C) Surayud mentioned at the close of the meeting that he was maintaining a low profile, given the common perception of animosity between himself and Thaksin, and speculation he might replace Thaksin if the political crisis were to require that the King appoint a new Prime Minister not from the parliament. Surayud mentioned that, after Prem's July 14 speech, he (Surayud) had deferred an invitation to speak to military cadets. COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) We were struck by Surayud's seeming optimism that Thaksin might be gently forced from office in the event of a below-expectations performance by TRT in upcoming elections, caused by factionalism within TRT, a stronger showing by rival parties, and reduced funding for campaign activities. We also noted that, despite the August 31 bombings in Yala (ref B),Surayud had nothing to say about the South. Like Army Commander Sonthi (ref A) -- and everyone else in town -- he is focused on the political drama in Bangkok, not the threats far away in the South. BOYCE